How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Cognitive illusions have been linked to perceptual illusions, suggesting that they are “inevitable illusions”. This chapter criticizes the narrow norms that make humans look irrational and shows how to make inevitable illusions “evitable”. These so-called cognitive illusions largely disappear when one pays attention to conceptual distinctions. Cognitive illusions largely disappear due to the following: polysemy — not all probabilities are mathematical probabilities; a mathematical probability refers to a reference class, which may differ depending on the task; and natural frequencies facilitate Bayesian reasoning.
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Cites
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Cited by
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Extending the Bounds of Rationality: Evidence and Theories of Preferential Choice
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gigerenzer, G.
- Venue
- Adaptive Thinking
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2002-03-28
- Pages
- 241-266
- OpenAlex
- W2493323595
- Cited by
- 85
- References
- 49
- FWCI
- 5.42
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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