Resolving the Debate on Innate Ideas: Learnability Constraints and the Evolved Interpenetration of Motivational and Conceptual Functions
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 106 of the 106 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This chapter addresses the question of why many cognitive and behavioural scientists still fail to recognize the truth of nativism despite the power of poverty of stimulus arguments. It argues that this is primarily because the domains in which these arguments have hitherto been applied, for example, language or naive physics, are all ones in which the knowledge that children acquire is objectively present in their environment. Thus, the possibility always remains open that children could somehow be acquiring this knowledge from the environment through general learning. In the case of motivation, however, this last bastion of resistance is unavailable, since desires do not serve to represent information that is already present in the environment. The closest thing to a knockdown argument for nativism can therefore be developed in respect of innate motivational systems.
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Cites
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Cited by
Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate.
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Self-citationConceptual Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2015) · The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology · doi:10.1002/9780470939376.ch1 · Cited by 658
Self-citationThe evolutionary genetics of personality
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Evolutionary Psychology: New Perspectives on Cognition and Motivation
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2013) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.121208.131628 · Cited by 453
Self-citationGroups in Mind: The Coalitional Roots of War and Morality
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Metadata
- Authors
- Tooby, J., & Barrett, H. C.
- Venue
- The Innate Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2005-07-14
- Pages
- 305-337
- OpenAlex
- W2483192295
- Cited by
- 100
- References
- 106
- FWCI
- 11.83
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Tooby, J., & Barrett, H. C. (2005). Resolving the Debate on Innate Ideas: Learnability Constraints and the Evolved Interpenetration of Motivational and Conceptual Functions. The Innate Mind. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780195179675.003.0018
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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