Rejecting the Ideal of Value‐Free Science
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This chapter begins by explaining why nonepistemic values are logically needed for reasoning in science, even in the internal stages of the process. It then bolsters the point with an examination of ways to block this necessity, all of which prove unsatisfactory. Finally, it argues that rejection of the value-free ideal does not demolish science's objectivity and that we have plenty of remaining resources with which to understand and evaluate the objectivity of science. By understanding science as value laden, we can better understand the nature of scientific controversy in many cases and even help speed resolution of those controversies.
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Citations
Cites
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science
Hacking, I. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814563 · Cited by 4,814
The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change
Kuhn, T. S. (1977) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226217239.001.0001 · Cited by 3,861
Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry
Longino, H. E. (1990) · doi:10.1515/9780691209753 · Cited by 3,092
Daston, L., & Galison, P. (1992) · Representations · doi:10.2307/2928741 · Cited by 1,269
Cited by
The New Statistics: Why and How
Cumming, G. (2014) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797613504966 · Cited by 3,200
Decolonial AI: Decolonial Theory as Sociotechnical Foresight in Artificial Intelligence
Mohamed, S., Png, M.-T., & Isaac, W. (2020) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-020-00405-8 · Cited by 912
“There is strong consensus that non-epistemic values have a legitimate role in scientific reasoning, particularly in the choice of research projects and the application of scientific results (Elliott and McKaughan 2014; Douglas 2007).”
BackgroundIn defence of the value free ideal
Betz, G. (2013) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-012-0062-x · Cited by 252
Conditional Objectivism: A Strategy for Connecting the Social Sciences and Practical Decision-Making
Reber, R., & Bullot, N. J. (2019) · Theory and History in the Human and Social Sciences · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-33099-6_5 · Cited by 7
‘We can see a savage’: a case study of the colonial gaze in generative AI algorithms
Alenichev, A., Shaffer, J. D., Kingori, P., Grietens, K. P., Muldoon, J., & Rocher, L. (2026) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-025-02685-0 · Cited by 3
“There is a substantial body of scholarly literature on the values embedded in technological artifacts and how technology can help shape the views of those who use it through its design and affordances (Douglas 2007; Friedman et al. 2013; Winner 2020).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Douglas, H.
- Venue
- Value-Free Science?
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2007-04-05
- Pages
- 120-140
- OpenAlex
- W2476369131
- Cited by
- 106
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 19.67
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Douglas, H. (2007). Rejecting the Ideal of Value‐Free Science. Value-Free Science? https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780195308969.003.0009
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