The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Laws and Lawmakers Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature
Abstract
What distinguishes laws of nature from ordinary facts? What are the 'lawmakers': the facts in virtue of which the laws are laws? How can laws be necessary, yet contingent? Lange provocatively argues that laws are distinguished by their necessity, while also providing a non-technical and accessible survey of the field.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Lange (2009) calls them metalaws.”
From Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature (2022) · cites this paper as Lange (2009)
In the citing paper
“Panpsychism has some structural similarities to the theories ofLange (2009) andWhittle (2009), so we are inclined to think that it is susceptible to the Peril of Insufficient Structure as well.”
From The nomological argument for the existence of God (2022) · cites this paper as Lange (2009)
Citations
Cites
Still being checked.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Quantum states for primitive ontologists
Belot, G. (2011) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-011-0024-8 · Cited by 119
Making best systems best for us
Jaag, S., & Loew, C. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1829-1 · Cited by 90
Nomothetic Explanation and Humeanism about Laws of Nature
Bhogal, H. (2020) · Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 12 · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192893314.003.0006 · Cited by 74
Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature
Chen, E. K., & Goldstein, S. (2022) · Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-96775-8_2 · Cited by 69
Tugby, M., & Mumford, S. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674527.001.0001 · Cited by 69
Hicks, M. T. (2017) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axx006 · Cited by 57
Tugby, M. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02781-2 · Cited by 36
A disposition-based process-theory of causation
Hüttemann, A. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674527.003.0005 · Cited by 49
Jansson, L., & Saatsi, J. T. (2017) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axx016 · Cited by 46
Dispositionalism and the Metaphysics of Science
Dumsday, T. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108647502 · Cited by 43
Asay, J. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108759465 · Cited by 42
Breaking the explanatory circle
Hicks, M. T. (2020) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01444-9 · Cited by 39
Using Natural-Kind Essentialism to Defend Dispositionalism
Dumsday, T. (2012) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-012-9361-z · Cited by 38
Knappik, F. (2016) · European Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/ejop.12129 · Cited by 38
Natural Properties, Necessary Connections, and the Problem of Induction
Hildebrand, T. (2016) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12351 · Cited by 36
Epistemic and Objective Possibility in Science
Wirling, Y. S., & Grüne‐Yanoff, T. (2021) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/716925 · Cited by 36
The nomological argument for the existence of God
Hildebrand, T., & Metcalf, T. (2022) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12364 · Cited by 38
A Powerful Particulars View of Causation
Ingthorsson, R. (2021) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003094241 · Cited by 35
Considering a Consensus View of Nature of Science Content for School Science Purposes
McComas, W. F. (2020) · Science: Philosophy, history and education · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-57239-6_2 · Cited by 34
Lowe's Unorthodox Dispositionalism
Dumsday, T. (2015) · Res Philosophica · doi:10.11612/resphil.2016.93.1.7 · Cited by 33
Asay, J. (2014) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0596-x · Cited by 32
Nonlinearity and metaphysical emergence
Wilson, J. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674527.003.0010 · Cited by 31
Woodward, J. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674527.003.0003 · Cited by 29
Divine Action, Determinism, and the Laws of Nature
Koperski, J. (2019) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429029110 · Cited by 29
Do Counterfactuals Ground the Laws of Nature? A Critique of Lange
Demarest, H. (2012) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/666066 · Cited by 28
The Teleological and Kalam Cosmological Arguments Revisited
Loke, A. T. E. (2022) · Palgrave frontiers in philosophy of religion · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-94403-2 · Cited by 32
Non‐Humean theories of natural necessity
Hildebrand, T. (2020) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12662 · Cited by 28
Humean Laws and (Nested) Counterfactuals
Loew, C., & Jaag, S. (2019) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqz037 · Cited by 27
Biggs, S., & Wilson, J. (2016) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0705-4 · Cited by 27
Better Best Systems – Too Good to Be True
Backmann, M. (2014) · dialectica · doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12070 · Cited by 25
Lange, M. (2009) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00726.x · Cited by 25
Self-citationNo Work for a Theory of Universals
Eddon, M., & Meacham, C. J. G. (2015) · doi:10.1002/9781118398593.ch9 · Cited by 25
Dispositional Essentialism and the Nature of Powerful Properties
Bauer, W. A. (2013) · Disputatio · doi:10.2478/disp-2013-0001 · Cited by 23
Dispositionality: Beyond The Biconditionals
Manley, D. (2011) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2011.596215 · Cited by 22
The difference between epistemic and metaphysical necessity
Glazier, M. (2017) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1626-2 · Cited by 22
Lange, M. (2009) · dialectica · doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01207.x · Cited by 22
Self-citationHow to carve across the joints in nature without abandoning Kripke–Putnam semantics
Beebee, H. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674527.003.0007 · Cited by 21
Why do forces add vectorially? A forgotten controversy in the foundations of classical mechanics
Lange, M. (2011) · American Journal of Physics · doi:10.1119/1.3534836 · Cited by 20
Self-citationSlater, M. H. (2013) · Biological Theory · doi:10.1007/s13752-012-0084-9 · Cited by 20
Theory of the Origin, Evolution, and Nature of Life
Andrulis, E. D. (2011) · Life · doi:10.3390/life2010001 · Cited by 22
What are Dispositional Properties?
Tugby, M. (2016) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755722.003.0005 · Cited by 18
A Simulacrum Account of Dispositional Properties
Nathan, M. J. (2013) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12031 · Cited by 18
Understanding does not depend on (causal) explanation
Verreault-Julien, P. (2019) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-018-0240-6 · Cited by 18
II—L. A. Paul: Categorical Priority and Categorical Collapse
Paul, L. A. (2013) · Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2013.00221.x · Cited by 18
DISPOSITIONS, PRIMITIVE ACTIVITIES, AND ESSENTIALLY ACTIVE OBJECTS
Dumsday, T. (2012) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01415.x · Cited by 17
Atoms vs. Extended Simples: Towards a Dispositionalist Reconciliation
Dumsday, T. (2015) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-015-9616-4 · Cited by 17
Newtonian Emanation, Spinozism, Measurement and the Baconian Origins of the Laws of Nature
Schliesser, E. S. (2012) · Foundations of Science · doi:10.1007/s10699-011-9279-y · Cited by 17
Vetter, B. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02872-0 · Cited by 10
The Function of Boundary Conditions in the Physical Sciences
Bursten, J. R. S. (2020) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/711502 · Cited by 17
What distinguishes the practice-dependent approach to justice?
Erman, E., & Möller, N. (2015) · Philosophy & Social Criticism · doi:10.1177/0191453715580475 · Cited by 16
No laws and (thin) powers in, no (governing) laws out
Ioannidis, S., Livanios, V., & Psillos, S. (2020) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-020-00304-x · Cited by 16
MaxCon extended simples and the dispositionalist ontology of laws
Dumsday, T. (2016) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-015-1009-5 · Cited by 15
Pre-emption cases may support, not undermine, the counterfactual theory of causation
Northcott, R. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-02038-z · Cited by 15
Explanation by status as empty-base explanation
Kappes, Y. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02901-y · Cited by 15
Friend, T. (2016) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-015-0131-z · Cited by 15
Knowledge of objective modality
Strohminger, M., & Yli‐Vakkuri, J. (2018) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1052-4 · Cited by 15
How experimental neuroscientists can fix the hard problem of consciousness
Klein, C., & Barron, A. B. (2020) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niaa009 · Cited by 15
Projection, symmetry, and natural kinds
Jantzen, B. C. (2014) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0637-5 · Cited by 17
A Theory of Non-universal Laws
Reutlinger, A. (2011) · International Studies in the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1080/02698595.2011.574853 · Cited by 13
Defining Qualitative Properties
Hoffmann-Kolss, V. (2018) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-018-9991-x · Cited by 13
A unificationist defence of revealed preferences
Vredenburgh, K. (2019) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267118000524 · Cited by 13
Nominalist dispositional essentialism
Vogt, L. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03588-z · Cited by 12
Chen, E. K. (2024) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009026390 · Cited by 17
Kistler, M. (2025) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009260800 · Cited by 12
Are Conservation Laws Metaphysically Necessary?
Wolff, J. (2013) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/673715 · Cited by 11
Lange’s Challenge: Accounting for Meta-laws
Yudell, Z. (2012) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axs008 · Cited by 10
The landscape of integrative pluralism
Mitchell, S. D. (2023) · THEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science · doi:10.1387/theoria.25273 · Cited by 11
Bryant, A., & Wilson, A. (2024) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009351645 · Cited by 8
Fundamental Properties and the Laws of Nature
Demarest, H. (2015) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12222 · Cited by 9
How to explain the Lorentz transformations
Lange, M. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674527.003.0004 · Cited by 9
Self-citationAdam Smith, natural movement and physics
Pack, S. J., & Schliesser, E. S. (2017) · Cambridge Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/cje/bex008 · Cited by 10
Shumener, E. (2022) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/phpe.12168 · Cited by 9
The explanatory virtue of abstracting away from idiosyncratic and messy detail
Clarke, C. J. (2015) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0554-6 · Cited by 9
The Nomic Likelihood Account of Laws
Meacham, C. J. G. (2023) · Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.3998/ergo.2265 · Cited by 8
The problem of nomological harmony
Cutter, B., & Saad, B. (2023) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12463 · Cited by 11
Replies to Weatherson, Hall, and Lange
Strevens, M. (2012) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00576.x · Cited by 8
On metaphysically necessary laws from physics
Linnemann, N. (2020) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-020-00281-1 · Cited by 8
The selectionist rationale for evolutionary progress
Desmond, H. (2021) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-021-09806-1 · Cited by 9
Stamatiadis‐Bréhier, A. (2022) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2022.2035814 · Cited by 10
The Humean pragmatic turn and the case for revisionary best systems accounts
Friend, T. (2022) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-021-00436-8 · Cited by 8
Some Laws of Nature are Metaphysically Contingent
Roberts, J. T. (2009) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400903159016 · Cited by 8
Introduction What is the metaphysics of science?
Mumford, S. D., & Tugby, M. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674527.003.0001 · Cited by 7
A New Task for Philosophy of Science
Maxwell, N. (2019) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/meta.12355 · Cited by 7
Bianchi, S. D. (2015) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0795-0 · Cited by 7
A pluralist account of non-causal explanation in science and mathematics
Saatsi, J. T. (2017) · Metascience · doi:10.1007/s11016-017-0249-z · Cited by 7
Vikings or Normans? The Radicalism of Naturalized Metaphysics
Ross, D. (2016) · Metaphysica · doi:10.1515/mp-2016-0018 · Cited by 6
Are natural kinds and natural properties distinct?
Tobin, E. (2013) · Metaphysics and Science · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674527.003.0008 · Cited by 6
From Physical to Metaphysical Necessity
Roberts, A. (2021) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzab032 · Cited by 6
McKitrick, J. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674527.003.0006 · Cited by 6
Loewer, B. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198907695.001.0001 · Cited by 5
Meacham, C. J. G. (2025) · Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.3998/ergo.7427 · Cited by 5
A New Role for Mathematics in Empirical Sciences
Kasirzadeh, A. (2021) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/713906 · Cited by 6
The strong arm of the law: a unified account of necessary and contingent laws of nature
Hirèche, S., Linnemann, N., Michels, R., & Vogt, L. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03243-z · Cited by 5
Kappes, Y. (2023) · De Gruyter eBooks · doi:10.1515/9783111069500 · Cited by 5
An Empiricist View on Laws, Quantities and Physical Necessity
Johansson, L. (2019) · Theoria · doi:10.1111/theo.12176 · Cited by 5
The Nomological Interpretation of the Wave Function
Solé, A., & Hoefer, C. (2019) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-15659-6_9 · Cited by 5
What Humeans should say about tied best systems
Loew, C., & Jaag, S. (2019) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anz047 · Cited by 5
How to Be Humean about Symmetries
Friend, T. (2021) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/716924 · Cited by 5
Motivational Kantianism: Cassirer's late shift towards a regulative conception of the a priori
Giovanelli, M. (2022) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.08.002 · Cited by 5
Loew, C. (2016) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1029-9 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Lange, M.
- Corresponding author
- Lange, Marc
- ORCID
- Lange, Marc
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2009-09-01
- OpenAlex
- W4300570223
- Cited by
- 257
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 31 · 2020: 33 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 20 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 15.87
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- DIAL (Catholic University of Leuven) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- laws of nature, metaphysics of law, necessity of law, science and law, philosophy of science, philosophy of law
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
