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Laws and Lawmakers Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature
Abstract
What distinguishes laws of nature from ordinary facts? What are the 'lawmakers': the facts in virtue of which the laws are laws? How can laws be necessary, yet contingent? Lange provocatively argues that laws are distinguished by their necessity, while also providing a non-technical and accessible survey of the field.
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“Lange (2009) calls them metalaws.”
From Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature (2022) · cites this paper as Lange (2009)
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“Panpsychism has some structural similarities to the theories ofLange (2009) andWhittle (2009), so we are inclined to think that it is susceptible to the Peril of Insufficient Structure as well.”
From The nomological argument for the existence of God (2022) · cites this paper as Lange (2009)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lange, M.
- Corresponding author
- Lange, Marc
- ORCID
- Lange, Marc
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2009-09-01
- OpenAlex
- W4300570223
- Cited by
- 257
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 28 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 31 · 2020: 33 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 20 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 15.87
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- DIAL (Catholic University of Leuven) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- laws of nature, metaphysics of law, necessity of law, science and law, philosophy of science, philosophy of law
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