The DOI matches its Crossref record; 77 of the 77 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Abstract
In this book, we offer an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that we justify are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though we meet many other related principles along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, we should distribute our credences equally over all possibilities we entertain; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how we should plan to respond when we receive new evidence. Ultimately, then, the book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, we look to decision theory. We treat an agent’s credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options. We give an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets of credences. And we appeal to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility we give is the veritist’s: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, this is an investigation of the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology. The book can also be read as an extended reply on behalf of the veritist to the evidentialist’s objection that veritism cannot account for certain evidential principles of credal rationality, such as the Principal Principle, the Principle of Indifference, and Conditionalization.
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Cites
Information theory and statistical mechanics
Jaynes, E. T. (1957) · Physical Review · doi:10.1103/physrev.106.620 · Cited by 12,931
A Mathematical Theory of Evidence
Shafer, G. (2020) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv10vm1qb · Cited by 11,711
Jeffreys, H., Moran, P. A. P., & Chatfield, C. (1922) · Nature · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198503682.001.0001 · Cited by 7,878
Lewis, D. (1979) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184843 · Cited by 1,941
Fraassen, B. C. V. (1989) · doi:10.1093/0198248601.001.0001 · Cited by 1,821
A Generalization of Bayesian Inference
Dempster, A. P. (2008) · Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-44792-4_4 · Cited by 1,702
A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition
Rawls, J. (1971) · Cited by 1,504
Halpern, J. Y. (2017) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/10951.001.0001 · Cited by 1,336
Ramsey, F. P. (2016) · Readings in Formal Epistemology · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_3 · Cited by 1,301
van Fraassen, B. C. (1989) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,279
Cited by
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Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law
Littlejohn, C. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1608-4 · Cited by 95
Metadata
- Authors
- Pettigrew, R.
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2016-04-01
- OpenAlex
- W1824373354
- Cited by
- 473
- References
- 77
- FWCI
- 43.17
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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