The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Two Kinds of Agency
Abstract
This chapter introduces a novel account of our agency over certain attitudes (most centrally, belief and intention). The account assumes that these attitudes embody our answer to a question. Thus, we exercise two kinds of agency over them: we control these attitudes either by changing our answer to the question they embody (exercising evaluative control) or by acting upon them to affect them according to our purposes (exercising managerial control). The chapter argues that evaluative control is a genuine form of agency, despite the fact that it is neither voluntary (in a certain, defined sense) nor does it involve awareness of the object controlled. In fact, it is argued that the fundamental form of agency could not be voluntary. The chapter ends by examining how the two kinds of agency work in tandem and how certain complex forms of ‘reflective’ agency can be decomposed into these two simpler kinds.
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Citations
Cites
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Frankfurt, H. G. (1971) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024717 · Cited by 4,663
Cited by
Friedman, J. (2019) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12222 · Cited by 256
Doing things with thoughts: brain–computer interfaces and disembodied agency
Steinert, S., Bublitz, C., Jox, R., & Friedrich, O. (2019) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-018-0308-4 · Cited by 117
Metadata
- Authors
- Hieronymi, P.
- Venue
- Mental Actions
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2009-06-11
- Pages
- 138-162
- OpenAlex
- W2506929234
- Cited by
- 187
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 10.54
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.