The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Freedom and Belief
Abstract
There are many senses in which we can be said to be free agents, and to be morally responsible. There is also, however, a strong, fundamental, and natural sense in which these things are impossible. Very briefly: we cannot be ultimately responsible for how we act. Why not? Because when we act, we do what we do because of the way we are, all things considered, and we cannot be ultimately responsible for the way we are. Suppose this is right: ultimate responsibility is impossible. Can we nevertheless state what would be necessary and sufficient for someone to possess ultimate responsibility (as we can state the necessary and sufficiently conditions of being a round square)? One proposal is that one would have to be causa sui, truly, ultimately the cause or source of oneself, at least in fundamental mental or characteral respects. Another proposal considered in this book is that one could not really count as a free agent (even if one was somehow causa sui) unless one also experienced oneself as, or believed oneself to be, a free agent. This raises the question whether believing something to be the case could ever be a condition of its actually being the case (the idea is highly paradoxical). It also leads to a sustained discussion of the experience of agency, and of being a free agent. Generally speaking, the metaphysical possibilities seem fairly clear when it comes to the question of free will. The remaining questions of interest may have more to do with the phenomenology of freedom, and more generally, moral psychology.
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Cites
An Essay concerning Human Understanding
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Cited by
The impossibility of moral responsibility
Strawson, G. (1994) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00989879 · Cited by 814
Self-citationMoral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions
Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2007) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x · Cited by 558
Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility
Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2005) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080500264180 · Cited by 526
Christman, J. (1991) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.1991.10717234 · Cited by 422
Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?
SARKISSIAN, H., CHATTERJEE, A., DE BRIGARD, F., KNOBE, J., NICHOLS, S., & SIRKER, S. (2010) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01393.x · Cited by 283
Metadata
- Authors
- Strawson, G.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2010-08-19
- OpenAlex
- W2020175250
- Cited by
- 327
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 7.60
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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