The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Understanding ‘Virtue’ and the Virtue of Understanding
Abstract
This chapter offers an alternative to the standard success-oriented epistemological theories by arguing that the highest epistemic good is a state which includes much more than the achievement of true beliefs and the avoidance of false ones. Indeed, it includes much more than knowledge: it requires understanding of important truths. For some of the intellectual virtues are best understood as directed at understanding rather than truth or knowledge. Whether the goal of the intellectual virtues is truth or understanding, reliable success cannot be necessary for the possession of an intellectual virtue given that some of the most impressive intellectual giants such as Aristotle, Newton, and Galileo are not noted for their success. The intellectual virtues should therefore be understood in terms of the values at which they aim, not the values they reliably bring about. The upshot of giving up success oriented approaches in epistemology will provide greater clarity in understanding intellectual virtues.
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Cites
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
Explanation and Scientific Understanding
Friedman, M. (1974) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024924 · Cited by 1,386
Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory
Carruthers, P. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487491 · Cited by 632
How Must Knowledge Be Modally Related to What Is Known?
Sosa, E., & University of Arkansas Press (1999) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics1999261/229 · Cited by 235
Cited by
Hills, A. (2016) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12092 · Cited by 289
The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good
Zagzebski, L. (2003) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/1467-9973.00257 · Cited by 288
EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY, PREEMPTIVE REASONS, AND UNDERSTANDING
Jäger, C. (2016) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2015.38 · Cited by 144
Intellectual Humility: An Interpersonal Theory
Priest, M. (2017) · Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.016 · Cited by 81
Metadata
- Authors
- Riggs, W. D.
- Venue
- Intellectual Virtue
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2003-09-04
- Pages
- 203-226
- OpenAlex
- W2490767642
- Cited by
- 187
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 13.15
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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