The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good
Abstract
Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this “the value problem.” I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is that not all instances of true belief seem to be good on balance, so even if a given instance of knowing p is better than merely truly believing p, not all instances of knowing will be good enough to explain why knowledge has received so much attention in the history of philosophy. The article aims to answer two questions: (1) What makes knowing p better than merely truly believing p? The answer involves an exploration of the connection between believing and the agency of the knower. Knowing is an act in which the knower gets credit for achieving truth. (2) What makes some instances of knowing good enough to make the investigation of knowledge worthy of so much attention? The answer involves the connection between the good of believing truths of certain kinds and a good life. In the best kinds of knowing, the knower not only gets credit for getting the truth but also gets credit for getting a desirable truth. The kind of value that makes knowledge a fitting object of extensive philosophical inquiry is not independent of moral value and the wider values of a good life.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge
Zagzebski, L. T. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174763 · Cited by 2,211
Self-citationThe Structure of Empirical Knowledge.
Moser, P. K., & Bonjour, L. (1987) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2107238 · Cited by 1,206
Intellectual virtue : perspectives from ethics and epistemology
DePaul, M. R., & Zagzebski, L. T. (2003) · Cited by 394
Self-citationKnowledge as Credit for True Belief
Greco, J. (2003) · Intellectual Virtue · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0006 · Cited by 360
Reliability and the Value of Knowledge*
RIGGS, W. D. (2002) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00143.x · Cited by 287
Zagzebski, L. (2001) · Knowledge, Truth, and Duty · doi:10.1093/0195128923.003.0015 · Cited by 268
Self-citationEpistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility
Montmarquet, J. A. (1992) · Cited by 259
Understanding ‘Virtue’ and the Virtue of Understanding
Riggs, W. D. (2003) · Intellectual Virtue · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0010 · Cited by 187
Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility
Fairweather, A., & Zagzebski, L. T. (2000) · Cited by 168
Self-citationThe Unity of the Epistemic Virtues
Goldman, A. I. (2002) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0195138791.003.0003 · Cited by 65
Cited by
Pritchard, D. (2005) · doi:10.1093/019928038x.001.0001 · Cited by 874
Justification and the Truth-Connection
Littlejohn, C. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139060097 · Cited by 530
The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations
Pritchard, D., Millar, A., & Haddock, A. (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.001.0001 · Cited by 454
Metadata
- Authors
- Zagzebski, L.
- Venue
- Metaphilosophy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003-01
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 12-28
- ISSN
- 0026-1068 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9973
- OpenAlex
- W2129707691
- Cited by
- 288
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 101.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1467-9973.00257
- The paper
- Zagzebski, L. (2003). The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good. Metaphilosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9973.00257
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.