Humility and Epistemic Goods
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Some of the most interesting works in virtue ethics are the detailed, perceptive treatments of specific virtues and vices. This chapter aims to develop such work as it relates to intellectual virtues and vices. It begins by examining the virtue of intellectual humility. Its strategy is to situate humility in relation to its various opposing vices, which include vices like arrogance, vanity, conceit, egotism, grandiosity, pretentiousness, snobbishness, haughtiness, and self-complacency. From this list vanity and arrogance are focused on in particular. Humble persons are not distinguished from arrogant persons by being unaware of or unconcerned with entitlements; rather, they lack the arrogance that entails a specific kind of motivation called ‘ego-exalting potency’. Humble people are motivated by pure interests regarding entitlements given their ability to serve as means to some valuable purpose or project. The chapter ends by considering a wide variety of ways intellectual humility can promote the acquisition of epistemic goods.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958) · Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0031819100037943 · Cited by 2,686
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
Explanation and Scientific Understanding
Friedman, M. (1974) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024924 · Cited by 1,386
DeRose, K. (1995) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2186011 · Cited by 1,280
Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory
Carruthers, P. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487491 · Cited by 632
How Must Knowledge Be Modally Related to What Is Known?
Sosa, E., & University of Arkansas Press (1999) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics1999261/229 · Cited by 235
Principlism and Its Alleged Competitors
Beauchamp, T. L. (1995) · Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal · doi:10.1353/ken.0.0111 · Cited by 147
Cited by
Expressed humility in organizations: Implications for performance, teams, and leadership
Owens, B. P., Johnson, M. D., & Mitchell, T. R. (2013) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1120.0795 · Cited by 927
Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations
Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard‐Snyder, D. (2017) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12228 · Cited by 610
Cognitive and Interpersonal Features of Intellectual Humility
Leary, M. R., Diebels, K. J., Davisson, E. K., Jongman-Sereno, K. P., Isherwood, J. C., Raimi, K. T., Deffler, S. A., & Hoyle, R. H. (2017) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167217697695 · Cited by 539
Owens, B. P., & Hekman, D. R. (2016) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2013.0660 · Cited by 531
McElroy, S. E., Rice, K. G., Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Hill, P. C., Worthington, E. L., & Van Tongeren, D. R. (2014) · Journal of Psychology and Theology · doi:10.1177/009164711404200103 · Cited by 208
Metadata
- Authors
- Roberts, R. C., & Wood, W. J.
- Venue
- Intellectual Virtue
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2003-09-04
- Pages
- 257-280
- OpenAlex
- W144096025
- Cited by
- 170
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 21.92
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Humility and Epistemic Goods. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199252732.003.0012
- The paper
- Roberts, R. C., & Wood, W. J. (2003). Humility and Epistemic Goods. Intellectual Virtue. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780199252732.003.0012
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.