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Cited by 615Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryPhenomenology and Existential Philosophy

Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations

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Whitcomb, Dennis, Battaly, Heather, Baehr, Jason, Howard‐Snyder, Daniel·2017·Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12228
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Abstract

Robert Nozick wonders why philosophical writings seem so arrogant:. ..the usual manner of presenting philosophical work puzzles me.Works of philosophy are written as though their authors believe them to be the absolutely final word on their subject.But it's not, surely, that each philosopher thinks that he finally, thank God, has found the truth and built an impregnable fortress around it.We are all actually much more modest than that.For good reason.Having thought long and hard about the view he proposes, a philosopher has a reasonably good idea about its weak points; the places where great intellectual weight is placed upon something perhaps too fragile to bear it, the places where the unraveling of the view might begin, the unprobed assumptions he feels uneasy about. 1 Although Nozick does not use these words, we might say that, by his lights, most philosophical writings display an astounding lack of intellectual humility.In her widely-acclaimed book, I Don't Know, Leah Hager Cohen relates a conversation with her students about a "well-read" and "incredibly smart" colleague named "Mary".Mary routinely exhibits an unusual response when 1

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  • Most philosophical accounts define intellectual humility as a virtuous balance between intellectual arrogance (overvaluing one's beliefs) and intellectual diffidence (undervaluing one's beliefs).

    “Most accounts define intellectual humility as a virtuous balance between intellectual arrogance (overvaluing one's beliefs) and intellectual diffidence (undervaluing one's beliefs) 28-30 .”

    From Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility (2022) · cites this paper as [28]

    In the passage labeled “30” (page not given), the paper says humility lies between arrogance and servility or diffidence, but only with respect to how one regards one’s limitations. It distinguishes this from proper intellectual pride, which lies between those extremes with respect to one’s strengths. The passage does not establish that most philosophical accounts define humility as a balance between overvaluing and undervaluing one’s beliefs. (LLM, conf=0.88)

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1 of the 50 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. Hart, K.E. and Huggett. C. 2005. "Narcissism: A Barrier to Personal Acceptance of the Spiritual Aspects of Alcoholics Anonymous," Alcoholism Treatment Quarterly 25: 85-100.
  2. Kellenberger, J. 2010. "Humility," American Philosophical Quarterly 47: 321-336.
  3. Nuyen, A. T. 1998. "Just Modesty," American Philosophical Quarterly 35: 101-109.
  4. Schwab, A. 2012. "Epistemic Humility and Medical Practice," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37: 28-48.
  5. Sidgwick, H. 1907/1962. The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  6. Snow, N. 1995. "Humility," Journal of Value Inquiry 29: 203-216.

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Authors
Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard‐Snyder, D.
Affiliations
  • Western Washington University (US)
  • California State University, Fullerton (US)
  • Loyola Marymount University (US)
ORCID
Venue
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2015-08-17
Volume
94
Issue
3
Pages
509-539
ISSN
  • 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
  • 1933-1592
DOI
10.1111/phpr.12228
OpenAlex
W1954332009
Cited by
610
References
50
Citations by year
2026: 47 · 2025: 95 · 2024: 72 · 2023: 44 · 2022: 57 · 2021: 119 · 2020: 83 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 1
FWCI
119.15
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)
Locations
  • Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Funders
John Templeton Foundation (29630)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
Keywords
intellectual humility, Robert Nozick, limits of knowledge, epistemic self-knowledge

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