The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays
Abstract
This volume collects most of the author's publications on human action since the 1970s. The essays collected here are concerned to answer the questions ‘What makes us agents?’ and ‘What makes us responsible to one another for how we live our lives?’ The author develops a unified account of human agency and responsibility in terms of our capacity for critical evaluation, or normative competence. We are agents because we have (and to the extent that we exercise) this capacity, and we are responsible to each other for our lives as reflections of our exercise of this capacity. The account is developed in these essays largely by considering possible sources of normative incapacity, such as compulsion, addiction, manipulation, childhood deprivation, and one's own desires. Many of these essays engage critically with contemporary accounts of free will, action, and moral responsibility.
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Citations
Cites
The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays
Frankfurt, H. G. (1988) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818172 · Cited by 2,634
Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior
Loewenstein, G. (1996) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1006/obhd.1996.0028 · Cited by 2,610
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814594 · Cited by 2,249
Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency
Bratman, M. E. (1999) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625190 · Cited by 1,496
Cited by
Legal and Moral Responsibility
Duff, A. (2009) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00257.x · Cited by 40
Self-exposure and exposure of the self: informational privacy and the presentation of identity
Shoemaker, D. W. (2010) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-009-9186-x · Cited by 33
A way forward for responsibility in the age of AI
Gogoshin, D. L. (2025) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2024.2312455 · Cited by 9
Metadata
- Authors
- Watson, G.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2004-07-15
- OpenAlex
- W2502739406
- Cited by
- 480
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 0.31
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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