A way forward for responsibility in the age of AI
Open accessAbstract
Whatever one makes of the relationship between free will and moral responsibilitye.g.whether it's the case that we can have the latter without the former and, if so, what conditions must be met; whatever one thinks about whether artificially intelligent agents might ever meet such conditions, one still faces the following questions.What is the value of moral responsibility?If we take moral responsibility to be a matter of being a fitting target of moral blame or praise, what are the goods attached to them?The debate concerning 'machine morality' is often hinged on whether artificial agents are or could ever be morally responsible, and it is generally taken for granted (following Matthias 2004) that if they cannot, they pose a threat to the moral responsibility system and associated goods.In this paper, I challenge this assumption by asking what the goods of this system, if any, are, and what happens to them in the face of artificially intelligent agents.I will argue that they neither introduce new problems for the moral responsibility system nor do they threaten what we really (ought to) care about.I conclude the paper with a proposal for how to secure this objective.
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Diffusion of responsibility and accountability is a well-known moral and legal problem with complex systems involving human and technological components, including AI.
“Diffusion of responsibility and accountability is a well-known moral and legal problem with complex systems involving human and technological components, including AI [5, 121].”
From Autonomous artificial intelligence, scientific research, and human values (2026) · cites this paper as [121]
Although attribution of responsibility and accountability may become complicated when AI acts autonomously, the problem is not intractable and can be handled with appropriate attention to the different ways that human beings can be involved in the task.
“Although attribution of responsibility and accountability may become complicated when AI acts autonomously, the problem is not intractable and can be handled with appropriate attention to the different ways that human beings can be involved in the task [121].”
From Autonomous artificial intelligence, scientific research, and human values (2026) · cites this paper as [121]
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Tollon, F. (2026) · ACM AI Letters · doi:10.1145/3820053
ABCDE of Deception: A Relational Research Ethics Proposal
Verbeke, K., Baeyens, D., Piasecki, J., Krawczyk, T., & Borry, P. (2026) · Bioethics · doi:10.1111/bioe.70178
- Authors
- Gogoshin, D. L.
- Affiliations
- University of Helsinki (FI)
- Corresponding author
- Gogoshin, Dane Leigh
- ORCID
- Gogoshin, Dane Leigh
- Venue
- Inquiry
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2024-02-12
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1164-1197
- ISSN
- 0020-174X (ISSN-L)
- 1502-3923
- OpenAlex
- W4392729585
- Cited by
- 9
- References
- 117
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1
- FWCI
- 25.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Inquiry (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Työväentutkimus Vuosikirja (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Kone Foundation (201906341)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Keywords
- moral responsibility, artificial intelligence, free will, artificial agents
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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