The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Which Properties are Represented in Perception?
Abstract
What kind of information is found in visual experience, and what kind can be found only in judgments made on its basis? Do we visually experience arrays of colored shapes, variously illuminated, and sometimes moving? Or does visual experience involve more complex features, such as personal identity, causation, and kinds such as bicycle, keys, and cars? This chapter argues that kind properties can be represented in experience. The contents of visual experience are not limited to colour, shape, illumination, and motion.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146
Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism
MACPHERSON, F. (2012) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00481.x · Cited by 461
Imagining as a Guide to Possibility
KUNG, P. (2010) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00377.x · Cited by 310
Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception
Nanay, B. (2016) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658442.001.0001 · Cited by 301
Varieties of cognitive penetration in visual perception
Vetter, P., & Newen, A. (2014) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.04.007 · Cited by 263
Metadata
- Authors
- Siegel, S.
- Venue
- Perceptual Experience
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2006-01-19
- Pages
- 481-503
- OpenAlex
- W68259286
- Cited by
- 538
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 25.11
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Which Properties are Represented in Perception? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199289769.003.0015
- The paper
- Siegel, S. (2006). Which Properties are Represented in Perception? Perceptual Experience. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780199289769.003.0015
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.