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Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience

Block, Ned · 2007 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 376 of the 380 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases – when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority – and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is “Yes,” then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is “Yes”? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1017/s0140525x07002786

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Citations

Cites

Show all 376 references

Research works printed but not linked: 14

  1. 10.1037/0033-2909.88.3.785 · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.88.3.785 · Paper page
  2. 10.1037/0096-3445.109.1.75 · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.109.1.75 · Paper page
  3. Nakayama, 1995, Visual cognition: An invitation to cognitive science, 2, 1
  4. Cattell, 1885, The inertia of the eye and brain, Brain, 8, 295
  5. Goldman-Rakic, 1987, Handbook of physiology: The nervous system, higher functions of the brain, 373
  6. 10.1207/s15516709cog2302_3 · doi:10.1207/s15516709cog2302_3 · Paper page
  7. Armstrong, 1977, The causal theory of the mind, Neue Heft für Philosophie, 11, 82
  8. Cowan, 2007, Tall tales about the brain: Things we think we know about the mind, but ain't so, 45
  9. Burge, 2006, Philosophical essays, vol. II: Foundations of mind, 392
  10. Heath, 1949, Selective partial ablation of the frontal cortex: A correlative study of its effects on human psychotic subjects; problems of the human brain, 489
  11. Uebel, 2006, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2006 Edition
  12. Wolfe, 1999, Fleeting memories, 71
  13. Block, 1974, IQ, heritability, and inequality I, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 3, 331
  14. Aimola Davies, 2004, Disorders of spatial orientation and awareness: Cognitive and behavioral rehabilitation: From neurobiology to clinical practice

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Block, N.
Affiliations
New York University (US)
Corresponding author
Block, Ned
Venue
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Published
2007-12
Volume
30
Issue
5-6
Pages
481-499
ISSN
  • 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-1825
OpenAlex
W2047192086
Cited by
1,146
References
380
Citations by year
2026: 82 · 2025: 51 · 2024: 58 · 2023: 106 · 2022: 52 · 2021: 66 · 2020: 70 · 2019: 109 · 2018: 79 · 2017: 72 · 2016: 34 · 2015: 51 · 2014: 57 · 2013: 50 · 2012: 47
FWCI
47.77
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Keywords
phenomenal consciousness, cognitive accessibility, reportability, neural basis of consciousness, philosophy of mind, neuroscience of consciousness
MeSH terms
Adult, Animals, Haplorhini, Attention, Awareness, Brain, Cognition, Consciousness, Depth Perception, Discrimination Learning, Dominance, Cerebral, Field Dependence-Independence, Humans, Infant, Memory, Short-Term, Optical Illusions, Pattern Recognition, Visual, Problem Solving, Psychophysiology, Mental Recall, Retina, Persistent Vegetative State

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s0140525x07002786
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Block, N. (2007). Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x07002786

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.