Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 376 of the 380 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases – when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority – and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is “Yes,” then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is “Yes”? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.
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In the citing paper
“In this case, relying on reports may lead us to misidentify the neural basis of access as that of phenomenal consciousness (Block 1995(Block , 2007)).”
From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Block 2007
In the citing paper
“A third strategy for validating a putative C-test involves treating consciousness as a natural kind [67,68].”
From Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond (2024) · cites this paper as [67]
Citations
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Cited by
Emotion Theory and Research: Highlights, Unanswered Questions, and Emerging Issues
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Metadata
- Authors
- Block, N.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Block, Ned
- ORCID
- Block, Ned
- Venue
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2007-12
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 5-6
- Pages
- 481-499
- ISSN
- 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-1825
- OpenAlex
- W2047192086
- Cited by
- 1,146
- References
- 380
- Citations by year
- 2026: 82 · 2025: 51 · 2024: 58 · 2023: 106 · 2022: 52 · 2021: 66 · 2020: 70 · 2019: 109 · 2018: 79 · 2017: 72 · 2016: 34 · 2015: 51 · 2014: 57 · 2013: 50 · 2012: 47
- FWCI
- 47.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Keywords
- phenomenal consciousness, cognitive accessibility, reportability, neural basis of consciousness, philosophy of mind, neuroscience of consciousness
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Animals, Haplorhini, Attention, Awareness, Brain, Cognition, Consciousness, Depth Perception, Discrimination Learning, Dominance, Cerebral, Field Dependence-Independence, Humans, Infant, Memory, Short-Term, Optical Illusions, Pattern Recognition, Visual, Problem Solving, Psychophysiology, Mental Recall, Retina, Persistent Vegetative State
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.