The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism
Abstract
The chapter presents the Hegelian Argument for panpsychism. It is inspired by Hegel’s dialectical method in exploring the possibility of a conceptual middle-ground between materialism and dualism. It seeks a ‘synthesis’ between these two antithetical positions. The chapter establishes this synthesis by elucidating the opposition of materialism and dualism, as well as their respective strengths and weaknesses: Materialism is supported by causal arguments, which claim that causal explanations must be grounded in physical properties. If phenomenal properties are to be causally relevant, they have to be grounded in physical properties. This entails the truth of materialism. Conceivability arguments undermine the truth of materialism: There is no strong modal entailment between physical and phenomenal properties; physicalism requires that physical facts necessitate all other facts. Conversely, dualism is supported by conceivability arguments and heavily criticized by causal arguments. It presents constitutive Russellian panpsychism as a promising synthesis in this dialectic.
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Citations
Cites
James, W. (1891) · Personality Culture Society · doi:10.1037/11059-000 · Cited by 25,876
Parfit, D. (1986) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.001.0001 · Cited by 5,803
Schaffer, J. (2009) · Metametaphysics · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199546046.003.0012 · Cited by 1,382
Papineau, D. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001 · Cited by 884
Sensations and brain processes
Smart, J. J. C. (1970) · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15364-0_3 · Cited by 653
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind · doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5 · Cited by 574
Self-citationRealistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism
Strawson, G. (2008) · Real Materialism · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0003 · Cited by 558
James, W. (1904) · The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods · doi:10.2307/2011942 · Cited by 519
Russell, B., & Slater, J. G. (2022) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003308898 · Cited by 457
Russell, B., Slater, J. G., & Frohmann, B. (1922) · The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease · doi:10.1097/00005053-192205000-00054 · Cited by 452
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Chalmers, D.J. forthcoming. The combination problem for panpsychism. In (G. Bruntrup and L. Jaskolla, eds.) Panpsychism . Oxford University Press.
- Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons . Oxford University Press.
- Yablo, S. 1992. Mental causation. Philosophical Review 101:245-280.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
A materialist theory of the mind
Armstrong, D. M. (2017) · Advances in consciousness research · doi:10.1075/aicr.95.c1 · Cited by 821
Levin, M. G. (2019) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02688 · Cited by 334
The Meta-Problem of Consciousness
Chalmers, D. J. (2018) · ANU Open Research (Australian National University) · Cited by 235
Self-citationThe Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism
Goff, P. (2019) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315717708 · Cited by 203
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196
Metadata
- Authors
- Chalmers, D. J.
- Corresponding author
- Chalmers, David J.
- ORCID
- Chalmers, David J.
- Venue
- Panpsychism
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2016-12-29
- Volume
- 8
- Pages
- 19-47
- OpenAlex
- W2532347072
- Cited by
- 432
- References
- 31
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 44 · 2024: 53 · 2023: 72 · 2022: 43 · 2021: 51 · 2020: 33 · 2019: 44 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 40 · 2016: 15
- FWCI
- 185.79
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- panpsychism, Hegel, materialism, dualism, phenomenal properties, conceivability argument, causal argument, physicalism, dialectical synthesis
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