CoChat

Improbable Knowing

Williamson, Timothy · 2011 · Evidentialism and its Discontents
Cited by 183

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Abstract

Timothy Williamson describes an example which he takes to establish the possibility of knowledge in the presence of the extreme improbability to one that one knows. Prima facie, it seems such an example doesn't sit well with evidentialism, for then one's (total) evidence could support knowledge level justification for p, yet at the same time support the same level of justification for the proposition that you don't know.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.003.0010

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 183

Metadata

Authors
Williamson, T.
Venue
Evidentialism and its Discontents
Published
2011-08-25
Pages
147-164
OpenAlex
W4244788660
Cited by
183
References
0
FWCI
16.30
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Improbable Knowing. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.003.0010
The paper
Williamson, T. (2011). Improbable Knowing. Evidentialism and its Discontents. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780199563500.003.0010

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.