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Singular and general causal relations: A mechanist perspective
Abstract
My aim in this paper is to make a case for the singularist view from the perspective of a mechanical theory of causation (Glennan 1996, 1997, 2010, forthcoming), and to explain what, from this perspective, causal generalizations mean, and what role they play within the mechanical theory.
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“If we follow a token theory of causation, we can still arrive at causal claims about type-level relationships, but we do so by generalizing over causal claims about token-level phenomena (Glennan 2011:789).”
From Check Your Truth Conditions! Clarifying the Relationship between Theories of Causation and Social Science Methods for Causal Inference (2021) · cites this paper as Glennan 2011
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Metadata
- Authors
- Glennan, S.
- Affiliations
- Butler University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Glennan, Stuart
- ORCID
- Glennan, Stuart
- Venue
- Causality in the Sciences
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2011-03-17
- Pages
- 789-817
- OpenAlex
- W163998248
- Cited by
- 54
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 35.65
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Digital Commons @ Butler University (Butler University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Critical Realism in Sociology
- Keywords
- singular causation, causal generalization, mechanistic explanation, causal relationship
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