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Multi‐system Moral Psychology
Abstract
This chapter argues for a synthesis of two recent projects in moral psychology. One has proposed a division between “emotional” versus “cognitive” moral judgments, while another has proposed a division between “automatic” versus “controlled” moral judgments. These appear to describe the same underlying psychological systems: one that appears to give rise to automatic, rapid, and emotionally forceful moral intuitions, and another that appears to use controlled, effortful cognition to apply explicit moral principles. These psychological systems can explain a lot about the basic form of competing philosophical normative theories. Some core philosophical deontic principles are mirrored in ordinary people's emotional intuitions; meanwhile, people often use controlled cognitive processes to think about moral problems in utilitarian terms. The chapter concludes by arguing that this division is not hard-and-fast. There is evidence for reasoning from explicit deontic principles in ordinary people; meanwhile, utilitarian thought must depend on some underlying affective currency. This analysis is used to motivate several new questions facing the field of moral psychology.
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Cited by
Action, Outcome, and Value: A Dual-System Framework for Morality
Cushman, F. (2013) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868313495594 · Cited by 473
Self-citationSCHWITZGEBEL, E., & CUSHMAN, F. (2012) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01438.x · Cited by 391
Self-citationBauman, C. W., McGraw, A. P., Bartels, D. M., & Warren, C. (2014) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/spc3.12131 · Cited by 323
Disordered Social Cognition: Alexithymia and Interoception
Brewer, R., & Bird, G. (2020) · The Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior · doi:10.1017/9781108131797.036 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Cushman, F., Young, L., & Greene, J. D.
- Venue
- The Moral Psychology Handbook
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2010-06-10
- Pages
- 47-71
- OpenAlex
- W53704760
- Cited by
- 201
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 24.90
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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