The DOI matches its Crossref record; 55 of the 55 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non‐Philosophers
Abstract
We examined the effects of order of presentation on the moral judgments of professional philosophers and two comparison groups. All groups showed similar‐sized order effects on their judgments about hypothetical moral scenarios targeting the doctrine of the double effect, the action‐omission distinction, and the principle of moral luck. Philosophers' endorsements of related general moral principles were also substantially influenced by the order in which the hypothetical scenarios had previously been presented. Thus, philosophical expertise does not appear to enhance the stability of moral judgments against this presumably unwanted source of bias, even given familiar types of cases and principles.
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Cites
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An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment
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The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect
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Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment
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Greene, J. D. (2014) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/675875 · Cited by 375
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Schwitzgebel, E., & Cushman, F. (2015) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.04.015 · Cited by 314
Self-citationSchwitzgebel, E., & Rust, J. (2014) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2012.727135 · Cited by 175
Self-citationBergmann, L. T., Schlicht, L., Meixner, C., König, P., Pipa, G., Boshammer, S., & Stephan, A. (2018) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2018.00031 · Cited by 96
Metadata
- Authors
- SCHWITZGEBEL, E., & CUSHMAN, F.
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-03-26
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 135-153
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W1972605989
- Cited by
- 391
- References
- 55
- FWCI
- 12.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.