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European Agencies: Law and Practices of Accountability
Abstract
European agencies have been created at a rapid pace in recent years in a multitude of highly pertinent and sensitive fields ranging from pharmaceuticals and aviation safety to chemicals or financial supervision. This agency phenomenon shows no signs of relenting, and the trend in recent years is towards the delegation of ever-broader powers. These bodies, meant to operate at arm's length from political control, have real power and their opinions and decisions can have a direct impact on individuals, regulators, and member states. Given the powers wielded by the agencies, who is responsible for holding these non-majoritarian actors to account? Is the growing concern surrounding agency accountability ‘much ado about nothing’ or are we faced with the threat of a powerful and unaccountable bureaucracy? These are precisely the questions that this book seeks to answer. It thus addresses one of the most relevant topics in current European governance: the accountability of European agencies. Scholars have increasingly called attention to the risk of placing too much power in the hands of such agencies, which operate at arm's length from traditional controls and cannot easily be held accountable for their actions. Although this is a major issue of concern, systematic empirical research into the topic is lacking. This book addresses empirically whether, and if so on what counts, agency accountability is problematic. It examines how the accountability system of European agencies operates at both the de jure as well as the de facto level, through an examination of legal provisions, relevant case law as well as policy documents and extensive interview material. Reflecting on these findings, the book also offers important theoretical insights for our understanding and study of accountability in a complex regulatory regime such as the EU context.
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“Negative outcomes invite accountability demands, whereas favorable outcomes may discourage forums from challenging decisions, even if flawed (Brandsma and Schillemans 2012;Busuioc 2013).”
From Holding AI Accountable Like Herding Cats: The Contingent Impact on the Legitimacy of Algorithmic Bureaucracy (2026) · cites this paper as Busuioc 2013
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Font, N., & Pérez‐Durán, I. (2022) · Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives · doi:10.3917/risa.883.0675
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Trondal, J. (2023) · European administrative governance · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-28008-5_1
Bundling of authority and accountability in organizations
Wang, S. (2023) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/jems.12553
The Role of the Treasury Select Committee
Kaprinis, K. (2023) · Studies in European economic law and regulation · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-33576-1_8
The Political Economy of MPP: Delegation and Accountability
Kaprinis, K. (2023) · Studies in European economic law and regulation · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-33576-1_4
Chalmers, D., Davies, G., Monti, G., & Heyvaert, V. (2024) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009230322.009
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Öberg, J. O. G. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4864281
Lettanie, U. (2025) · Journal of Banking Regulation · doi:10.1057/s41261-025-00289-8
Díaz, J. G. (2026) · JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies · doi:10.1111/jcms.70090
Pircher, B. (2026) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/rego.70139
Scrutinising Frontex: The European Parliament and Accountability through Discharge
Schoeller, M. G., & Slominski, P. (2026) · JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies · doi:10.1111/jcms.70097
Schlecht, P., & Moch, E. (2026) · Advances in computational intelligence and robotics book series · doi:10.4018/979-8-2600-0467-8.ch011
Saes-Louarn, A. N. (2026) · Political Research Exchange · doi:10.1080/2474736x.2026.2693565
Bezerra, E., & Freire, F. D. S. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7293005
Leidorf‐Tidå, B., Alon‐Barkat, S., Busuioc, M., & de Boer, T. (2026) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/rego.70205
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Busuioc, M.
- Corresponding author
- Busuioc, Madalina
- ORCID
- Busuioc, Madalina
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2013-02-28
- OpenAlex
- W4256233435
- Semantic Scholar
- 2bfe7c85afceb896bd577e1f7534064ab795dbe2
- Cited by
- 138
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 19 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 2
- FWCI
- 16.37
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › European Union Policy and Governance
- Social Sciences › Law › Administrative Law and Governance
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Regulation and Compliance Studies
- Keywords
- European agencies, agency accountability, EU governance, regulatory agencies, delegation of powers, bureaucratic accountability, EU case law
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