Holding AI Accountable Like Herding Cats: The Contingent Impact on the Legitimacy of Algorithmic Bureaucracy
Open accessAbstract
ABSTRACT The rise of artificial intelligence in public decision‐making is reshaping state legitimacy by shifting administrative discretion from human bureaucracies to algorithmic systems. While research has explored AI accountability and legitimacy deficits, how they are related across different decision contexts remains unclear. Drawing on bureaucratic legitimacy, procedural fairness, and forum drifting theories, this study examines how AI accountability and effectiveness shape legitimacy perceptions, depending on decision outcomes. Using three survey experiments with 1135 participants in China, we find that accountability is most crucial when AI decisions introduce losses to citizens, whereas effectiveness plays a greater role when outcomes are positive to them. Additionally, the interaction effects between AI accountability and effectiveness are also contingent on decision outcomes. These findings advance AI governance research by highlighting the conditions under which algorithmic legitimacy is strengthened or weakened, emphasizing the need for tailored accountability and effectiveness strategies based on decision outcomes.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
8 of 49 cited sources checked · 3 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Legitimacy perceptions in redistribution depend not only on effectiveness but also on whether policies reflect broader social goods such as transparency, accountability and fairness.
“Legitimacy perceptions in redistribution depend not only on effectiveness but also on whether policies reflect broader social goods such as transparency, accountability and fairness (Chugunova and Luhan 2025;Moon 2023).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Chugunova and Luhan 2025 source
The cited source is a correction notice. Its Additional information section (page not provided) addresses appendix placement and labeling, not legitimacy in redistribution. Searches for legitimacy, effectiveness, transparency, accountability, and fairness found no relevant passage in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Moon 2023 source
The 'Introducing algorithmic impact assessment (AIA)' section says AI policy should incorporate social good and ethical principles including transparency and accountability; 'Moralizing and regulating AI for social good' also discusses fairness. The paper does not establish that perceived legitimacy of redistribution policies depends on those values rather than effectiveness. No page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Citizens' perceptions strongly influence the political feasibility of adopting algorithmic systems.
“Second, emerging research shows that citizens' perceptions strongly influence the political feasibility of adopting algorithmic systems (Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer 2022;König et al. 2024).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer 2022 source
In ‘Defining and Conceptualizing Government Legitimacy’ (page unavailable), the paper says legitimacy depends on how citizens perceive government actions. Its ‘Input legitimacy’ section also links citizens’ preferences to the legitimacy of algorithm design and use. It does not establish that citizens’ perceptions strongly influence the political feasibility of adopting algorithmic systems. (LLM, conf=0.81)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites König et al. 2024
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Strong performance, especially when paired with positive outcomes, can foster trust and acceptance of algorithms.
“Moreover, while research on algorithm aversion shows that individuals are skeptical of algorithms after observing errors (Dietvorst et al. 2015), emerging evidence of algorithm appreciation (Logg et al. 2019) suggests that strong performance-especially when paired with positive outcomes-can foster trust and acceptance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked - Findingown data
In three survey experiments with 1135 Chinese participants, AI accountability is most crucial for legitimacy perceptions when AI decisions introduce losses to citizens.
“Using three survey experiments with 1135 participants in China, we find that accountability is most crucial when AI decisions introduce losses to citizens, whereas effectiveness plays a greater role when outcomes are positive to them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The interaction effects between AI accountability and AI effectiveness on legitimacy perceptions are contingent on decision outcomes.
“Additionally, the interaction effects between AI accountability and effectiveness are also contingent on decision outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Findingown data
In three survey experiments with 1135 Chinese participants, AI effectiveness plays a greater role for legitimacy perceptions when outcomes are positive to citizens.
“Using three survey experiments with 1135 participants in China, we find that accountability is most crucial when AI decisions introduce losses to citizens, whereas effectiveness plays a greater role when outcomes are positive to them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The interaction term between effectiveness and negative outcomes is not significant (coef.= -0.05, p = 0.616), contrary to Hypothesis 4.
“By contrast, the interaction term between effectiveness and negative outcomes is not significant (coef.= -0.05,p = 0.616), indicating that the legitimacy gains from effectiveness do not differ significantly across positive and negative conditions, contrary to Hypothesis 4.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Overall, decisions made by highly effective AI systems were rated as more legitimate than those made by less effective systems (mean difference = 0.22, p < 0.001).
“The main effect confirms that, overall, decisions made by highly effective AI systems were rated as more legitimate than those made by less effective systems (mean difference = 0.22, p < 0.001), again supporting Hypothesis 1.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Across conditions, participants consistently assigned higher legitimacy ratings to positive outcomes compared to negative ones.
“Across conditions, participants consistently assigned higher legitimacy ratings to positive outcomes compared to negative ones, highlighting the central role of outcome favorability in shaping citizens' perceptions of AI-driven decision-making.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Under positive outcomes, the mean difference between High_Efft × AfR and High_Efft × No_Acct is 0.055 (p = 0.051).
“Under positive outcomes, the mean difference between High_Efft × AfR and High_Efft × No_Acct is 0.055 (p = 0.051).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Accountability for Results does not differ significantly from Accountability for Compliance in overall legitimacy perception (mean difference = -0.058, p = 0.270).
“AfR vs. AfC -0.058 0.034 0.270”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Accountability for Results yields higher legitimacy perception than no accountability overall (mean difference = 0.191, p < 0.001).
“AfR vs. No_Acct 0.191 0.034 0.000”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
High effectiveness yields higher legitimacy perception than low effectiveness overall (mean difference = 0.290, p < 0.001).
“Effectiveness High_Efft vs. Low_Efft 0.290 0.029 0.000”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Under negative outcomes, the corresponding mean difference is 0.485 (p < 0.001).
“By contrast, under negative outcomes, the corresponding mean difference is 0.485 (p < 0.001), showing that AfR substantially boosts legitimacy perceptions when outcomes are unfavorable-even for effective AI systems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In Model 2 (negative outcomes), the AfR × Effectiveness interaction is significantly positive.
“In Model 2 (negative outcomes), however, the AfR × Effectiveness interaction is significantly positive, suggesting that result-oriented accountability amplifies the legitimacy gains of effective AI under adverse conditions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
When AI effectiveness is low, only AfC significantly improves legitimacy perceptions in both models, whereas AfR does not.
“When AI effectiveness is low, only AfC significantly improves legitimacy perceptions in both models, whereas AfR does not.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Under positive outcomes, accountability differences were minimal, with only a small increase for AfR compared to no accountability (mean difference = 0.067, p = 0.036).
“Examined by decision outcome, accountability differences under positive outcomes were minimal, with only a small increase for AfR compared to no accountability (mean difference = 0.067, p = 0.036).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the positive decision-outcome condition, the combination of high effectiveness and Accountability for Results yields higher legitimacy than the combination of low effectiveness and no accountability (mean difference = 0.302, p < 0.001).
“(High_Efft×AfR) vs. | 0.302 | 0.046 | 0.000 | 0.680 | 0.085 | 0.000 |”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The interaction between Accountability for Results (AfR) and effectiveness is not statistically significant for legitimacy in the positive decision-outcome condition (β = -0.0517).
“AfR × Efft | -0.0517 | 0.368**”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Perceived effectiveness is positively associated with perceived legitimacy in the negative decision-outcome condition (β = 0.195, p < 0.05).
“Effectiveness (Efft) | 0.248*** | 0.195*”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
A negative decision outcome yields lower legitimacy perception than a positive decision outcome overall (mean difference = -0.556, p < 0.001).
“Outcome Negative vs. Positive -0.556 0.029 0.000”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Accountability for Compliance (AfC) is positively associated with perceived legitimacy in the positive decision-outcome condition (β = 0.128, p < 0.05).
“Accountability for | 0.128* | 0.321**”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Accountability for Compliance yields higher legitimacy perception than no accountability overall (mean difference = 0.249, p < 0.001).
“Accountability AfC vs. No_Acct 0.249 0.037 0.000”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Accountability for Compliance (AfC) is positively associated with perceived legitimacy in the negative decision-outcome condition (β = 0.321, p < 0.01).
“Accountability for | 0.128* | 0.321**”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The interaction between Accountability for Results (AfR) and effectiveness is positive and statistically significant for legitimacy in the negative decision-outcome condition (β = 0.368, p < 0.01).
“AfR × Efft | -0.0517 | 0.368**”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Perceived effectiveness is positively associated with perceived legitimacy in the positive decision-outcome condition (β = 0.248, p < 0.001).
“Effectiveness (Efft) | 0.248*** | 0.195*”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the negative decision-outcome condition, the combination of high effectiveness and Accountability for Results yields higher legitimacy than the combination of low effectiveness and no accountability (mean difference = 0.680, p < 0.001).
“(High_Efft×AfR) vs. | 0.302 | 0.046 | 0.000 | 0.680 | 0.085 | 0.000 |”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Overall, both accountability measures enhanced legitimacy relative to no accountability.
“Overall, both accountability measures enhanced legitimacy relative to no accountability, consistent with Hypothesis 2.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductcitation
Concurrent implementation of all experimental conditions minimizes maturation effects by controlling for time-related psychological or contextual changes that might confound treatment.
“Concurrent implementation minimizes maturation effects by controlling for time-related psychological or contextual changes that might confound the treatment (Campbell and Stanley 2015).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Campbell and Stanley 2015
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Citizens are willing to forgo key principles essential for AI accountability, such as transparency and civic participation, in exchange for even modest gains in effectiveness.
“Recent empirical studies have also demonstrated that citizens are willing to forgo key principles essential for ensuring AI accountability-such as transparency and civic participation-in exchange for even modest gains in effectiveness (König et al. 2024;Willems et al. 2023).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites König et al. 2024
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Willems et al. 2023
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Study design and conductcitation
The three focused experiments, with Bonferroni adjustments, balance Type I and Type II error risks better than high-dimensional factorial designs.
“With Bonferroni adjustments controlling Type I error, this hypothesis-focused experiments balance Type I and Type II error risks better than high-dimensional factorial designs (Smith et al. 2002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Smith et al. 2002 source
- Study design and conductreasoning
The rental subsidy context uniquely enables manipulation of both positive and negative outcomes with strong psychological salience.
“Third, from an experimental-design perspective, the rental subsidy context uniquely enables us to manipulate both positive and negative outcomes with strong psychological salience.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
When outcomes are negative, even highly effective AI systems fail to meaningfully enhance legitimacy.
“When outcomes are negative, even highly effective AI systems fail to meaningfully enhance legitimacy, as citizens may attribute adverse consequences to the impersonal and rigid nature of algorithmic decisionmaking (Laux et al. 2024).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Laux et al. 2024
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Algorithmic tools are already used in related contexts, such as automating access to housing benefits and detecting welfare fraud.
“Importantly, algorithmic tools are already used in related contexts, such as automating access to housing benefits (Ohakawa et al. 2024), and detecting welfare fraud (van Schendel 2019).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Ohakawa et al. 2024
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites van Schendel 2019 source
- Study design and conductown data
A balance check confirmed no statistically significant differences across the 18 experimental groups regarding key demographic characteristics and context-relevant covariates.
“A balance check (Table A3) confirmed no statistically significant differences across the 18 experimental groups regarding key demographic characteristics such as age, gender, education, and income.”
- Also stated in: § 3.4 | Participants · plain
“Additionally, the groups showed no significant differences in context-relevant covariates, including current employment in AI-related industries (Yes/No), experience receiving government housing subsidies (Yes/No), familiarity with AI technologies, and familiarity with AI-delivered public services (measured on a 7-point Likert scale, from 1 = Extremely unfamiliar to 7 = Extremely familiar).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 3.4 | Participants · plain
- Interpretationreasoning
Input legitimacy is not a central concern in the study's empirical context because the algorithm independently makes decisions, leaving little opportunity for citizen involvement.
“In our empirical context, we study legitimacy perceptions in a scenario where an algorithm independently makes decisions, leaving little opportunity for citizen involvement.Thus, input legitimacy is not a central concern.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Trust perception remains critical for legitimacy in algorithmic decision-making, as it reflects citizens' confidence and willingness to comply.
“However, trust perception remains critical, as it reflects citizens' confidence in the algorithm and their willingness to voluntarily comply with its decisions-an important expression of legitimacy (Brummel and de Blok 2024;Grimes 2006;Grimmelikhuijsen and Knies 2017).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Interpretationown data
When AI systems are effective, subject to result-oriented accountability, and deliver favorable outcomes, citizens perceive them as the most legitimate.
“This pattern suggests that when AI systems are effective, subject to resultoriented accountability, and deliver favorable outcomes, citizens perceive them as the most legitimate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
When algorithms perform effectively, forums may have little incentive to monitor.
“When algorithms perform effectively, forums may have little incentive to monitor.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Hypothesis 1 receives partial support, as the positive effect of AI effectiveness on legitimacy is statistically significant only when decision outcomes are favorable.
“First, Hypothesis 1 receives partial support, as the positive effect of AI effectiveness on legitimacy is statistically significant only when decision outcomes are favorable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The same increase in AI effectiveness produces smaller legitimacy gains after losses than after gains.
“Consequently, the same increase in AI effectiveness produces smaller legitimacy gains after losses than after gains.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Accountability failures may also stem from forum drifting, where accountability forums themselves choose not to exercise oversight.
“What is often overlooked, however, is that accountability failures may also stem from forum drifting, where accountability forums themselves choose not to exercise oversight (Schillemans and Busuioc 2014).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schillemans and Busuioc 2014
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Bureaucracies must demonstrate substantial expert competence to secure legitimacy.
“In line with the bureaucratic politics literature (Bertelli and Lewis 2013;Christensen 2024;Olsen 2006), it is widely recognized that bureaucracies must demonstrate substantial expert competence to secure legitimacy (Rimkute and Mazepus 2025).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Bertelli and Lewis 2013
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Christensen 2024
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Olsen 2006
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationown data
When AI systems perform poorly, lack oversight, and deliver adverse results, citizens perceive the decision-making process as least legitimate.
“It indicates that when AI systems perform poorly, lack oversight, and deliver adverse results, citizens perceive the decision-making process as least legitimate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Within positive outcomes, effective AI systems do improve perceived legitimacy as expected.
“But within positive outcome, effective AI systems do improve perceived legitimacy as expected.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Accountability deficits in algorithmic governance cannot be explained solely by drifting agents; forums also drift in systematic ways shaped by task relevance, incentives, outcomes, and costs.
“In sum, these questions suggest that accountability deficits in algorithmic governance cannot be explained solely by drifting agents.Forums also drift, often in systematic ways shaped by task relevance, incentives, outcomes, and costs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductown data
The manipulation checks confirmed that the experimental manipulations were successful in shaping participants' perceptions as intended.
“These findings confirm that the experimental manipulations were successful in shaping participants' perceptions as intended.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Citizens are the most fundamental accountability forum in democratic governance, as their evaluations directly shape the legitimacy of public authority.
“First, citizens are the most fundamental accountability forum in democratic governance, as their evaluations directly shape the legitimacy of public authority (Li et al. 2025).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Li et al. 2025
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationown data
Citizens' willingness to prioritize effectiveness or accountability depends on decision outcomes.
“Second, the study contributes to emerging debates on value trade-offs in AI governance (Feng and Chandra 2025;König et al. 2024;Schiff et al. 2022;van Noordt and Tangi 2023;Wenzelburger et al. 2024) by demonstrating that citizens' willingness to prioritize effectiveness or accountability depends on decision outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Accountability safeguards are especially salient when decisions have adverse consequences.
“This finding is consistent with procedural justice theory, which suggests that accountability safeguards are especially salient when decisions have adverse consequences (Brummel and de Blok 2024).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Brummel and de Blok 2024 source
- Interpretationown data
The interaction effects between AI accountability and effectiveness are contingent on decision outcomes.
“Additionally, the interaction effects between AI accountability and effectiveness are also contingent on decision outcomes, meaning that these two factors do not influence legitimacy perceptions in isolation but rather in relation to whether AI decisions benefit or disadvantage citizens.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Legitimacy in algorithmic systems is best understood as conditional and situational, rather than as a function of fixed institutional design principles.
“Theoretically, this suggests that legitimacy in algorithmic systems is best understood as conditional and situational, rather than as a function of fixed institutional design principles.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Forum drifting is more likely to happen when AI brings favorable decisions to citizens.
“It shows forum drifting are more likely to happen when AI brings favorable decisions to citizens.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The legitimacy-generating roles of accountability and effectiveness are conditional.
“Whereas prior work often treats accountability and effectiveness as broadly desirable attributes, our findings suggest that their legitimacy-generating roles are conditional.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The accountability-effectiveness trade-offs are conditional rather than fixed.
“It refines debates on accountability-effectiveness trade-offs by demonstrating that these trade-offs are conditional rather than fixed.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Citizens appear more willing to tolerate unfavorable outcomes when the system is demonstrably effective and institutional checks exist to review and justify results.
“Citizens appear more willing to tolerate unfavorable outcomes when two conditions are met: the system is demonstrably effective, and institutional checks exist to review and justify results.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
AfC acts as a procedural safety net when AI underperforms, signaling fairness and rule adherence despite technical shortcomings.
“Instead, we found that AfC acts as a procedural”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
When performance is weak, procedural fairness exerts a stronger influence on legitimacy judgments.
“This aligns with research showing that when performance is weak, procedural fairness exerts a stronger influence on legitimacy judgments (Ruder and Woods 2020;Tyler 2006a).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Ruder and Woods 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Tyler 2006a source
- Interpretationown data
Under positive outcomes, citizens are already reassured by favorable results and demonstrated accuracy, leaving little room for AfR to further enhance legitimacy.
“Under positive outcomes, however, citizens are already reassured by favorable results and demonstrated accuracy, leaving little room for AfR to further enhance legitimacy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
AfC improves legitimacy only under negative outcomes.
“AfC, however, improves legitimacy only under negative outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Hypothesis 5 receives partial support, limited to scenarios involving negative outcomes and AfR.
“Thus, Hypothesis 5 receives partial support-limited to scenarios involving negative outcomes and AfR.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
AfR substantially boosts legitimacy perceptions when outcomes are unfavorable, even for effective AI systems.
“By contrast, under negative outcomes, the corresponding mean difference is 0.485 (p < 0.001), showing that AfR substantially boosts legitimacy perceptions when outcomes are unfavorable-even for effective AI systems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- May combine two claims. 40
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 26
- The quote only partly states this claim. 2
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPeople are more likely to accept and trust AI systems when they produce desirable results but become skeptical when outcomes are unfavorable.
“It aligns with the theoretical rationale on algorithm aversion (Dietvorst et al. 2015;Hohensinn et al. 2024) and appreciation (Logg et al. 2019), which suggests that people are more likely to accept and trust AI systems when they produce desirable results but become skeptical when outcomes are unfavorable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites Dietvorst et al. 2015 source
The General Discussion (p. 10) reports that seeing an algorithm err reduced confidence in it and willingness to choose it, supporting the skepticism part of the claim. It does not establish that desirable results increase acceptance: participants became less confident even when they saw the algorithm outperform a human forecaster. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Hohensinn et al. 2024 source
- cites Logg et al. 2019 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationAI's opacity, proprietary design, and technical complexity exacerbate information asymmetries.
“Busuioc (2021) further emphasizes that AI's opacity, proprietary design, and technical complexity exacerbate information asymmetries.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Busuioc 2021 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAI agents act autonomously, creating risks of agency drift.
“Like human bureaucrats, AI agents act autonomously, creating risks of agency drift (Lechterman 2022).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Lechterman 2022 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationAI expertise and accountability are the twin foundations of algorithmic bureaucracy.
“As we have illustrated for the first two hypotheses, AI expertise and accountability are the twin foundations of algorithmic bureaucracy (Busuioc 2021;Roehl and Crompvoets 2023;Vogl et al. 2020).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites Busuioc 2021 source
The Conclusion (page not provided) calls bureaucratic expertise and accountability the twin foundations of bureaucratic legitimacy. It does not call AI expertise a foundation of algorithmic bureaucracy; that substitution changes both the kind of expertise and what the foundations underpin. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Roehl and Crompvoets 2023
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Vogl et al. 2020 source
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataUnder positive outcomes, AfC does not significantly improve legitimacy (p = 0.056), and AfR produces only a modest increase compared to no accountability (coef.= 0.067, p = 0.002).
“Regression results (Table 4) show that under positive outcomes, AfC does not significantly improve legitimacy (p = 0.056), and AfR produces only a modest increase compared to no accountability (coef.= 0.067, p = 0.002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataHighly effective AI systems significantly increase perceived legitimacy when outcomes are positive (coef.= 0.25, p < 0.001), providing partial support for Hypothesis 1.
“Regression results (Table 2) show that highly effective AI systems significantly increase perceived legitimacy when outcomes are positive (coef.= 0.25, p < 0.001), providing partial support for Hypothesis 1.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataGroup 15 had the highest legitimacy mean (1.793), combining high effectiveness, AfR, and a positive outcome.
“By contrast, Group 15 is with the highest legitimacy mean (1.793), which combined high effectiveness, AfR, and a positive outcome.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataGroup 4 had the lowest legitimacy mean (0.78), combining low effectiveness, no accountability, and a negative outcome.
“Group 4 has the lowest legitimacy mean (0.78), which combined low effectiveness, no accountability, and a negative outcome.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe positive effect of effectiveness was significant only under positive outcomes (p < 0.001), but not under negative ones (p = 0.227).
“However, when broken down by decision outcome, the positive effect of effectiveness was significant only under positive outcomes (p < 0.001), but not under negative ones (p = 0.227).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe interaction terms AfC × Negative (p < 0.001) and AfR × Negative (p = 0.003) are both positive and significant, indicating that accountability arrangements have stronger legitimating effects when AI decisions produce negative outcomes.
“By contrast, the interaction terms AfC × Negative (p < 0.001) and AfR × Negative (p = 0.003) are both positive and significant, indicating that accountability arrangements have stronger legitimating effects when AI decisions produce negative outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe combination of high effectiveness and Accountability for Results does not differ significantly from the combination of high effectiveness and Accountability for Compliance in legitimacy, in either the positive (mean difference = 0.003, p = 1.000) or the negative (mean difference = -0.010, p = 1.000) decision-outcome condition.
“(High_Efft×AfR) vs. | 0.003 | 0.024 | 1.000 | -0.010 | 0.079 | 1.000 |”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataUnder negative outcomes, both AfC and AfR significantly improved legitimacy compared to no accountability (mean differences = 0.500 and 0.365, respectively; both p < 0.01).
“By contrast, under negative outcomes, both AfC and AfR significantly improved legitimacy compared to no accountability (mean differences = 0.500 and 0.365, respectively; both p < 0.01).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn Model 1 (positive outcomes), neither AfC × Effectiveness nor AfR × Effectiveness interactions are statistically significant.
“In Model 1 (positive outcomes), neither AfC × Effectiveness nor AfR × Effectiveness interactions are statistically significant, indicating that combining accountability mechanisms with effectiveness does not further increase legitimacy under favorable conditions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataThe interaction between Accountability for Compliance (AfC) and effectiveness is not statistically significant for legitimacy in either the positive (β = -0.0759) or the negative (β = 0.173) decision-outcome condition.
“AfC × Efft | -0.0759 | 0.173”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataAfC increased legitimacy by 0.27 points (p < 0.001) and AfR by 0.22 points (p < 0.001), with no significant difference between the two (p = 0.721).
“AfC increased legitimacy by 0.27 points (p < 0.001) and AfR by 0.22 points (p < 0.001), with no significant difference between the two (p = 0.721).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenThe platform facilitated random assignment, ensuring participants were evenly distributed across the 18 experimental conditions.
“The platform facilitated random assignment, ensuring that participants were evenly distributed across the 18 experimental conditions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenThe log transformation normalized the distribution of the composite legitimacy index and enhanced its suitability for OLS regression models.
“The log transformation normalized the distribution and enhanced the suitability of the index for OLS regression models.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenCredamo has over two million registered users and has been widely used to obtain reliable and representative samples.
“While the platform has faced some criticisms, it boasts over two million registered users and has been widely used to obtain reliable and representative samples.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Study design and conductcitationRealistic and high-stakes settings help ensure manipulations are plausible and psychologically engaging.
“Following best practices in vignette design, realistic and high-stakes settings help ensure manipulations are both plausible and psychologically engaging (Mutz 2011).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mutz 2011 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationMany recent public administration studies have employed Credamo for survey experiments.
“Many recent PA studies have employed Credamo for survey experiments (Deng and Sun 2025;Tao et al. 2024;Wang and Zhang 2024;Zhang et al. 2025).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Deng and Sun 2025
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Tao et al. 2024
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Wang and Zhang 2024 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataThe legitimacy items demonstrated strong internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = 0.95).
“The items demonstrate strong internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = 0.95).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductcitationSeparating experiments helps avoid effect size attenuation and preserves statistical power by concentrating sample size on theoretically central comparisons.
“Separating experiments helps avoid effect size attenuation, a critical concern for Type II error management, and also allows sample size to be concentrated on theoretically central comparisons instead of dispersed across redundant cells, thereby actively preserving statistical power (Cohen 1988;Aron et al. 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Cohen 1988
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Aron et al. 2009
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataThe study set the minimum per-group sample at 58 participants, the most conservative estimate.
“To ensure robustness, we adopted the most conservative estimate, setting the minimum per-group sample at 58 participants.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationown dataThese findings support Hypothesis 3.
“These findings support our Hypothesis 3.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationUnlike human agents, algorithms lack self-interest or corrupt motives, reducing the likelihood of agent drift and making forum dynamics more critical.
“Unlike human agents, algorithms lack self-interest or corrupt motives (Heidelberg 2024), reducing the likelihood of agent drift and making forum dynamics more critical.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Heidelberg 2024 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationcitationCitizens are likely to integrate decision outcomes into their legitimacy judgments.
“In this context, citizens are likely to integrate decision outcomes into their legitimacy judgments.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationNegative outcomes invite accountability demands, whereas favorable outcomes may discourage forums from challenging decisions, even if flawed.
“Negative outcomes invite accountability demands, whereas favorable outcomes may discourage forums from challenging decisions, even if flawed (Brandsma and Schillemans 2012;Busuioc 2013).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Brandsma and Schillemans 2012
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Busuioc 2013 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningNegative outcomes weaken the legitimacy benefits of AI effectiveness, while positive outcomes allow performance cues to translate more directly into legitimacy perceptions.
“Negative outcomes thus weaken the legitimacy benefits of effectiveness, while positive outcomes allow performance cues to translate more directly into legitimacy perceptions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningNegative outcomes amplify algorithm aversion and reduce the incremental effect of AI effectiveness on legitimacy, whereas positive outcomes foster algorithm appreciation and strengthen this effect.
“Collectively, these insights suggest that negative outcomes amplify algorithm aversion and reduce the incremental effect of AI effectiveness on legitimacy, whereas positive outcomes foster algorithm appreciation and strengthen this effect.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningA highly accountable AI system that lacks effectiveness may fail to gain public confidence due to subpar performance.
“An effective AI system without proper accountability may lead to skepticism regarding its decision-making processes, while a highly accountable system that lacks effectiveness may fail to gain public confidence due to subpar performance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationPositive outcomes typically meet or exceed expectations, leading citizens to attribute performance success to the AI system and evaluate it as legitimate.
“The expectancy-disconfirmation model (Chen et al. 2022;Van Ryzin 2006) lends additional support: positive outcomes typically meet or exceed expectations, leading citizens to attribute performance success to the AI system and evaluate it as legitimate.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisereasoningNegative outcomes invite causal search and blame attribution, shifting attention toward potential shortcomings in technical capacity and dampening the marginal benefits of perceived effectiveness.
“Negative outcomes, however, invite causal search and blame attribution, shifting attention toward potential shortcomings in technical capacity and dampening the marginal benefits of perceived effectiveness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataHypothesis 4 is not supported by the interaction test, but the pattern of simple effects suggests that decision outcomes condition the extent to which effectiveness translates into perceived legitimacy.
“Second, Hypothesis 4 is not supported by the interaction test, but the pattern of simple effects suggests that decision outcomes condition the extent to which effectiveness translates into perceived legitimacy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataRandomization was successfully implemented, ensuring the validity of the experimental design.
“These findings confirm that randomization was successfully implemented, ensuring the validity of the experimental design.”
- Also stated in: § 6 | Research Limitation · hedged
“While the platform ensures random assignment across experimental conditions, online samples may not fully capture the diversity of the broader population.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 6 | Research Limitation · hedged
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningThe three experiments form an integrated and theoretically progressive design that isolates core mechanisms, preserves statistical power, and enhances the rigor and interpretability of tests of algorithmic legitimacy.
“Overall, the three experiments form an integrated and theoretically progressive design that isolates core mechanisms, preserves statistical power, and enhances the rigor and interpretability of tests of algorithmic legitimacy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataAfter quality control, 1135 valid responses were retained, averaging approximately 63 participants per group.
“After applying all quality control measures (Section A1), we retained 1135 valid responses, averaging approximately 63 participants per group.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThe sample had a higher proportion of young and educated participants, which reflects real-world housing dynamics because these groups face greater rental housing demand and are primary beneficiaries of government housing support policies.
“Notably, the sample had a higher proportion of young and educated participants, which reflects real-world housing dynamics, as these groups face greater rental housing demand and are primary beneficiaries of government housing support policies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningAccountability arrangements are particularly effective in enhancing legitimacy perceptions when AI decisions lead to negative rather than positive outcomes for citizens.
“The studies above suggested accountability arrangements are particularly effective in enhancing legitimacy perceptions when AI decisions lead to negative outcomes for citizens.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Brummel and de Blok 2024 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe quality control procedures enhance the internal validity of the findings by ensuring that participants meaningfully engaged with the experimental stimuli.
“We believe these procedures enhance the internal validity of our findings by ensuring that participants meaningfully engaged with the experimental stimuli.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningFor a public decision to be perceived as legitimate, acceptability of the decision result and fairness of the decision-making process are essential.
“Together, these frameworks suggest that for a public decision to be perceived as legitimate, two elements are essential: the acceptability of the decision result (acceptance perception) and the fairness of the decision-making process (fairness perception).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationcitationDecision outcomes may moderate the impact of accountability on legitimacy perceptions.
“This suggests that decision outcomes may moderate the impact of accountability on legitimacy perceptions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataThe power analysis indicated minimum per-group sample requirements of 45 participants for the 3 × 2 design, 58 participants for the 2 × 2 design, and 28 participants for the 3 × 2 × 2 design.
“The analysis indicated the following minimum per-group sample requirements: 45 participants for the 3 × 2 design, 58 participants for the 2 × 2 design, and 28 participants for the 3 × 2 × 2 design.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationAccountability is essential for holding administrative expertise under control, reinforcing its legitimacy.
“Accountability is therefore essential for holding administrative expertise under control, which reinforcing its legitimacy (Bovens 2007;Olsen 2013).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningAn effective AI system without proper accountability may lead to skepticism regarding its decision-making processes.
“An effective AI system without proper accountability may lead to skepticism regarding its decision-making processes, while a highly accountable system that lacks effectiveness may fail to gain public confidence due to subpar performance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationNegative outcomes create a legitimacy deficit, and AfR provides assurance that adverse results are accurate, reviewable, and therefore justifiable.
“Negative outcomes create a legitimacy deficit, and AfR provides assurance that adverse results are accurate, reviewable, and therefore justifiable (Licht et al. 2022).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Licht et al. 2022 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationProcedural fairness can mitigate negative evaluations of ineffective authorities by reassuring citizens that decisions are rule-based and impartial.
“As Tyler (2006b) argues, procedural fairness can mitigate negative evaluations of ineffective authorities by reassuring citizens that decisions are rule-based and impartial.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Tyler (2006b) source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAfR operates as a general assurance mechanism, particularly salient when negative outcomes must be justified, whereas AfC becomes especially important when outcomes are unfavorable and citizens scrutinize procedural fairness.
“AfR operates as a general assurance mechanism, particularly salient when negative outcomes must be justified, whereas AfC becomes especially important when outcomes are unfavorable and citizens scrutinize procedural fairness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe findings are context-specific and most directly applicable to welfare policies, particularly in the Chinese context.
“Accordingly, our findings should be interpreted as most directly applicable to welfare policies, particularly in the Chinese context.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningCitizens' perceptions of algorithmic legitimacy may differ across policy domains with different stakes, outcome structures, and accountability concerns.
“Citizens' perceptions of algorithmic legitimacy may differ across policy domains with different stakes, outcome structures, and accountability concerns.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAfR enhances legitimacy across both positive and negative outcomes, reflecting the value citizens place on performance assurances regardless of valence.
“AfR enhances legitimacy across both positive and negative outcomes, reflecting the value citizens place on performance assurances regardless of valence.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataWhen decisions are favorable, citizens focus on outcomes and pay less attention to procedural safeguards, but when outcomes are unfavorable, scrutiny of processes and fairness mechanisms intensifies.
“When decisions are favorable, citizens focus on outcomes and pay less attention to procedural safeguards, but when outcomes are unfavorable, scrutiny of processes and fairness mechanisms intensifies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenOnline samples may not fully capture the diversity of the broader population.
“While the platform ensures random assignment across experimental conditions, online samples may not fully capture the diversity of the broader population.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationForum drifting can take several forms.
“As Schillemans and Busuioc (2014)suggest, forum drifting can take several forms, of which our study only addressed two.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schillemans and Busuioc (2014)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataUsing data from three survey experiments involving 1135 participants in China, accountability is most critical when AI decisions lead to negative outcomes, while effectiveness plays a greater role when AI decisions result in positive outcomes.
“Using data from three survey experiments involving 1135 participants in China, we find that accountability is most critical when AI decisions lead to negative outcomes, while effectiveness plays a greater role when AI decisions result in positive outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningRespondents' decision-making in an online setting may not fully reflect behaviors in real-world governance contexts.
“Additionally, respondents' decision-making in an online setting may not fully reflect behaviors in real-world governance contexts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
Interpretationown dataAfR operates as damage control, particularly valuable when negative outcomes must be justified, but adds little when AI is effective and results are favorable.
“AfR operates as”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenLegitimacy is a concept that is inherently difficult to measure directly.
“Fourth, the outcome variable in this study is legitimacy, a concept that is inherently difficult to measure directly.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningPositive outcomes shift attention toward performance, while negative outcomes heighten sensitivity to institutional safeguards.
“Positive outcomes shift attention toward performance, while negative outcomes heighten sensitivity to institutional safeguards.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataEffectiveness functions as the primary source of legitimacy when algorithmic decisions yield favorable outcomes, whereas accountability becomes central when decisions impose losses on citizens.
“Specifically, effectiveness functions as the primary source of legitimacy when algorithmic decisions yield favorable outcomes, whereas accountability becomes central when decisions impose losses on citizens.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The relationship between AI accountability and legitimacy deficits across different decision contexts remains unclear.
“While research has explored AI accountability and legitimacy deficits, how they are related across different decision contexts remains unclear.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Directly measuring AI expertise is highly technical and typically not observable to most citizens.
“Directly measuring AI expertise is highly technical and typically not observable to most citizens.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The rental subsidy scenario is easily understood and realistic.
“The scenario is easily understood and realistic.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Most survey respondents assume that AI decisions either do not directly affect them or affect them in a positive way.
“This occurs because most survey respondents assume that AI decisions either do not directly affect them or affect them in a positive way.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Most citizens lack sufficient technical literacy or the willingness to pay for accountability measures.
“Given that most citizens lack sufficient technical literacy or the willingness to pay for such measures, policymakers should balance implement accountability measures strategically.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The rental subsidy scenario provides a theoretically rich and practically relevant case.
“Second, the rental subsidy scenario provides a theoretically rich and practically relevant case, but the findings are contextspecific.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Citizens play a central role in conferring legitimacy in democratic systems.
“Fifth, our analysis centers on citizens as the primary accountability forum, reflecting their central role in conferring legitimacy in democratic systems.”
Statistics recomputed
Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.
- Consistentχ²(1) = 38.26reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“χ 2 (1) = 38.26,p < .001”
- Consistentχ²(1) = 117.57reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001
“χ 2 (1) = 117.57,p < .001”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Group 15 is not the highest-scoring group
MinorThe text identifies Group 15's mean of 1.793 as the highest, but Table A5 reports a mean of 1.80 for Group 9. Even allowing for the table's rounding, Group 9's mean exceeds 1.793.
“By contrast, Group 15 is with the highest legitimacy mean (1.793), which combined high effectiveness, AfR, and a positive outcome.”
“9 [Blank] AfR Positive 60 1.80 0.11 1.54 1.95”
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524 · see citing works
Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches
Suchman, M. C. (1995) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/258788 · Cited by 19,903 · see citing works
The DeLone and McLean Model of Information Systems Success: A Ten-Year Update
(2003) · Journal of Management Information Systems · doi:10.1080/07421222.2003.11045748 · Cited by 11,791 · see citing works
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.5.4.323 · Cited by 7,678 · see citing works
Tyler, T. R. (2006) · doi:10.1515/9781400828609 · Cited by 5,156 · see citing works
Algorithm aversion: People erroneously avoid algorithms after seeing them err.
Dietvorst, B. J., Simmons, J. P., & Massey, C. (2015) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000033 · Cited by 3,232 · see citing works
Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework <sup>1</sup>
Bovens, M. (2007) · European Law Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00378.x · Cited by 2,667 · see citing works
Wilson, W. (1887) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2139277 · Cited by 2,544 · see citing works
Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation
Tyler, T. R. (2006) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190038 · Cited by 2,381 · see citing works
Algorithm appreciation: People prefer algorithmic to human judgment
Logg, J. M., Minson, J. A., & Moore, D. A. (2019) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2018.12.005 · Cited by 2,061 · see citing works
Artificial Intelligence and the Public Sector—Applications and Challenges
Wirtz, B. W., Weyerer, J. C., & Geyer, C. (2019) · International Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/01900692.2018.1498103 · Cited by 1,341 · see citing works
Lee, M. K. (2018) · Big Data & Society · doi:10.1177/2053951718756684 · Cited by 1,338 · see citing works
Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation
Baron, J., & Hershey, J. C. (1988) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.54.4.569 · Cited by 873 · see citing works
Anderson, C. J., Blais, A., Bowler, S., Donovan, T., & Listhaug, O. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199276382.001.0001 · Cited by 827 · see citing works
Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy
Olsen, J. P. (2005) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mui027 · Cited by 784 · see citing works
Accountable Artificial Intelligence: Holding Algorithms to Account
Busuioc, M. (2021) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13293 · Cited by 652 · see citing works
Sousa, W. G. D., Melo, E. R. P. D., Bermejo, P. H. D. S., Farias, R. A. S., & Gomes, A. O. (2019) · Government Information Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.giq.2019.07.004 · Cited by 501 · see citing works
Accountability in artificial intelligence: what it is and how it works
Novelli, C., Taddeo, M., & Floridi, L. (2024) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-023-01635-y · Cited by 495 · see citing works
Alon-Barkat, S., & Busuioc, M. (2023) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muac007 · Cited by 469 · see citing works
Baumeister, R. F. (2000) · PsycEXTRA Dataset · doi:10.1037/e413792005-154 · Cited by 424 · see citing works
Validating a Scale for Citizen Trust in Government Organizations
Grimmelikhuijsen, S., & Knies, E. (2017) · International Review of Administrative Sciences · doi:10.1177/0020852315585950 · Cited by 366 · see citing works
Laux, J., Wachter, S., & Mittelstadt, B. (2024) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/rego.12512 · Cited by 365 · see citing works
Algorithm Aversion: People Erroneously Avoid Algorithms after Seeing Them ErrPreprint
Dietvorst, B. J., Simmons, J. P., & Massey, C. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2466040 · Cited by 356 · see citing works
The Reputational Basis of Public Accountability
Busuioc, M., & Lodge, M. C. (2015) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12161 · Cited by 311 · see citing works
Testing the Expectancy Disconfirmation Model of Citizen Satisfaction with Local Government
Van Ryzin, G. G. (2006) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mui058 · Cited by 301 · see citing works
The Public Administration Theory Primer
Frederickson, H. G., Smith, K. B., Larimer, C. W., et al. (2018) · doi:10.4324/9780429494369 · Cited by 291 · see citing works
Predicting Public Sector Accountability: From Agency Drift to Forum Drift
Schillemans, T., & Busuioc, M. (2015) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muu024 · Cited by 290 · see citing works
The Accountability Cube: Measuring Accountability
Brandsma, G. J., & Schillemans, T. (2013) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mus034 · Cited by 278 · see citing works
The perils and pitfalls of explainable AI: Strategies for explaining algorithmic decision-making
de Bruijn, H., Warnier, M., & Janssen, M. (2022) · Government Information Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.giq.2021.101666 · Cited by 264 · see citing works
Grimmelikhuijsen, S. (2023) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13483 · Cited by 259 · see citing works
Young, M. M., Bullock, J. B., & Lecy, J. D. (2019) · Perspectives on Public Management and Governance · doi:10.1093/ppmgov/gvz014 · Cited by 255 · see citing works
Margetts, H., & Dorobantu, C. (2019) · Nature · doi:10.1038/d41586-019-01099-5 · Cited by 238 · see citing works
Organizing consent: The role of procedural fairness in political trust and compliance
Grimes, M. (2006) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00299.x · Cited by 224 · see citing works
Vogl, T. M., Seidelin, C., Ganesh, B., & Bright, J. (2020) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13286 · Cited by 209 · see citing works
Reputation and Accountability Relationships: Managing Accountability Expectations through Reputation
Busuioc, M., & Lodge, M. C. (2016) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.12612 · Cited by 207 · see citing works
Grimmelikhuijsen, S., & Meijer, A. (2022) · Perspectives on Public Management and Governance · doi:10.1093/ppmgov/gvac008 · Cited by 189 · see citing works
Artificial intelligence technology, public trust, and effective governance
Robles, P., & Mallinson, D. J. (2023) · Review of Policy Research · doi:10.1111/ropr.12555 · Cited by 174 · see citing works
The Institutional Basis of Democratic Accountability
Olsen, J. P. (2013) · West European Politics · doi:10.1080/01402382.2012.753704 · Cited by 159 · see citing works
Assessing public value failure in government adoption of <scp>artificial intelligence</scp>
Schiff, D. S., Schiff, K. J., & Pierson, P. (2022) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12742 · Cited by 155 · see citing works
van Noordt, C., & Tangi, L. (2023) · Government Information Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.giq.2023.101860 · Cited by 151 · see citing works
Martin, K. E., & Waldman, A. E. (2022) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-021-05032-7 · Cited by 151 · see citing works
Giest, S. N., & Klievink, B. (2022) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2022.2095001 · Cited by 147 · see citing works
AI-driven public services and the privacy paradox: do citizens really care about their privacy?
Willems, J., Schmid, M. J., Vanderelst, D. F., Vogel, D., & Ebinger, F. (2022) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2022.2063934 · Cited by 139 · see citing works
European Agencies: Law and Practices of Accountability
Busuioc, M. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699292.001.0001 · Cited by 138 · see citing works
Accountability When Hierarchical Authority Is Absent
Acar, M., Guo, C., & Yang, K. (2008) · The American Review of Public Administration · doi:10.1177/0275074007299481 · Cited by 132 · see citing works
Starke, C., & Lünich, M. (2020) · Data & Policy · doi:10.1017/dap.2020.19 · Cited by 107 · see citing works
Population-Based Survey Experiments
Mutz, D. C. (2011) · doi:10.23943/princeton/9780691144511.001.0001 · Cited by 104 · see citing works
Moon, M. J. (2023) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13648 · Cited by 99 · see citing works
Arnesen, S. (2017) · Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0032321716667956 · Cited by 89 · see citing works
Towards Accountability in the Use of Artificial Intelligence for Public Administrations
Loi, M., & Spielkamp, M. (2021) · Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society · doi:10.1145/3461702.3462631 · Cited by 81 · see citing works
Smith, R. A., Levine, T. R., Lachlan, K. A., & Fediuk, T. A. (2002) · Human Communication Research · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2958.2002.tb00821.x · Cited by 77 · see citing works
Algorithms in the public sector. Why context matters
Wenzelburger, G., König, P. D., Felfeli, J., & Achtziger, A. (2022) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12901 · Cited by 77 · see citing works
Policy Influence, Agency-Specific Expertise, and Exit in the Federal Service
Bertelli, A. M., & Lewis, D. E. (2012) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mus044 · Cited by 76 · see citing works
The Past, Present, and Future of Experimental Methods in the Social Sciences
Mize, T. D., & Manago, B. (2022) · Social Science Research · doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2022.102799 · Cited by 76 · see citing works
BEYOND ACCOUNTABILITY: POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND DELEGATED WATER GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRALIA
Wood, M. (2015) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12178 · Cited by 73 · see citing works
Explainable machine learning for public policy: Use cases, gaps, and research directions
Amarasinghe, K., Rodolfa, K. T., Lamba, H., & Ghani, R. (2023) · Data & Policy · doi:10.1017/dap.2023.2 · Cited by 73 · see citing works
Schiff, K. J., Schiff, D. S., Adams, I. T., McCrain, J., & Mourtgos, S. M. (2023) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13754 · Cited by 71 · see citing works
Procedural Fairness and the Legitimacy of Agency Rulemaking
Ruder, A. I., & Woods, N. D. (2019) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muz017 · Cited by 61 · see citing works
Fairness matters when responding to disasters: An experimental study of government legitimacy
Mazepus, H., & van Leeuwen, F. (2019) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12440 · Cited by 59 · see citing works
Büthe, T., Djeffal, C., Lütge, C., Maasen, S., & von Ingersleben-Seip, N. (2022) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501763.2022.2126515 · Cited by 56 · see citing works
Bureaucratic expertise, overconfidence, and policy choice
Liu, X., Stoutenborough, J. W., & Vedlitz, A. (2016) · Governance · doi:10.1111/gove.12257 · Cited by 56 · see citing works
Koenig, P. D. (2023) · AI & Society · doi:10.1007/s00146-024-01987-z · Cited by 56 · see citing works
König, P. D., Felfeli, J., Achtziger, A., & Wenzelburger, G. (2022) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2022.2144938 · Cited by 55 · see citing works
The Administrative State Revisited
Waldo, D. (1965) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.2307/974004 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
Regulating for trust: Can law establish trust in artificial intelligence?
Tamò‐Larrieux, A., Guitton, C., Mayer, S., & Lutz, C. (2023) · Regulation & Governance · doi:10.1111/rego.12568 · Cited by 51 · see citing works
Aoki, N., Tatsumi, T., Naruse, G., & Maeda, K. (2024) · Government Information Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.giq.2024.101965 · Cited by 51 · see citing works
Holding AI-Based Systems Accountable in the Public Sector: A Systematic Review
Yuan, Q., & Chen, T. (2025) · Public Performance & Management Review · doi:10.1080/15309576.2025.2469784 · Cited by 50 · see citing works
Wang, Y., & Zhang, J. (2024) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12932 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
When bureaucratic expertise comes under attack
Christensen, J. (2022) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12905 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
Dickinson, H., & Yates, S. (2021) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2021.1972681 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
Good decision vs. good results: Outcome bias in the evaluation of financial agents
König-Kersting, C., Pollmann, M. M. H., Potters, J., & Trautmann, S. T. (2020) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-020-09773-1 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
Chen, W., Dong, B., Hsieh, C., Lee, M. J., Liu, N., Walker, R. M., Wang, Y., Wen, B., Wen, W., Wu, P., et al. (2022) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12860 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
Dekker, R., Koot, P., Birbil, Ş. İ., & Andres, M. V. E. (2022) · Big Data & Society · doi:10.1177/20539517221087855 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
Weberian Bureaucracy and Contemporary Governance
Kettl, D. F. (2021) · Perspectives on Public Management and Governance · doi:10.1093/ppmgov/gvab026 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
“It’s Not Over When It’s Over”―Post-Decision Arrangements and Empirical Legitimacy
de Fine Licht, J., Agerberg, M., & Esaiasson, P. (2022) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muab023 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
Williams, K. (2018) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12385 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
Li, Y., Koppenjan, J. F. M., & Wang, H. (2024) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2024.2369799 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
The Concept of Accountability in AI Ethics and Governance
Lechterman, T. M. (2022) · The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.013.10 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Yi, D., & Sun, Y. (2024) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2024.2370982 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Hillo, J., Vento, I., & Erkkilä, T. (2026) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.70028 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Inside algorithmic bureaucracy: Disentangling automated decision-making and good administration
Roehl, U., & Crompvoets, J. (2025) · Public Policy and Administration · doi:10.1177/09520767231197801 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Barbera, C., Ferry, L., Hyndman, N. S., Liguori, M., McCandless, S. A., & Midgley, H. (2025) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.70012 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Ingaggiati, M., Barbato, G., Guerci, M., & Ruffini, R. (2024) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2024.2358322 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
Rimkutė, D., & Mazepus, H. (2025) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13916 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
Accountability in Government Use of <scp>AI</scp> : Citizen Concerns and Preferences
Feng, N., & Chandra, Y. (2025) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.70030 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Tao, L., Wan, J., & Wen, B. (2025) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2024.2411632 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Brummel, L., & de Blok, L. (2024) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2024.2337843 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
Algorithmic formalization: Impacts on administrative processes
Cordella, A., & Gualdi, F. (2024) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.13030 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
The Challenges of Risk Profiling Used by Law Enforcement: Examining the Cases of COMPAS and SyRI
van Schendel, S. (2019) · Information Technology and Law Series · doi:10.1007/978-94-6265-279-8_12 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Fang, X., Zhou, H., & Chen, S. (2025) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.70015 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Zhang, J., Wen, X., Mao, H., Xu, R., & Zhang, S. (2024) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.13037 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Public Perceptions of the Administrative Values Tradeoff: Bureaucratic and Democratic Ethos
Jo, S., & Meier, K. J. (2024) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.13041 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Ruled by robots: preference for algorithmic decision makers and perceptions of their choices
Chugunova, M., & Luhan, W. J. (2024) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-024-01178-w · Cited by 12 · see citing works
Hohensinn, L., Willems, J., Soliman, M., Vanderelst, D., & Stoll, J. (2024) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2023.2269203 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Nieuwenhuizen, E., Trehan, V., & Porumbescu, G. A. (2025) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.70034 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Artificial Intelligence and the Modern Condition of Expertise
Heidelberg, R. L. (2024) · Administration & Society · doi:10.1177/00953997231204968 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Chugunova, M., & Luhan, W. J. (2025) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-024-01209-6
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 10
- Aron A., 2009, Statistics for Psychology
- Calo R., 2020, The Automated Administrative State: A Crisis of Legitimacy, Emory Law Journal, 70, 797
- Campbell D. T., 2015, Experimental and Quasi‐Experimental Designs for Research
- Cohen J., 1988, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences
- Eubanks V., 2018, Automating Inequality: How High‐Tech Tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor
- Lipsky M., 2010, Street‐Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service
- Mann M., 1993, The Sources of Social Power: Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation States 1760–1914
- Ohakawa T. C., 2024, Digital Tools and Technologies in Affordable Housing Design: Leveraging AI and Machine Learning for Optimized Outcomes, International Journal of Smart Cities and Housing Technologies, 10, 55
- Rohr J. A., 1986, To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy of the Administrative State
- Wood B. D., 1994, Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Negativity trumps source: exploring the perceptions of AI-advice among public officials
Cao, Y., & Liang, X. (2026) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2026.2685255
- Authors
- Liu, R., & Han, Y.
- Affiliations
- Nanjing University (CN)
- Corresponding author
- Han, Yanbing
- Venue
- Public Administration
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2026-02-12
- ISSN
- 0033-3298 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9299
- OpenAlex
- W7128717635
- Semantic Scholar
- f691a9eccb5c3704e31c3e0838e039c73603ff1b
- Cited by
- 2
- References
- 85
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2
- FWCI
- 11.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Public Administration (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (72404126, 72404124, 72134005)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › E-Government and Public Services
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
- Keywords
- AI accountability, state legitimacy, procedural justice, administrative discretion, AI governance, decision outcomes, citizen perceptions, public decision-making, China
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-11.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-11.
Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review