Agency as a Marker of Consciousness
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Abstract
Although both folk psychology and philosophical tradition regard agency as a legitimate marker of consciousness, this position is looked on with some suspicion by many consciousness scientists in favor of the view that the only legitimate basis on which to ascribe consciousness is introspective report. This chapter examines the question of whether this suspicion is justified. The first half of the chapter distinguishes a number of ways in which agency might be employed as a marker of consciousness, while the second half defends the use of agency as a marker of consciousness against objections that derive from findings in cognitive neuroscience and social psychology.
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Cited by
Cleeremans, A., Achoui, D., Beauny, A., Keuninckx, L., Martin, J.-R., Muñoz-Moldes, S., Vuillaume, L., & de Heering, A. (2020) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2019.11.011 · Cited by 142
Human Brain Organoids and Consciousness
Niikawa, T., Hayashi, Y., Shepherd, J., & Sawai, T. (2022) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-022-09483-1 · Cited by 79
“All animals are conscious”: Shifting the null hypothesis in consciousness science
Andrews, K. (2024) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12498 · Cited by 40
The presence of consciousness in absence seizures
Bayne, T. (2011) · Behavioural Neurology · doi:10.1155/2011/128567 · Cited by 15
Self-citationAffective experience and evidence for animal consciousness.
Butlin, P., & University of Arkansas Press (2020) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics20204816 · Cited by 6
Metadata
- Authors
- Bayne, T.
- Venue
- Decomposing the Will
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2013-03-25
- Pages
- 160-180
- OpenAlex
- W4233842937
- Cited by
- 23
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 8.59
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Bayne, T. (2013). Agency as a Marker of Consciousness. Decomposing the Will. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780199746996.003.0009
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