Learning to be conscious.
Open accessAbstract
Consciousness remains a formidable challenge. Different theories of consciousness have proposed vastly different mechanisms to account for phenomenal experience. Here, appealing to aspects of global workspace theory, higher-order theories, social theories, and predictive processing, we introduce a novel framework: the self-organizing metarerpresentational account (SOMA), in which consciousness is viewed as something that the brain learns to do. By this account, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to redescribe its own activity to itself, so developing systems of metarepresentations that qualify target first-order representations. Thus, experiences only occur in experiencers that have learned to know they possess certain first-order states and that have learned to care more about certain states than about others. In this sense, consciousness is the brain's (unconscious, embodied, enactive, nonconceptual) theory about itself.
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Consciousness must be learned.
“This accords with the idea that consciousness must be learned (Cleeremans, 2011; Cleeremans et al., 2020; Lacalli, 2024a)”
From The function(s) of consciousness revisited: insights from a modular/constitutive model using vision as a test case (2026) · cites this paper as Cleeremans et al., 2020
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Cellular Mechanisms of Conscious Processing
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Northoff, G., & Lamme, V. (2020) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.07.019 · Cited by 247 · see citing works
Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness
Doerig, A., Schurger, A., & Herzog, M. H. (2021) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2020.1772214 · Cited by 194 · see citing works
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196 · see citing works
Cogitate Consortium, Ferrante, O., Gorska-Klimowska, U., Henin, S., Hirschhorn, R., Khalaf, A., Lepauvre, A., Liu, L., Richter, D., Vidal, Y., et al. (2025) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-025-08888-1 · Cited by 136 · see citing works
“52,53).”
All in Good Time: Long-Lasting Postdictive Effects Reveal Discrete Perception
Herzog, M. H., Drissi-Daoudi, L., & Doerig, A. (2020) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2020.07.001 · Cited by 129 · see citing works
“For example, global workspace theory [87–89], higher-order theories [90,91], and the radical plasticity hypothesis [92] all propose that there is extensive and parallel unconscious processing in sensory areas, followed by a unified conscious percept.”
BackgroundConsciousness matters: phenomenal experience has functional value
Cleeremans, A., & Tallon‐Baudry, C. (2022) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niac007 · Cited by 158 · see citing works
Raccah, O., Block, N., & Fox, K. C. R. (2021) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.1141-20.2020 · Cited by 96 · see citing works
“involvement in conscious experience subscribe to either higher-order or global workspace theories (Baars, 1993; Brown, Lau, & LeDoux, 2019; Cleeremans et al., 2020; S. Dehaene, 2014; H. Lau, 2019b; Mashour, Roelfsema, Changeux, & Dehaene, 2020).”
BackgroundThe mnemonic basis of subjective experience
Lau, H. C., Michel, M., LeDoux, J. E., & Fleming, S. M. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-022-00068-6 · Cited by 91 · see citing works
Unpacking the complexities of consciousness: Theories and reflections
Mudrik, L., Boly, M., Dehaene, S., Fleming, S. M., Lamme, V., Seth, A., & Melloni, L. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106053 · Cited by 81 · see citing works
“There are also intermediate views, in which the first-order states contribute to conscious experience, but the higher-order states are more than mere pointers or indexes, and also furnish independent content (Cleeremans et al., 2020; LeDoux, 2020a; Van Gulick, 2004).”
Wahbeh, H., Radin, D. I., Cannard, C., & Arnaud Delorme, A. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.955594 · Cited by 58 · see citing works
“The HOTs family includes, for example, the self-organizing meta-representational account theory (SOMA; Cleeremans et al., 2020), the adversarial framework for probabilistic computation (Gershman, 2019), and the perceptual reality monitoring theory (Lau, 2019).”
BackgroundMethodMeasuring children's metalinguistic awareness
Roehr‐Brackin, K. (2024) · Language Teaching · doi:10.1017/s0261444824000016 · Cited by 52 · see citing works
“The researchers distinguish between access awareness, which is comparable to the notion of noticing, and phenomenal awareness, which implies verbalisable explicit knowledge (for a conceptualisation of different types of awareness or consciousness, see Cleeremans et al., 2020).”
BackgroundVagus Nerve Stimulation as a Gateway to Interoception
Paciorek, A., & Skora, L. I. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01659 · Cited by 48 · see citing works
The evolutionary origins of the Global Neuronal Workspace in vertebrates
Zacks, O., & Jablonka, E. (2023) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niad020 · Cited by 47 · see citing works
“More recently, he and his colleagues proposed that the brain learns to redescribe its own activity to itself, transforming unconscious first-order representations into conscious meta-representations (Cleeremans et al. 2020).”
BackgroundOsińska, A., Rynkiewicz, A., Binder, M., Komendziński, T., Lipiec-Borowicz, A., & Leszczyński, A. (2022) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2022.834507 · Cited by 39 · see citing works
“At a cognitive level of analysis, consciousness restoration through taVNS is consistent with an embodied, interoceptive model of the conscious self where the brain is assumed to constantly evaluate the signal from the physical body (Seth et al., 2012; Seth, 2013; Cleeremans et al., 2020; Paciorek and Skora, 2020; Yu e…”
BackgroundThe function of consciousness is to generate experiencePreprint
Cleeremans, A., & Tallon‐Baudry, C. (2021) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/jfpw2 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
From internal models toward metacognitive AI
Kawato, M., & Cortese, A. (2021) · Biological Cybernetics · doi:10.1007/s00422-021-00904-7 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
“One of the core proposals of the self-organizing mental representational account (SOMA) theory by Cleeremans et al. (2019) is that learning of a metarepresentation of first-order representations is essential for consciousness.”
How does the non-conscious become conscious?
LeDoux, J. E. (2020) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2020.01.033 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
Identifying cultural differences in metacognition.
van der Plas, E., Zhang, S., Dong, K., Bang, D., Li, J., Wright, N. D., & Fleming, S. M. (2022) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0001209 · Cited by 32 · see citing works
A possible evolutionary function of phenomenal conscious experience of pain
Kolodny, O., Moyal, R., & Edelman, S. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab012 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
Is predictive processing a theory of perceptual consciousness?
Marvan, T., & Havlík, M. (2020) · New Ideas in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2020.100837 · Cited by 30 · see citing works
Consciousness science: where are we, where are we going, and what if we get there?
Cleeremans, A., Mudrik, L., & Seth, A. K. (2025) · Frontiers in Science · doi:10.3389/fsci.2025.1546279 · Cited by 32 · see citing works
Kataoka, M., Niikawa, T., Nagaishi, N., Lee, T.-L., Erler, A., Savulescu, J., & Sawai, T. (2024) · European Journal of Cell Biology · doi:10.1016/j.ejcb.2024.151470 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
Wiese, W., & Friston, K. J. (2021) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2021.81 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
The No-Report Paradigm: A Revolution in Consciousness Research?
Duman, I., Ehmann, I. S., Gonsalves, A. R., Gültekin, Z., Van den Berckt, J., & van Leeuwen, C. (2022) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2022.861517 · Cited by 24 · see citing works
“Contextual emergentism provides a natural framework for, for instance, theories that view consciousness at the personal level as grounded in learning (Cleeremans et al., 2020), coordination behavior (Solfo and van Leeuwen, 2018), or from neural prediction failure (e.”
BackgroundThe function(s) of consciousness: an evolutionary perspective
Lacalli, T. C. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1493423 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
A beautiful loop: An active inference theory of consciousness.
Laukkonen, R., Friston, K., & Chandaria, S. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106296 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
“It is the sensation that psychedelics “ expand consciousness ” , “ heighten awareness ” , or reveal “ higher states Cleeremans et al., 2020).”
InfluentialUnconscious categorization of sub-millisecond complex images
Beauny, A., de Heering, A., Muñoz-Moldes, S., Martin, J., Beir, A. D., & Cleeremans, A. (2020) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0236467 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
“Adopting a similar view, the Self-Organizing Metarepresentational Account (SOMA) proposes that second-order meta-representations are necessary to enable a first order perceptual representation to become available for consciousness.”
BackgroundA construct-first approach to consciousness science
Fazekas, P., Cleeremans, A., & Overgaard, M. S. (2023) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105480 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
“Note that the lower-level constructs that SOMA relies on to explicate the higher-level construct of metarepresentation partly overlap with the constructs used by GNW and LRT: all three accounts make reference to the strength and stability of the first-order representations when characterizing which content elements ca…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialChen, H., Miao, G., Wang, S., Zheng, J., Zhang, X., Lin, J., Hao, C., Huang, H., Jiang, T., Gong, Y., et al. (2023) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2023.1118395 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
“Several leading theories of consciousness suggest that the prefrontal cortex is inextricably linked to consciousness (Seth and Bayne, 2022), like higher-order theories (HOTs) (Cleeremans et al., 2020; Fleming, 2020), and global workspace theories (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Mashour et al.”
BackgroundSchwitzgebel, E. (2026) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009694285 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
The functional contributions of consciousness
Ludwig, D. (2022) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2022.103383 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Neural Design Principles for Subjective Experience: Implications for Insects
Key, B., Zalucki, O. H., & Brown, D. J. (2021) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2021.658037 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Cultural influence on metacognition: comparison across three societies
Ordin, M., El‐Dakhs, D. A. S., Ming, T., Chu, F., & Polyanskaya, L. (2024) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-024-04013-1 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
“As societies differ in the perceived importance of understanding others ’ states of mind and social collaboration (Cleeremans et al. 2020; Hofstede et al. 2010a; Markus and Kitayama, 2010), the precision of understanding others ’ states of mind and intentions varies across globe (Heyes and Frith,…”
What does decoding from the PFC reveal about consciousness?
Block, N. J. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.05.004 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Functionally Effective Conscious AI Without Suffering
Agarwal, A., & Edelman, S. (2020) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness · doi:10.1142/s2705078520300030 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
“Another role is facilitating learning (Cleeremans, 2011; Cleeremans et al., 2020), especially of the unsupervised and autonomous variety (Metzinger, 2017).”
BackgroundThe Origins and Emergence of Self-Representation
Southgate, V. (2024) · Annual Review of Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-devpsych-120621-025747 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Evidences of emerging pain consciousness during prenatal development: a narrative review
Falsaperla, R., Collotta, A. D., Spatuzza, M., Familiari, M., Vitaliti, G., & Ruggieri, M. (2022) · Neurological Sciences · doi:10.1007/s10072-022-05968-2 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
“, phenomenal features like “experience of content,” the “what is like” of phenomenal (P-) consciousness [49], are the main topics of RPT, IIT, ST, and TTC, while theories like GNWT and HOT have targeted more cognitive aspects like the “awareness of content,” or access (A-) consciousness, linked to functions like worki…”
BackgroundThe Active Inference Model of Coherence Therapy
Chamberlin, D. E. (2023) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2022.955558 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
“” As suggested by the SOMA framework strong schemas may operate automatically outside of conscious awareness and control as long as the effects on behavior are adaptive (Cleeremans et al., 2020).”
BackgroundInfluentialBuilding the Blocks of Being: The Attributes and Qualities Required for Consciousness
Tait, I., Bensemann, J., & Nguyen, T. (2023) · Philosophies · doi:10.3390/philosophies8040052 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
“In both SOMA and HOT, meta-representations are both required and sufficient for consciousness, and are arrayed in a hierarchical structure (more explicitly in HOT than SOMA).”
MethodError-Correction for AI Safety
Aliman, N.-M., Elands, P. J. M., Hürst, W., Kester, L. J. H. M., Þórisson, K. R., Werkhoven, P. J., Yampolskiy, R. V., & Ziesche, S. (2020) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-52152-3_2 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
“In a nutshell, Popperian epistemology represents an important scientific guide but not an exclusive descriptive(2) account of brain functioning which substantially includes unconscious processing [14].”
BackgroundLǐ, Y., Wan, X., Zhang, Y., & Song, W. (2024) · Neuroscience Letters · doi:10.1016/j.neulet.2024.137986 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
The human biological advantage over AI
Stewart, W. (2024) · AI & Society · doi:10.1007/s00146-024-02112-w · Cited by 11 · see citing works
“But in a general sense, we can say that it involves a kind of recursion, an awareness of one-self (Cleeremans et al 2019).”
Froese, T. (2024) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e26040288 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
“Importantly, there is a broad consensus that a key signature of consciousness in the brain is that its high-dimensional neural state space is transformed into a low-dimensional system [46].”
BackgroundA First Principles Approach to Subjective Experience
Key, B., Zalucki, O. H., & Brown, D. J. (2022) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2022.756224 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
“Although the details about how or why this processing should feel like something is left unanswered by SOMA, we like how this account has at least attempted to provide a computational basis of re-representations.”
BackgroundInfluentialHybrid Cognitive-Affective Strategies for AI Safety
Aliman, N.-M. (2020) · doi:10.33540/203 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
An embarrassment of richnesses: the PFC isn’t the content NCC
Kozuch, B. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae017 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Granato, G., & Baldassarre, G. (2024) · Neural Networks · doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2024.106292 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Thiruvasagam, S., & Srinivasan, N. (2021) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103174 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
The effect of writing script on efficiency and metacognitive monitoring in inferential word learning
Polyanskaya, L., El‐Dakhs, D. A. S., Ming, T., Chu, F., & Ordin, M. (2024) · Metacognition and Learning · doi:10.1007/s11409-024-09380-3 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
“As societal perceptions of the importance of interpersonal understanding and social collaboration vary significantly (Cleeremans et al., 2020; Markus & Kitayama, 2010), the precision with which individuals are able to understand others’ mental states and intentions also varies across the globe…”
Bowman, H., Jones, W., Pincham, H. L., Fleming, S., Cleeremans, A., & Smith, M. (2022) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niac003 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
“Beyond HOT theory itself (Rosenthal 2005), five extant theories of consciousness broadly espouse such a view: (i) Higher-Order Representation Of a Representation theory (Brown 2015; Brown et al. 2019), (ii) Perceptual Reality Monitoring theory (Lau 2019), (iii) the Higher-Order State Space model (HOSS, Fleming 2020),…”
Quantifying empirical support for theories of consciousness: a tentative methodological framework
Kirkeby-Hinrup, A. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1341430 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“…the first-order theory of Block (1995); the Dispositional Higher-order theory of Carruthers (1998); the Same-Order Metarepresentational Account of Cleeremans et al. (2020); the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory of Dehaene and Naccache (2001); the Predictive Processing Theory of Friston (2013);…”
Key, B., & Brown, D. J. (2024) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niae034 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“This basic premise has similarities to another recent described framework of consciousness referred to as the self-organizing meta-representational account (SOMA) (Cleeremans et al. 2020).”
BackgroundThe value of consciousness: experiences worth having
Moncoucy, L., Dołęga, K., Tallon-Baudry, C., & Cleeremans, A. (2025) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2024.0303 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Self-citationWhy using “consciousness” in psychotherapy? Insight, metacognition and self-consciousness
Martin, S. S. (2023) · New Ideas in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2023.101015 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
“Another approach would be to differentiate sentience from consciousness, as neurobiology and neuroscience long ago started to use sentience as a mechanism distinct from human consciousness (Cleeremans et al., 2020).”
BackgroundInfluentialVelázquez, J. L. P., Mateos, D. M., Guevara, R., & Erra, R. G. (2024) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2024.1426986 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Consciousness and its hard problems: Separating the ontological from the evolutionary.
Lacalli, T. (2023) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1196576 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Patniyot, N. S. (2021) · Medical Hypotheses · doi:10.1016/j.mehy.2021.110664 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Our brains sense the future through a new quantum-like implicit learning mechanism
Escolà-Gascón, Á. (2024) · Brain Research Bulletin · doi:10.1016/j.brainresbull.2024.111048 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Evaluating the explanatory power of the Conscious Turing Machine
Kirkeby-Hinrup, A., Stenseke, J., & Overgaard, M. S. (2024) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2024.103736 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
How does the quality space come to be?
Dołęga, K., Mentec, I., & Cleeremans, A. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.10.007 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Next generation antidepressants with novel mechanisms for treatment resistant depression
Chen, M., Tu, P., & Su, T. (2023) · Progress in brain research · doi:10.1016/bs.pbr.2023.02.005 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Consciousness in Solitude: Is Social Interaction Really a Necessary Condition?
Rahimian, S. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.630922 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Is Learning the Cognitive Basis of Consciousness? The Moral Implications of SOMA
Overgaard, M. S., & Kirkeby-Hinrup, A. (2020) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2020.08.004 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
A comprehensive taxonomy of machine consciousness
Qin, R., Zhou, C., & He, M. (2025) · Information Fusion · doi:10.1016/j.inffus.2025.102994 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Tool evolution as a prerequisite for consciousness
Korth, C. (2025) · Reviews in the Neurosciences · doi:10.1515/revneuro-2024-0166 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Origins and Evolution of Imagination, From Australopithecus to Modern‐Day Deep Learning
Sidhu, K., Roy, R., & D’Angiulli, A. (2026) · Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.70030 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“Moreover, there is a consensus that non-living entities lack emotions and do not experience desires or consciousness (Cleeremans 2019), meaning they fundamentally lack the qualities of self-consciousness (Cleeremans et al. 2020).”
Concurrent visual sequence learning
Wilts, S., & Haider, H. (2023) · Psychological Research · doi:10.1007/s00426-023-01810-2 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“This processing of the target stimuli depends on bottom-up saliences and top-down intentional weighting so that characteristics of the targets influence the processing of its features and hence, on their impact on human behavior (Cleeremans et al., 2020; Memelink & Hommel, 2012).”
BackgroundMental causation: an evolutionary perspective
Lacalli, T. C. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1394669 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“…theory-independent) stance taken by some in the field, that consciousness (conscious agency in this formulation) must be learned (Cleeremans, 2011; Cleeremans et al., 2020; see also Jablonka and Ginsburg, 2022), or similarly, for theories where consciousness depends on the emergence of a self,…”
BackgroundTheory and Practice of Awareness Measurement in Experimental Cognitive Research
Kulieva, A. K. K., Вадимович, Т. Р., & Ivanchei, I. I. (2021) · Experimental Psychology (Russia) · doi:10.17759/exppsy.2021140409 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Do You Need to Be Conscious to Learn to Be Conscious?
Cleeremans, A., Achoui, D., Beauny, A., Keuninckx, L., Martin, J., Muñoz-Moldes, S., Vuillaume, L., & de Heering, A. (2020) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2020.10.002 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Craffert, P. F. (2024) · HTS religion & society series · doi:10.4102/aosis.2024.bk500.00 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
The performance of mind: from movement, mental states, and consciousness
Cheron, G. A., & Cebolla, A. M. (2026) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1736933 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“In this line, Cleeremans et al. (2020) propose the existence of a common prediction-driven learning mechanisms, perceptual and self-awareness, operating over three loops: an inner loop, a perception– action loop, and a self–other loop.”
Granato, G., Mattera, A., Cartoni, E., & Baldassarre, G. (2026) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-026-37612-w · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“For instance, higher-order perspectives 100 emphasise metacognitive evaluation, and approaches such as SOMA 101 describe recurrent metacognitive-evaluative loops but neglect goal-directed representational manipulations.”
Unexpected benefits of self-modelling in neural systems
Premakumar, V. N., Vaiana, M., Pop, F., Rosenblatt, J., de Lucena, D. S., Ziman, K., & Graziano, M. S. A. (2026) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences · doi:10.1098/rsta.2024.0531 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Loops all the way up: Recurrency as an implementation-first primitive for consciousness
Zheng, Z., Chis-Ciure, R., Waade, P. T., Eiserbeck, A., Aru, J., Andrillon, T., Jarraya, B., Melloni, L., Northoff, G., Rosas, F. E., et al. (2026) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2026.07.006 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Cleeremans, A., & Overgaard, M. S. (2026) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhag144 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Wierzchoń, M. (2022) · Roczniki Psychologiczne · doi:10.18290/rpsych21242-6s · Cited by 1 · see citing works
How to interpret LeDoux’s multistate hierarchical theory of consciousness
Brown, R. (2024) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhae389 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Brains and where else? Mapping theories of consciousness to unconventional embodiments
Rouleau, N., & Levin, M. G. (2026) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences · doi:10.1098/rsta.2025.0082 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Unifying consciousness theories with MaxCon: maximizing configurations of the brain webPreprint
Velázquez, J. L. P., Mateos, D. M., Wennberg, R. A., & Erra, R. G. (2023) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/af4n5 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
The origins and emergence of self-representationPreprint
Southgate, V. (2024) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/ys659 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Lacalli, T. (2026) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1829430
“Section 4 explores the learning task required if Cleeremans’ premise is correct, that consciousness must be learned (Cleeremans, 2011; Cleeremans et al., 2020) or, more precisely, that if conscious agency depends on a learning process, what that process is.”
Neuroscience undermines the higher-order theorists' preferred solution to the targetless HOT problem
Kozuch, B. (2026) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2026.2629514
“In contrast, Lower-deck PFC Theory maintains that while the PFC is essential for consciousness, activity there does not constitute the content of experience (Cleeremans et al., 2020; Lau, 2019; Michel, 2025).”
Interaction of Human Temporality and External World
Lubashevsky, I., & Plavinska, N. (2021) · Understanding complex systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-82612-3_4
Book Review: In Consciousness We Trust by Hakwan Lau
Cheng, T., & Lin, Y. (2022) · Perception · doi:10.1177/03010066221102881
“Ch.6 argues that neither global nor local theories seem right given what has been discussed so far, so the author’s alternative—the centralist proposal—looms large (other centralists include, e.g., Cleeremans et al., 2020).”
BackgroundA Runtime Framework of mindPreprint
Li, F., & Zhang, X. (2022) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/gmbc8
6. Supercedure: Into the Posthuman
Matthews, P. (2023) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0348.06
Matthews, P. (2023) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0348.07
Matthews, P. (2023) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0348.05
Matthews, P. (2023) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0348.02
Transparent Minds in Science Fiction
Matthews, P. (2023) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0348
Matthews, P. (2023) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0348.01
Matthews, P. (2023) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0348.03
4. The Alien, the Artificial, and the Extended
Matthews, P. (2023) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0348.04
What We Are for Us, What We Are for Others: Consciousness and Identity
López-Segura, P., & Alonso, T. O. (2023) · Logic, argumentation & reasoning · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-46742-4_12
The jungle of consciousness—current neuroscientific theories
Northoff, G. (2024) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-821935-5.00045-4
The ecology of consciousness: Modes, domains, cycles, levels and states of givenness
Craffert, P. F. (2024) · HTS religion & society series · doi:10.4102/aosis.2024.bk500.17
- Authors
- Cleeremans, A., Achoui, D., Beauny, A., Keuninckx, L., Martin, J.-R., Muñoz-Moldes, S., Vuillaume, L., & de Heering, A.
- Affiliations
- Université Libre de Bruxelles (BE)
- Corresponding author
- Cleeremans, Axel
- Venue
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2020-02
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 112-123
- ISSN
- 1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1924059505
- Semantic Scholar
- a17ac90617afd51bcf94988217d0c96058b927aa
- Cited by
- 142
- References
- 121
- Citations by year
- 2026: 22 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 44 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 13
- FWCI
- 1.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- Locations
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Dépôt institutionnel de l'Université libre de Bruxelles (Université Libre de Bruxelles) (submittedVersion)
- Dépôt institutionnel de l'Université libre de Bruxelles (Université Libre de Bruxelles) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research
- European Research Council
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Keywords
- consciousness, metarepresentation, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, phenomenal experience, first-order representation, embodied cognition, enactive cognition, non-conceptual content
- MeSH terms
- Brain, Consciousness, Humans, Learning, Unconsciousness
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