Cited by 6Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEmbodied and Extended CognitionAnimal Behavior and Welfare Studies

Affective experience and evidence for animal consciousness.

Butlin, Patrick, University of Arkansas Press·2020·Philosophical Topics

Abstract

Affective experience in nonhuman animals is of great interest for both theoretical and practical reasons. This paper highlights research by the psychologists Anthony Dickinson and Bernard Balleine which provides particularly good evidence of conscious affective experience in rats. This evidence is compelling because it implicates a sophisticated system for goal-directed action selection, and demonstrates a contrast between apparently conscious and unconscious evaluative representations with similar content. Meanwhile, the evidence provided by some well-known studies on pain in nonhuman animals is much less convincing. This comparison may offer lessons for the future study of animal consciousness.

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Crossref · 10.5840/philtopics20204816

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  • Since position-dependent and evaluative contents operate synergistically in our own consciousness, an emergent consciousness would be expected to contain both, which accords with the argument that affect should lie at the core of an evolved consciousness.

    “Since these operate in a synergistic way in our own consciousness, the expectation is that an emergent consciousness would contain both, which accords with the argument that affect should lie at the core of an evolved consciousness (e.g., see Cabanac, 1992; Dickinson and Balleine, 2010; Butlin, 2020; Cleeremans and Tallon-Baudry, 2022).”

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Authors
Butlin, P., & University of Arkansas Press
Corresponding author
Butlin, Patrick
Venue
Philosophical Topics
Published
2020
Volume
48
Issue
1
Pages
109-127
ISSN
0276-2080 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3209743885
Cited by
6
References
60
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2022: 3
FWCI
0.72
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Philosophical Topics (publishedVersion)
  • Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Health Sciences › Veterinary › Small Animals › Animal Behavior and Welfare Studies
Keywords
animal consciousness, emotional experience, rats

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