On What Matters: Volume One
Abstract
This book, on moral philosophy, is the long-awaited follow-up to Reasons and Persons, one of the landmarks of twentieth-century philosophy. It presents a powerful new treatment of reasons and rationality, and a critical examination of three systematic moral theories — Immanuel Kant's ethics, contractualism, and consequentialism — leading to a ground-breaking synthetic conclusion. Along the way the book discusses a wide range of moral issues, such as the significance of consent, treating people as a means rather than an end, and free will and responsibility.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
There is considerable metaethical debate about whether normative objective values exist.
“there is considerable metaethical debate about whether values, of a kind that are both normative and objective, actually exist”
From Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment (2020) · cites this paper as Parfit 2011
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment
Gabriel, I. (2020) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-020-09539-2 · Cited by 896 · see citing works
The Superintelligent Will: Motivation and Instrumental Rationality in Advanced Artificial Agents
Bostrom, N. (2012) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-012-9281-3 · Cited by 254 · see citing works
Tersman, F., & Risberg, O. (2022) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-022-10275-y · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Faultless Disagreement as Evidence for Moral Relativism
Denning, P., & Philosophy Documentation Center (2022) · Thought: A Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/tht202341718
- Authors
- Parfit, D.
- Corresponding author
- Parfit, Derek
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2011-05-26
- OpenAlex
- W4213023609
- Cited by
- 350
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 47 · 2025: 49 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 56 · 2020: 30 · 2019: 41 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 4.69
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Keywords
- moral reasons, rationality, Kantian ethics, contractualism, consequentialism, moral theory, consent, free will, moral responsibility, ethics
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
