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Cited by 182

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

On the Economics of Labels: How Their Introduction Affects the Functioning of Markets and the Welfare of All Participants

Bonroy, Olivier, Constantatos, Christos·2015·American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Abstract

Are labels good or bad for consumers and firms? The answer may seem straightforward since labels improve information, yet economic theory reveals situations where their introduction reduces the welfare of at least some market participants. This essay reviews the theoretical literature on labels in order to identify and explain the main reasons that may cause labeling to produce undesirable side‐effects. In contrast to earlier reviews that either concentrate on narrow topics or treat the subject in a more or less informal way, we bring together the main results from all the relevant topics by presenting and discussing the assumptions and model‐building techniques that underpin them. The advantage of this approach is that it identifies the origin of the differences between results, thus allowing the synthesis of results that sometimes appear even to be contradictory. We focus on “quality labels” and examine the impact of labeling on market structure, the side‐effects of costly certification, issues related to the label's trustworthiness, the rationale for mandatory vs. voluntary labeling, the level at which the label's standard is set according to the agency that selects it, the political economy of labels, that is, pro‐ or anti‐label lobbying, lobbying to affect the label's standard, and lobbying in favor or against the label's mandatory imposition. These topics cover a wide range of applications, including Genetically Modified Organism (GMOs), organic produce, geographic indicators, controlled origin, eco‐labels, etc. We conclude by identifying topics that require further research.

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Cites

  • Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud

    Darby, M. R., & Karni, E. (1973) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466756 · Cited by 3,947 · cited 1×

    “The introduction of a label or a modification of its standard creates gainers and losers, who stand on opposite sides with respect to implementing such regulatory intervention. For instance, some interest groups may resist the introduction of “GMfree” labels while other groups may wish to increase the purity requireme…”
    Background
  • Monopoly and product quality

    Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6 · Cited by 3,306

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Metadata

Authors
Bonroy, O., & Constantatos, C.
Venue
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2014-09-24
Volume
97
Issue
1
Pages
239-259
ISSN
  • 0002-9092 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-8276
OpenAlex
W2126559183
Cited by
182
References
2
FWCI
12.25
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: On the Economics of Labels: How Their Introduction Affects the Functioning of Markets and the Welfare of All Participants. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/ajae/aau088
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Bonroy, O., & Constantatos, C. (2015). On the Economics of Labels: How Their Introduction Affects the Functioning of Markets and the Welfare of All Participants. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. https://doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aau088

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