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V.—Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description
Abstract
Bertrand Russell; V.—Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 11, Issue 1, 1 June 1911, Page
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Items 401–500 of 796
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Russellians should have a no proposition view of empty names
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Slabey, M. (2007) · UA Campus Repository (The University of Arizona)
Bagni, G. T. (2006) · Redalyc (Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México)
Metadata
- Authors
- Russell, B.
- Corresponding author
- Russell, Bertrand
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1911-06-01
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 108-128
- ISSN
- 0066-7374 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9264
- OpenAlex
- W2505960753
- Cited by
- 799
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 74 · 2025: 59 · 2024: 42 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 59 · 2018: 29 · 2017: 20 · 2016: 33 · 2015: 38 · 2014: 25 · 2013: 37 · 2012: 51
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Keywords
- knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge by description, epistemology
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