The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge?
Abstract
Among philosophers of science there seems to be a general consensus that understanding represents a species of knowledge, but virtually every major epistemologist who has thought seriously about understanding has come to deny this claim. Against this prevailing tide in epistemology, I argue that understanding is, in fact, a species of knowledge: just like knowledge, for example, understanding is not transparent and can be Gettiered. I then consider how the psychological act of “grasping” that seems to be characteristic of understanding differs from the sort of psychological act that often characterizes knowledge. 1. Zagzebski's account 2. Kvanvig's account 3. Two problems 4. Comanche cases 5. Unreliable sources of information 6. The upper-right quadrant 7. So is understanding a species of knowledge? 8. A false choice
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Cited by
The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations
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No understanding without explanation
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Understanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge
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Hills, A. (2016) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12092 · Cited by 289
EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY, PREEMPTIVE REASONS, AND UNDERSTANDING
Jäger, C. (2016) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2015.38 · Cited by 144
Metadata
- Authors
- Grimm, S. R.
- Venue
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2006-09-01
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 515-535
- ISSN
- 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3537
- OpenAlex
- W2038906023
- Cited by
- 464
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 16.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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