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Cited by 85Philosophy and History of SciencePhilosophy, Science, and HistoryPhilosophy and Theoretical Science

Physical Causation and Difference-Making

Ney, Alyssa·2009·The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
DOI 10.1093/bjps/axp037
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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between physical theories of causation and theories of difference-making. It is plausible to think that such theories are compatible with one another as they are aimed at different targets: the former, an empirical account of actual causal relations; the latter, an account that will capture the truth of most of our ordinary causal claims. The question then becomes: what is the relationship between physical causation and difference-making? Is one kind of causal fact more fundamental than the other? This paper defends causal foundationalism: the view that facts about difference-making are dependent on the obtaining of facts about physical causation. However, the paper's main goal is to clarify the structure of the debate. At the end of the paper, it is shown how settling the issue about the relationship between physical theories of causation and theories of difference-making has more than mere intrinsic interest in unifying the very different pursuits that have been undertaken in the philosophy of causation. It can help to break a stalemate that has arisen in the current debate about mental causation. 1. Two Pursuits in the Philosophy of Causation 2. Causal Foundationalism and its Rivals 3. Anti-foundationalism: Russell and Field 4. Against the Russell/Field Arguments 5. The Case for Foundationalism 6. Causing and ‘Causing’ 7. An Application: Mental Causation

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  • The risk of omitting crucial details and focusing on irrelevancies is not unique to complex algorithms.

    “While this is a real risk, it is worth noting that this risk is by no means unique to complex algorithms.”

    From AI, Opacity, and Personal Autonomy (2022) · cites this paper as Ney, 2009

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Authors
Ney, A.
Affiliations
University of Rochester (US)
Corresponding author
Ney, Alyssa
Venue
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Published
2009-12-01
Volume
60
Issue
4
Pages
737-764
ISSN
  • 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-3537
DOI
10.1093/bjps/axp037
OpenAlex
W2155833355
Cited by
85
References
33
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 6 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 2
FWCI
17.15
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
  • HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Syracuse University
  • University of Rochester
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
physical causality, difference-making, anti-foundationalism, actual causation, mental causation, fields, metaphysics of causation

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