The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Quantum Theory: A Pragmatist Approach
Abstract
While its applications have made quantum theory arguably the most successful theory in physics, its interpretation continues to be the subject of lively debate within the community of physicists and philosophers concerned with conceptual foundations. This situation poses a problem for a pragmatist for whom meaning derives from use. While disputes about how to use quantum theory have arisen from time to time, they have typically been quickly resolved, and consensus reached, within the relevant scientific sub-community. Yet, rival accounts of the meaning of quantum theory continue to proliferate.1 In this article, I offer a diagnosis of this situation and outline a pragmatist solution to the problem it poses, leaving further details for subsequent articles. 1 Introduction 2 The Objectivity of Quantum Probabilities 2.1 Quantum probabilities are objective 2.2 Quantum probabilities do not represent physical reality 3 How Quantum Theory Limits Description of Physical Reality 4 The Relational Nature of Quantum States 4.1 Rovelli's relationism 4.2 Quantum Bayesian relationism 4.3 Reference-frame relationism 4.4 Agent-situation relationism and wave-collapse 4.5 Why quantum probabilities are not Lewisian chances 5 The Objectivity of Physical Description in Quantum Theory 5.1 Why violations of Bell inequalities involve no physical non-locality 5.2 Objectivity, inter-subjectivity, and Wigner's friend 6 Conclusion
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Citations
Cites
Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?
Einstein, A., Podolsky, B., & Rosen, N. (1935) · Physical Review · doi:10.1103/physrev.47.777 · Cited by 16,654
Decoherence, einselection, and the quantum origins of the classical
Zurek, W. H. (2003) · Reviews of Modern Physics · doi:10.1103/revmodphys.75.715 · Cited by 4,295 · cited 1×
“As Zurek ([2009]) explains, the post-interaction state of the detector and its environment acts as a witness of the horizontal polarization quantum state that may be consulted in many independent ways by an agent.”
BackgroundOn the Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics
BELL, J. S. (1966) · Reviews of Modern Physics · doi:10.1103/revmodphys.38.447 · Cited by 2,845
Rovelli, C. (1996) · International Journal of Theoretical Physics · doi:10.1007/bf02302261 · Cited by 1,381
Reference frames, superselection rules, and quantum information
Bartlett, S. D., Rudolph, T., & Spekkens, R. W. (2007) · Reviews of Modern Physics · doi:10.1103/revmodphys.79.555 · Cited by 827
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance
Lewis, D. (1980) · IFS · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_14 · Cited by 799 · cited 1×
“Despite his avowed subjectivism about probability, David Lewis ([1980])”
BackgroundSimple unified form for the major no-hidden-variables theorems
Mermin, N. D. (1990) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.65.3373 · Cited by 753
Zurek, W. H. (2009) · Nature Physics · doi:10.1038/nphys1202 · Cited by 564
QBism, the Perimeter of Quantum Bayesianism
Fuchs, C. A. (2010) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1003.5209 · Cited by 295
Cited by
Is the Quantum State Real? An Extended Review of ψ-Ontology Theorems
Leifer, M. S. (2014) · Quanta · doi:10.12743/quanta.v3i1.22 · Cited by 307
Adlam, E. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03989-0 · Cited by 38
Metadata
- Authors
- Healey, R.
- Venue
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2012-12-01
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 729-771
- ISSN
- 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3537
- OpenAlex
- W2129543243
- Cited by
- 170
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 4.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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