A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance
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The global optimization of consciousness is a mechanism of global subjective optimization that does not always entail objective optimality, though it must approximate objective optimality reliably enough.
“This is a mechanism of global “subjective” (here in roughly the sense of “subjective Bayesian”) optimization, which does not always entail “objective” optimality, though it must approximate the latter reliably enough (cf., Lewis, 1980).”
From The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood (2018) · cites this paper as Lewis, 1980
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BackgroundAccuracy and the Laws of Credence
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“Second, he appeals to a weak version of David Lewis’ Principal Principle, which says that, if an agent were to learn with certainty that the objective chances are given by p, the unique rational response to that evidence would be to adopt p (Lewis, 1980).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialWhat Conditional Probability Could Not Be
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“We then note how this move in interpretation is radically different from the one offered by the followers of “objective chance” in the Lewisian sense (Lewis, 1986a,b).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialIs the Quantum State Real? An Extended Review of ψ-Ontology Theorems
Leifer, M. (2014) · Quanta · doi:10.12743/quanta.v3i1.22 · Cited by 320 · see citing works
“Of course, both Popper and Lewis intend a more realist interpretation of quantum theory.”
BackgroundInfluentialA DEFENSE OF IMPRECISE CREDENCES IN INFERENCE AND DECISION MAKING1
Joyce, J. M. (2010) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00194.x · Cited by 295 · see citing works
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“The problem at bottom is that chance is really just a 'folk' concept, as Lewis admits in as many words ([1980], p.”
BackgroundInfluentialThe reference class problem is your problem too
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Beyond Subjective and Objective in Statistics
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“preted. • Assuming that frequentist probabilities from sampling models should be equal to the subjectivist or objectivist epistemic probabilities if it is known that the sampling model is true (which Lewis, 1980, called “the principal principle”), the parameter prior can still be interpreted as giving epistemic probab…”
BackgroundAmbiguity and the Bayesian Paradigm
Gilboa, I., & Marinacci, M. (2016) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_21 · Cited by 252 · see citing works
Interventionist counterfactuals
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Combinations of Tense and Modality
Thomason, R. H. (2002) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-0462-5_3 · Cited by 239 · see citing works
How Probabilities Reflect Evidence
Joyce, J. M. (2005) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00058.x · Cited by 239 · see citing works
“David Lewis (1980) dubs this the ‘Principal Principle’.”
BackgroundCounterfactual Theories of Causation
Menzies, P., & Beebee, H. (2001) · Cited by 223 · see citing works
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“Nor can you pay an infinitesimal amount for a bet; credences so understood can’t be infinitesimal numbers, pace Lewis (1980) and Skyrms (1980).”
BackgroundReasoning, decision making and rationality
Evans, J. S. B. T. (1993) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(93)90039-x · Cited by 204 · see citing works
The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Sceptic's Guide to Objective Chance
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“(Lewis 1983b p.99-100)20.”
BackgroundSubjective probability and quantum certainty
Caves, C. M., Fuchs, C. A., & Schack, R. (2007) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics · doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2006.10.007 · Cited by 175 · see citing works
“Instead of discussing the conceptual difficulties of orthodox statistics, we focus on a simpler and more direct postulate designed to bridge the category distinction between probability and physical parameters, namely, Lewis’s Principal Principle [49, 50].”
BackgroundWhat Else Justification Could Be1
Smith, M. J. (2010) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00729.x · Cited by 175 · see citing works
“Once we do reflect carefully upon the fallibility of perception, so this thought goes, these troublesome intuitions are exposed as a kind of groundless 3 One may think of this as an instance of what of David Lewis (1980) called the ‘principal principle’.”
BackgroundQuantum Theory: A Pragmatist Approach
Healey, R. (2012) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axr054 · Cited by 174 · see citing works
“Despite his avowed subjectivism about probability, David Lewis ([1980])”
BackgroundThe Pragmatic Values of Evidential Sentences
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Humean Reductionism about Laws of Nature
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“(Lewis 1986, p. 123) To help flesh this idea out more fully, let us imagine someone whom I will call a Limited Oracular Perfect Physicist.”
BackgroundRegularity and Hyperreal Credences
Easwaran, K. (2013) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2366479 · Cited by 154 · see citing works
“Skyrms and Lewis cite Bernstein and Wattenberg (1969) for a mathematically sophisticated account of how this could work, but they don’t consider the details explicitly themselves.”
BackgroundInfluentialKnowledge, probability, and adversaries
Halpern, J. Y., & Tuttle, M. R. (1993) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/153724.153770 · Cited by 152 · see citing works
MORAL DISAGREEMENT AND MORAL SKEPTICISM
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Reductive Theories of Modality
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David Lewis's Humean Theory of Objective Chance
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Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief
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Locating IBE in the Bayesian framework
Weisberg, J. (2008) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9305-y · Cited by 143 · see citing works
Sleeping Beauty and the Dynamics of De Se Beliefs
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“16See Lewis (1980).”
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The Non-Governing Conception of Laws of Nature
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Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism
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The puzzle of the unmarked clock and the new rational reflection principle
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“12 As was pointed out to me by Michael Titelbaum, the proof in the text is analogous to the proof that the ‘‘Old’’ Principal Principle is in tension with Humeanism about laws of nature (Hall 1994; Lewis 1994).”
BackgroundInfluentialDefeating Dr. Evil with Self‐Locating Belief
Elga, A. (2004) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00400.x · Cited by 133 · see citing works
“Remember that it follows from (1)-(3) that when Al awakens in TOSS&DUPLICATION, he ought to have the same credence that he is Al as that he is the duplicate.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialWhat Does It Mean to be Biased
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“…of a given color in an urn from which random draws are taken) as subjective degrees of belief, where such probabilities are available (the so-called Principal principle, Lewis, 1986; Meacham, 2010), and this is what we have assumed in our examples of populations and adverse events such as diseases.”
BackgroundInfinitesimal Chances and the Laws of Nature
Elga, A. (2004) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/713659804 · Cited by 131 · see citing works
“The [fair spinner's] chance of stopping exactly where it did was not zero; it was in®nitesimal, and in®nitesimal chance is still some chance' [Lewis 1986b: 176] and writes `It might happenÐthere is some chance of it, in®nitesimal but not zeroÐthat each nucleus lasted for precisely its expected…”
BackgroundInfluentialA Field Guide to Recent Work on the Foundations of Statistical MechanicsPreprint
Frigg, R. (2008) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.4324/9781315612676.ch3 · Cited by 131 · see citing works
“Does SM explain TD and if so in what sense? This question is clearly stated by Sklar (1993, 148-154; 2000, 740) Callender (1999, 372-373) and Hellman (1999, 210), but it still awaits an in-depth discussion.”
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On the Emergence of Time in Quantum Gravity
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Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity
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“This just is the requirement that any world w is closer than any 10For discussion, see Lewis (1980) .”
BackgroundArguments for–or against–Probabilism?
Hájek, A. (2008) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axn045 · Cited by 126 · see citing works
Loewer, B. (2001) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics · doi:10.1016/s1355-2198(01)00028-4 · Cited by 286 · see citing works
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“12 For classic discussions, see Lewis (1986), Hall (1994) and Lewis (1994).”
BackgroundSleeping Beauty: reply to Elga
Lewis, D. (2001) · Analysis · doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00291 · Cited by 121 · see citing works
“(See Mellor 1971; Lewis 1980.)”
Self-citationBayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding
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“14 On causal decision theory, see Lewis (1981).”
BackgroundBenci, V., Horsten, L., & Wenmackers, S. (2012) · Milan Journal of Mathematics · doi:10.1007/s00032-012-0191-x · Cited by 119 · see citing works
“It has been suggested that using infinitesimals, as available in the framework of nonstandard analysis (NSA), would allow describing regular probability functions on infinite domains [18, 21].”
MethodThau, M. (1994) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/103.412.491 · Cited by 117 · see citing works
Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence
Chalmers, D. J. (2011) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzr046 · Cited by 113 · see citing works
“Cases like this are familiar from the work of Perry (1979) and Lewis (1983). The following variant on Lewis’s ‘two gods’ case makes the point clearest for our purposes. 6This sort of strategy is reminiscent of the appeal to metalinguistic propositions by Stalnaker (1984).”
BackgroundTwenty-One Arguments against Propensity Analyses of Probability
Eagle, A. (2004) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1023/b:erke.0000023408.61887.6a · Cited by 108 · see citing works
“(1982), and Lewis (1997) in which dispositions supervene on”
BackgroundInfluentialDorst, K. M. (2021) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-10469499 · Cited by 111 · see citing works
Wallace, D. (2006) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axl023 · Cited by 104 · see citing works
“We do, however, have a good theory of how OP fits into our general conceptual scheme: it does so via Lewis’s Principal Principle (Lewis 1980).”
BackgroundKopec, M., & Titelbaum, M. G. (2016) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12318 · Cited by 105 · see citing works
Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic
Huemer, M. (2009) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axp008 · Cited by 104 · see citing works
Hitchcock, C. (2004) · Synthese · doi:10.1023/b:synt.0000024889.29125.c0 · Cited by 102 · see citing works
“5 Bartha and Hitchcock (1999) argue that a similar mistake is implicated in Leslie’s Doomsday argument (Leslie 1996): the evidential relevance of my time of birth for doom given that I am born at all is mistaken for the unconditional relevance of my time of birth for doom.”
BackgroundProbability Logic and Probabilistic Induction
Greenland, S. (1998) · Epidemiology · doi:10.1097/00001648-199805000-00018 · Cited by 97 · see citing works
Two Mistakes Regarding the Principal Principle
Meacham, C. J. G. (2009) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axp044 · Cited by 98 · see citing works
On the Foundations of Decision Theory
Binmore, K. (2017) · Homo Oeconomicus · doi:10.1007/s41412-017-0056-1 · Cited by 98 · see citing works
“This error is built into the ‘‘Principal Principle’’ of the philosopher Lewis (1980), which says that credences must coincide with chances when the latter are to be found.”
BackgroundA PROBABILISTIC SEMANTICS FOR COUNTERFACTUALS. PART A
Leitgeb, H. (2011) · The Review of Symbolic Logic · doi:10.1017/s1755020311000153 · Cited by 96 · see citing works
The Metaphysics of Representation
Williams, J. R. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198850205.001.0001 · Cited by 96 · see citing works
Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes: A Critique of Lewis
Menzies, P. (1989) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/289518 · Cited by 94 · see citing works
Frigg, R., & Hoefer, C. (2007) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics · doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2006.12.002 · Cited by 94 · see citing works
“Lewis’ account (1994) is in fact a proposal for how to understand laws of nature as well as objective probabilities.”
BackgroundInfluentialConditioning against the Grain
Kaufmann, S. C. (2004) · Journal of Philosophical Logic · doi:10.1023/b:logi.0000046142.51136.bf · Cited by 93 · see citing works
“8 Principles of this sort have been postulated by Lewis (1980, 1994) , van Fraassen”
BackgroundIndeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle
Field, H. H. (2000) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00200 · Cited by 93 · see citing works
“As is widely recognized (e.g. Lewis 1980, Leeds 1984, Skyrms 1984), it seems impossible to provide a non-circular reductive explanation of the notion of objective chance; all we can do is specify its conceptual role.”
BackgroundConditionalization, Reflection, and Self-Knowledge
Weisberg, J. (2007) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9073-4 · Cited by 90 · see citing works
“Reflection and Lewis’ Principal Principle ( Lewis, 1980 ) is suggestive in this connection.”
BackgroundCausation, Chance, and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence
Price, H. (2012) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-1630912 · Cited by 90 · see citing works
Updating, Undermining, and Independence
Weisberg, J. (2014) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axt052 · Cited by 89 · see citing works
“Pryor ([2013]), who worries that we would be moving epistemologically important work ‘offstage’.”
BackgroundA NEW EPISTEMIC UTILITY ARGUMENT FOR THE PRINCIPAL PRINCIPLE
Pettigrew, R. (2013) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2013.5 · Cited by 89 · see citing works
Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain
Dorst, K. M. (2019) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12561 · Cited by 89 · see citing works
“(p) = 1), it follows that 16For aficionados: this is the point at which the argument I’m about to give would fail as an argument against (say) the Principal Principle (Lewis 1980).”
BackgroundSubjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility
Moss, S. J. (2012) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00550.x · Cited by 86 · see citing works
“The Principal Principle advocated by Lewis 1980 says that your credences should reflect certain- 10.”
BackgroundA New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability
Douven, I. (2002) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/53.3.391 · Cited by 86 · see citing works
Modelling the Moral Dimension of Decisions
Colyvan, M., Cox, D., & Steele, K. (2010) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00754.x · Cited by 86 · see citing works
Benci, V., Horsten, L., & Wenmackers, S. (2016) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axw013 · Cited by 86 · see citing works
“Perhaps the best known principle relating subjective probability and chance is Lewis’s ([1980]) principal principle, which can be roughly stated as follows:”
BackgroundWho's Afraid of Impossible Worlds?
MARES, E. D. (1997) · Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic · doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1039540767 · Cited by 85 · see citing works
‘More of a Cause’: Recent Work on Degrees of Causation and Responsibility
Kaiserman, A. (2018) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12498 · Cited by 85 · see citing works
How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment
Jackson, E. G. (2019) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqz006 · Cited by 85 · see citing works
The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood
Williford, K., Bennequin, D., Friston, K., & Rudrauf, D. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02571 · Cited by 78 · see citing works
“This is a mechanism of global “subjective” (here in roughly the sense of “subjective Bayesian”) optimization, which does not always entail “objective” optimality, though it must approximate the latter reliably enough (cf., Lewis, 1980).”
BackgroundGRW as an ontology of dispositions
Dorato, M., & Esfeld, M. (2009) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics · doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2009.09.004 · Cited by 81 · see citing works
“…also Frigg’s and Hoefer’s account of probabilities with subjectivity.10 Lewis is quite aware that an appeal to simplicity, strength and their balance—given that these virtues are relative to our current, socially shared, standards—make his account of laws relative to us (Lewis, 1986, p. 123).”
Will done Better: Selection Semantics, Future Credence, and Indeterminacy
Cariani, F., & Santorio, P. (2017) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzw004 · Cited by 82 · see citing works
“In a standard contextualist framework, built on Kaplan (1989), truth at a context is defined by fixing the values of index parameters to the coordinates of the context (following Lewis 1980, we take contexts to be concrete situations of utterance).”
MethodRandomness Is Unpredictability
Eagle, A. (2005) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axi138 · Cited by 82 · see citing works
Pettigrew, R., & Titelbaum, M. G. (2014) · Bristol Research (University of Bristol) · Cited by 79 · see citing works
Decision-Making Under Indeterminacy
Williams, J. R. (2014) · White Rose Research Online (University of Leeds, The University of Sheffield, University of York) · Cited by 79 · see citing works
From Choice to Chance? Saving People, Fairness, and Lotteries
Henning, T. (2015) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2842176 · Cited by 78 · see citing works
The nature of doubt and a new puzzle about belief, doubt, and confidence
Moon, A. (2017) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1310-y · Cited by 78 · see citing works
“Lewis, David 1981: 'A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance'.”
BackgroundValidity, Uncertainty and Vagueness
Edgington, D. (1992) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/52.4.193 · Cited by 77 · see citing works
Reliability Theories of Justified Credence
Tang, W. H. (2016) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzv199 · Cited by 76 · see citing works
“…observes, in defending his theory of counterfactuals, that though the notion of comparative similarity is vague, it is precisely because of its vagueness that it is suitable for analysing counterfactuals, since the truth-conditions for counterfactuals admit of vagueness too (Lewis 1973, pp. 91–3).”
BackgroundAccuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle
Pettigrew, R. (2012) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-1539098 · Cited by 74 · see citing works
“Following Lewis (1980, 267), and heeding the recent salutary reminder from Chris Meacham (2010), I will talk throughout of norms that govern an agent’s initial or ur -credence function: that is, the agent’s credence function at the beginning of his or her epistemic life, prior to accumulating any evidence; the functio…”
Chance in the Everett Interpretation
Saunders, S. W. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560561.003.0008 · Cited by 75 · see citing works
A Bayesian Simulation Model of Group Deliberation and Polarization
Olsson, E. J. (2012) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-5357-0_6 · Cited by 73 · see citing works
“The way this should be done is generally known as the principal principle (Lewis 1980).”
BackgroundSelf-location is no problem for conditionalization
Bradley, D. (2010) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9748-9 · Cited by 71 · see citing works
Visual Confidences and Direct Perceptual Justification
Munton, J. (2016) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics201644225 · Cited by 71 · see citing works
Credence: A Belief-First Approach
Moon, A., & Jackson, E. G. (2020) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1017/can.2020.9 · Cited by 70 · see citing works
“FollowingMiller’s (1966) principle (also popularly called the “principal principle” developed by David Lewis 1980) we can see that a person’s epistemic probability may follow directly from their known objective probabilities.”
Background
- Authors
- Lewis, D.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Lewis, David
- ORCID
- Lewis, David
- Venue
- IFS
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Published
- 1980
- Pages
- 267-297
- OpenAlex
- W1510271585
- Cited by
- 799
- References
- 12
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 47 · 2021: 29 · 2020: 42 · 2019: 32 · 2018: 35 · 2017: 42 · 2016: 39 · 2015: 47 · 2014: 58 · 2013: 32 · 2012: 58
- FWCI
- 76.27
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Springer eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Literary, Cultural, Historical Analysis
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Probability and Statistical Research
- Keywords
- objective chance, subjective probability, partial belief, degrees of belief, tritium decay, philosophy of probability, concept of chance
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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