Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this article I ask whether elaborated and systematized delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia have the potential for epistemic innocence. Cognitions are epistemically innocent if they have significant epistemic benefits that could not be attained otherwise. In particular, I propose that a cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some significant epistemic benefit to a given agent at a given time, and if alternative cognitions delivering the same epistemic benefit are unavailable to that agent at that time. Elaborated and systematized delusions in schizophrenia are typically false and exemplify failures of rationality and self-knowledge. Empirical studies suggest that they may have psychological benefits by relieving anxiety and enhancing meaningfulness. Moreover, these delusions have been considered as adaptive in virtue of the fact that they enable automated learning to resume after a significant disruption caused by incorrect prediction-error signalling. I argue that such psychological benefits and adaptive features also have positive epistemic consequences. More precisely, delusions can be a means to restoring epistemic functionality in agents who are overwhelmed by hypersalient experiences in the prodromal stage of psychosis. The analysis leads to a more complex view of the epistemic status of delusions than is found in the contemporary philosophical literature and has some implications for clinical practice. 1 Introduction 2 Types of Delusions 3 What Is Wrong with Elaborated and Systematized Delusions? 4 Finding Life Meaningful 5 Learning Resumed 6 Epistemic Innocence 7 Epistemic Benefit 8 No Alternatives 9 Conclusions and Implications
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Citations
Cites
Kapur, S. (2003) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.160.1.13 · Cited by 2,813
Disrupted prediction-error signal in psychosis: Evidence for an associative account of delusions
Corlett, P. R., Murray, G. K., Honey, G. D., Aitken, M. R. F., Shanks, D. R., Robbins, T. W., Bullmore, E. T., Dickinson, A., & Fletcher, P. C. (2007) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awm173 · Cited by 460
Freeman, D., Garety, P. A., Fowler, D., Kuipers, E., Bebbington, P. E., & Dunn, G. (2004) · Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-006x.72.4.671 · Cited by 229
What causes the onset of psychosis?
Broome, M. R., Woolley, J. B., Tabraham, P., Johns, L. C., Bramon, E., Murray, G. K., Pariante, C., McGuire, P. K., & Murray, R. M. (2005) · Schizophrenia Research · doi:10.1016/j.schres.2005.02.007 · Cited by 207
Delusion formation and reasoning biases in those at clinical high risk for psychosis
Broome, M. R., Johns, L. C., Valli, I., Woolley, J. B., Tabraham, P., Brett, C., Valmaggia, L., Peters, E., Garety, P. A., & McGuire, P. K. (2007) · British Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1192/bjp.191.51.s38 · Cited by 204
Abductive inference and delusional belief.
Coltheart, M., Menzies, P., & Sutton, J. (2010) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546800903439120 · Cited by 177
The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions
Bortolotti, L. (2015) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.10.005 · Cited by 136
Self-citation
Cited by
The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs
Bortolotti, L. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863984.001.0001 · Cited by 127
Self-citationThe epistemic innocence of psychedelic states
Letheby, C. (2016) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2015.11.012 · Cited by 67
Thinking, believing, and hallucinating self in schizophrenia
Humpston, C. S., & Broome, M. R. (2020) · The Lancet Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/s2215-0366(20)30007-9 · Cited by 40
Metadata
- Authors
- Bortolotti, L.
- Venue
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2016-09-01
- Volume
- 67
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 879-900
- ISSN
- 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3537
- OpenAlex
- W2280981075
- Cited by
- 76
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 33.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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