Cited by 136Epistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsMental Health and PsychiatryPhilosophy and Theoretical Science

The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions

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Bortolotti, Lisa·2015·Consciousness and Cognition

Abstract

Delusions are defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. However, in the empirical literature, delusions have been found to have some psychological benefits. One proposal is that some delusions defuse negative emotions and protect one from low self-esteem by allowing motivational influences on belief formation. In this paper I focus on delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function (motivated delusions) and argue that some of their psychological benefits can convert into epistemic ones. Notwithstanding their epistemic costs, motivated delusions also have potential epistemic benefits for agents who have faced adversities, undergone physical or psychological trauma, or are subject to negative emotions and low self-esteem. To account for the epistemic status of motivated delusions, costly and beneficial at the same time, I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence. A delusion is epistemically innocent when adopting it delivers a significant epistemic benefit, and the benefit could not be attained if the delusion were not adopted. The analysis leads to a novel account of the status of delusions by inviting a reflection on the relationship between psychological and epistemic benefits.

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  • Maladaptive delusional consciousness attributions to chatbots may nonetheless produce epistemic benefits of the kind Bortolotti (2015) mentions for motivated delusions.

    “In this case, despite being maladaptive, they may nonetheless produce epistemic benefits of the kind that Bortolotti (2015) mentions with respect to motivated delusions more generally.”

    From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Bortolotti (2015)

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Authors
Bortolotti, L.
Affiliations
University of Birmingham (GB)
Corresponding author
Bortolotti, Lisa
Venue
Consciousness and Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2015-05
Volume
33
Pages
490-499
ISSN
1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2126366140
Cited by
136
References
40
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 22 · 2020: 19 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 2
FWCI
12.78
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
  • University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Institutional Research Information System University of Ferrara (University of Ferrara) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/K003615/1)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
delusions, epistemic benefits, psychological benefits, irrational beliefs, negative emotions, self-esteem, trauma, belief formation
MeSH terms
Defense Mechanisms, Delusions, Humans, Motivation, Knowledge

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