Can the Science of Well-Being Be Objective?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Well–being, health and freedom are some of the many phenomena of interest to science whose definitions rely on a normative standard. Empirical generalizations about them thus present a special case of value-ladenness. I propose the notion of a ‘mixed claim’ to denote such generalizations. Against the prevailing wisdom, I argue that we should not seek to eliminate them from science. Rather, we need to develop principles for their legitimate use. Philosophers of science have already reconciled values with objectivity in several ways, but none of the existing proposals are suitable for mixed claims. Using the example of the science of well-being, I articulate a conception of objectivity for this science and for mixed claims in general. 1 Introduction2 What Are Mixed Claims?3 Mixed Claims Are Different 3.1 Values as reasons to pursue science 3.2 Values as agenda-setters 3.3 Values as ethical constraints on research protocols 3.4 Values as arbiters between underdetermined theories 3.5 Values as determinants of standards of confirmation 3.6 Values as sources of wishful thinking and fraud4 Mixed Claims Should Stay 4.1 Against Nagel5 The Dangers of Mixed Claims6 The Existing Accounts of Objectivity 6.1 The perils of impartiality7 Objectivity for Mixed Claims8 Three Rules 8.1 Unearth the value presuppositions in methods and measures 8.2 Check if value presuppositions are invariant to disagreements 8.3 Consult the relevant parties9 Conclusion
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Cites
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Cited by
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
Science, Values, and the New Demarcation Problem
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Science Communication and the Problematic Impact of Descriptive Norms
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Metadata
- Authors
- Alexandrova, A.
- Venue
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2018-06-01
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 421-445
- ISSN
- 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3537
- OpenAlex
- W2513618691
- Cited by
- 110
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 12.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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