Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science
Open accessAbstract
The proposal that values in science are illegitimate and that they should be counteracted whenever they direct inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions is not uncommon in the philosophy of science. Drawing on recent research from cognitive science on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reliability of scientific inquiry at the group level, even when they negatively affect an individual’s cognition. This casts doubt on the proposal that such values should always be illegitimate in science. It also suggests that this proposal assumes a narrow, individualistic account of science that threatens to undermine the project of ensuring reliable belief-formation in science.
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Searching for information supporting one's beliefs and ignoring contradictory data is epistemically disadvantageous when what one takes to be reality is and stays different from what one believes it to be.
“Confirmation bias is typically taken to work against an individual's truth tracking (Mercier and Sperber 2017: 215;Peters 2018: 15), and indeed searching for information supporting one's beliefs and ignoring contradictory data is epistemically disadvantageous when what one takes to be reality is and stays different from what one believes it to be.”
From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Peters 2018
Cites
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.627 · Cited by 7,176 · cited 1× · see citing works
“When values play a direct role in evidential assessment or in the choice of a methodology (that corroborates a favoured view), values are illegitimate for Douglas because they incline scientists to accept (or reject) a particular conclusion on the basis of a preference for (or aversion against) it, rather than on the…”
BackgroundScience as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry
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Collective Intelligence and Group Performance
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Elliott, K. C. (2017) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190260804.001.0001 · Cited by 343 · see citing works
Psychological Strategies for Winning a Geopolitical Forecasting Tournament
Mellers, B., Ungar, L., Baron, J., Ramos, J., Gurcay, B., Fincher, K., Scott, S. E., Moore, D., Atanasov, P., Swift, S. A., et al. (2014) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797614524255 · Cited by 312 · see citing works
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What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias?
Peters, U. (2022) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-020-00252-1 · Cited by 163 · see citing works
Self-citationGeneralization Bias in Science
Peters, U., Krauss, A., & Braganza, O. (2022) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.13188 · Cited by 63 · see citing works
Self-citation
- Authors
- Peters, U.
- Affiliations
- University College London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Peters, Uwe
- Venue
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2021-12-01
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1061-1081
- ISSN
- 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3537
- OpenAlex
- W2906010609
- Cited by
- 45
- References
- 6
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 4
- FWCI
- 6.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- philarchive.org
- Licence
- academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model (am)
- Locations
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- KU Leuven
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- values in science, confirmation bias, scientific reliability, belief formation, philosophy of science
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