THE SELF IN NEUROSCIENCE AND PSYCHIATRY
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record.
Abstract
THE SELF IN NEUROSCIENCE AND PSYCHIATRY Edited by Tilo Kircher and Anthony David 2003. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Price £29.95. ISBN 0‐521‐53350‐3 It is only in his fifth year at Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry when Harry Potter learns that only muggles (the non‐magic folk, i.e. people like most of us) talk about ‘mind‐reading’: ‘The mind is not a book to be opened at will and examined at leisure. Thoughts are not etched on the inside of skulls, to be perused by any invader. The mind is a complex and many‐layered thing’ he learns during his ‘occlumency’ lesson by the much‐hated Professor Snape (J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix. London: Bloomsbury; 2003, pp. 468–9). And Professor Snape continues: ‘It is true, however, that those who have mastered legilimency (the ability to extract feeling and memories from another person’s mind) are able, under certain circumstances, to delve into the minds of their victims and to interpret their findings correctly … and only those skilled at Occlumency (i.e. the branch of magic which seals the mind against magical intrusion and influence) are able to shut down those feelings and memories’ (Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix, pp. 468–9). For those of us who are muggle‐born and who have not (yet) been invited to Hogwarts School the task remains to approach the main constituents of the ‘self’ (or self‐consciousness, as often used interchangeably throughout the book) from a more neuroscientific, non‐magic viewpoint (if one is happy to follow a naturalistic view in contemporary philosophy of mind and neuroscience, according to which mental phenomena are based upon neural processes). As the editors Tilo Kircher and Anthony David put it right at the beginning of their introduction to their book, ‘Who are we and what makes us who we are? Like our world, our self is a construction of our minds. But we do not live in isolation. How does the mind construct this world and ourselves in it?’ Reformulated with respect to the intention of the book, the question of the self then is: which neural ensembles underlie and may thus be responsible for the ‘subjective’ nature of the mental and bodily states that are key candidates for a formulation of the self (or self‐consciousness)? The book tries to answer this essential question, at least in part, by providing an up‐to‐date review of scientific research on the self from a psychiatric viewpoint. It consists of 22 chapters from various international experts, divided into three major parts that span the ‘Conceptual background’ (Part A), ‘Cognitive and neurosciences’ (Part B) and ‘Disturbances of the self: the case of schizophrenia’ (Part C). Part C is further divided into ‘Phenomenology’, ‘Social psychology’ and ‘Clinical neuroscience’. Part A provides a very useful overview from conceptual history to the phenomenology of the self and its relation to language. In accordance with the psychiatric background of the editors, Parts B and C then really zoom in on schizophrenia‐related research and how studies of the self can contribute to our understanding of schizophrenia, in which the self is supposed to become ‘disordered’, and vice versa. As Kircher and David argue in their introduction, the focus is ‘on schizophrenia because the core pathology of the disorder is a disentanglement of the normal unity of body, thoughts and emotions’ (p. 3). If there is anything to be really criticized about this book, it is the neglect of the important contributions that neuropsychologists and neurologists could have made to a book concerned with the self and self‐consciousness. The phenomenal discussion of the self has obvious affinities with the discussion of the symptoms observed in patients with schizophrenia: however, it surely goes beyond this. Berrios and Marková write in their intriguing chapter on ‘The self and psychiatry: a conceptual history’ vis ‘The Western concept of self emphasizes individualism and autonomy but this view is cultural and no more specific or truthful or advanced than the syncytial or collective view of self developed in other cultures and which revolves around family or clan rather than individual’. Consequently, the same is true for the neuroscientific approach to the self, which should be multifaceted and interdisciplinary in its best sense. The insights to be gained (e.g. from studying patients with schizophrenia) are relative to a certain viewpoint and the respective spotlight of attention. Combining data and results from studies of psychiatric patients with lesion‐based studies of neurological patients suffering from stroke and subsequent deficits, such as anosognosia and neglect, is likely to prove an even more fertile approach. It is time to show that there is more to the self than just a noble metaphor with a putative correlate in the frontal lobes. Groundbreaking progress in the field is likely to stem from the linking of theories to cognitive models and experimental proced
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
From drugs to deprivation: A Bayesian framework for understanding models of psychosis
Corlett, P. R., Frith, C. D., & Fletcher, P. C. (2009) · Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1007/s00213-009-1561-0 · Cited by 367
Toward a neurobiology of delusions
Corlett, P. R., Taylor, J. R., Wang, X.-J., Fletcher, P. C., & Krystal, J. H. (2010) · Progress in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2010.06.007 · Cited by 394
Morin, A. (2006) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.09.006 · Cited by 316
Self-awareness and the left inferior frontal gyrus: Inner speech use during self-related processing
Morin, A., & Michaud, J. (2007) · Brain Research Bulletin · doi:10.1016/j.brainresbull.2007.06.013 · Cited by 141
Self-awareness deficits following loss of inner speech: dr. Jill Bolte Taylor's case study
Morin, A. (2009) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.09.008 · Cited by 83
Metadata
- Authors
- Fink, G. R.
- Venue
- Brain
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-06-14
- Volume
- 127
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 1678-1679
- ISSN
- 0006-8950 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2156
- OpenAlex
- W2056878646
- Cited by
- 29
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 11.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: THE SELF IN NEUROSCIENCE AND PSYCHIATRY. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/brain/awh143
- The paper
- Fink, G. R. (2004). THE SELF IN NEUROSCIENCE AND PSYCHIATRY. Brain. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awh143
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.