The fantastic organ
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Abstract
The Age of Insight by Eric Kandel is a brutal and beautiful book. Its pages burgeon with beautiful images and beautiful ideas. The ideas are pursued with relentless honesty and diligence for more than 600 pages. There are parts of this book that should only be read in private. I know this after a slightly fraught flight to London, trying to read the book while covering its pictures of masturbating women with my boarding card—I did not want to offend the sensibilities of an Indian gentleman, who showed a polite interest in my reading material. I am not quite sure why I did this, perhaps because I am English; or perhaps because I found the pictures curiously arousing—despite their innocent titles {e.g. ‘Seated Woman in Armchair’ by Gustav Klimt [(1862–1918): c.1913], pencil and white chalk}. Happily, the book explained why I found them so alluring. THE AGE OF INSIGHT: THE QUEST TO UNDERSTAND THE UNCONSCIOUS IN ART, MIND, AND BRAIN, FROM VIENNA 1900 TO THE PRESENT By Eric R. Kandel 2012 New York: Random House ISBN: 978-1-4000-6871-5 Price: $40.00 Kandel’s treatment is a book of two parts. The first deals with innovative thinking and insights in science and art in turn of the century Vienna. The second overviews the neurobiology of perception and emotion, bringing the reader back to deep questions about perspective taking and neuroaesthetics. The premise that underpins both parts is that the brain is an inference machine, generating hypotheses and fantasies that are tested against sensory data. Put simply, the brain is—literally—a fantastic organ (fantastic: from Greek phantastikos, able to create mental images, from phantazesthai). For me, the story starts with Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–94) and the notion of unconscious inference (Helmholtz, 1866/1962). Kandel places this story in the context of history and art, in an illuminating and compelling way. In summarizing the context that art provides for understanding functional brain architectures (and vice versa) Kandel concludes ‘we now know that one of the main reasons expressionist art appeals to us so strongly is that we have evolved a remarkably large, social brain. Moreover, the brain’s mirror neuron systems, theory of mind system and biological modulators of emotions and empathy endow us with a great capacity for understanding other people’s minds and emotions.’ The early part of the book is concerned with the creative achievements of people like Oskar Kokoschka [(1886–1980): see Fig. 1] and Egon Schiele (1890–1918), whose expressionism engages unconscious inference, while Gustav Klimt’s ‘intuitive grasp of the power of implied line, contour and top-down processing enabled him to create some of the most subtle and sensual works in the history of modern art. With these new insights into the unconscious empathic, emotional and perceptual apparatuses of the brain, the Austrian modernists were indeed cognitive psychologists in their own right. In parallel with Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), they knew how to enter the private theatre of another’s mind, to understand its nature, mood and emotion, and to convey that understanding to the viewer.’ (p. 500). (Left) Oskar Kokoschka, ‘Self-portrait as warrior’ (1909). Unfired clay painted with tempera. This self-portrait is remarkably similar to the self-portrait of Sigmund Freud’s grandson (Right) painted nearly a century later: Lucian Freud (1922–2011), ‘Reflection (Self-portrait)’, (1985). Lucian Freud was widely considered the pre-eminent British artist of his time. His early work is often associated with (German) Expressionism; although interestingly, this was an influence he tended to deny. The fact that art affords insights into functional anatomy was not new to me: my first brain imaging experiment (Lueck et al., 1989)—in which Semir Zeki established the colour centre in the human brain—was inspired by Piet Mondrian (1872–1944). Mondrian articulated a fundamental truth about perceptual inference and how it depends on causal structure in the sensorium (p. 498): ‘For there are made laws, discovered laws, but also laws–a truth for all time. These are more or less hidden in the reality which surrounds us and do not change. Not only science but art also, shows us that reality, at first incomprehensible, gradually reveals itself, by the mutual relations that are inherent in things.’ In other words, there is causal structure in our world that the brain distils and embodies in its inferential machinery. Modern versions of Helmholtz’s ideas are now among the most popular explanations for message passing in the brain—generally cast in terms of the Bayesian brain hypothesis or predictive coding. These are not abstract or hand waving schemes; nearly everywhere one looks, the anatomical and physiological evidence points towards predictive coding as the organizing principle for cortical microcircuits and hierarchical brain systems: see Bastos et al. (2012) for a recent review of canonical microcircuits and predictive coding in
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Cites
Canonical Microcircuits for Predictive Coding
Bastos, A. M., Usrey, W. M., Adams, R. A., Mangun, G. R., Fries, P., & Friston, K. J. (2012) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.10.038 · Cited by 2,421 · cited 2×
“…physiological evidence points towards predictive coding as the organizing principle for cortical microcircuits and hierarchical brain systems: see Bastos et al. (2012) for a recent review of canonical microcircuits and predictive coding in sensory systems, and Adams et al. (2012) for a related…”
BackgroundSelf-citationWhen the world becomes ‘too real’: a Bayesian explanation of autistic perception
Pellicano, E., & Burr, D. (2012) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.08.009 · Cited by 1,156 · cited 1×
“Wherever one looks in the theoretical literature, the same theme is emerging: from false inference as an explanation for the positive symptoms (hallucinations and delusions) of schizophrenia (Fletcher and Frith, 2009), to the loss of central coherence in autism (Pellicano and Burr, 2012).”
BackgroundPredictive coding: an account of the mirror neuron system
Kilner, J. M., Friston, K. J., & Frith, C. D. (2007) · Cognitive Processing · doi:10.1007/s10339-007-0170-2 · Cited by 1,134 · cited 1×
“This provides a nice perspective on why mirror neurons respond both to self-made acts and during action observation (Kilner et al., 2007).”
BackgroundSelf-citationAn Interoceptive Predictive Coding Model of Conscious Presence
Seth, A. K., Suzuki, K., & Critchley, H. D. (2012) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00395 · Cited by 950 · cited 1×
“There are already exciting ideas in the recent literature that provide a simple perspective on emotional processing from an inferential (predictive coding) perspective; e.g. Seth et al. (2011).”
BackgroundA Bayesian account of ‘hysteria’
Edwards, M. J., Adams, R. A., Brown, H., Parees, I., & Friston, K. J. (2012) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/aws129 · Cited by 825 · cited 4×
“Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Guarantors of Brain.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationPredictions not commands: Active inference in the motor system
Adams, R. A., Shipp, S., & Friston, K. J. (2013) · Brain Structure and Function · doi:10.1007/s00429-012-0475-5 · Cited by 765 · cited 2×
“This view replaces descending motor commands with motor predictions that are fulfilled by peripheral reflexes (Adams et al., 2012).”
BackgroundSelf-citationPerceptual illusions and brain models
Gregory, R. L. (1968) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.1968.0071 · Cited by 237 · cited 1×
“Our percepts are constrained by what we expect to see and the portfolio of hypotheses that can be called upon to explain sensory impressions (Gregory, 1968).”
BackgroundRobbins (2012) · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.005 · Cited by 134
Will studies of macaque insula reveal the neural mechanisms of self-awareness?
Critchley, H., & Seth, A. (2012) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.04.012 · Cited by 84
Cited by
Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
Seth, A. K. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 · Cited by 1,816
Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain
Seth, A. K., & Friston, K. J. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2016.0007 · Cited by 945
Self-citationComputational psychiatry: the brain as a phantastic organ
Friston, K. J., Stephan, K. E., Montague, R., & Dolan, R. J. (2014) · The Lancet Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/s2215-0366(14)70275-5 · Cited by 531
Self-citationMinimal self-models and the free energy principle.
Limanowski, J., & Blankenburg, F. (2013) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00547 · Cited by 263
Yoshie, M., Nagai, Y., Critchley, H. D., & Harrison, N. A. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep19305 · Cited by 50
Metadata
- Authors
- Friston, K. J.
- Venue
- Brain
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-03-05
- Volume
- 136
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1328-1332
- ISSN
- 0006-8950 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2156
- OpenAlex
- W2077733326
- Cited by
- 18
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 1.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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