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Cited by 263Embodied and Extended CognitionPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceFree Will and Agency

Minimal self-models and the free energy principle.

Open access
Limanowski, Jakub, Blankenburg, Felix·2013·Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
DOI 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00547PMC PMC3770917
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Abstract

The term "minimal phenomenal selfhood" (MPS) describes the basic, pre-reflective experience of being a self (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Theoretical accounts of the minimal self have long recognized the importance and the ambivalence of the body as both part of the physical world, and the enabling condition for being in this world (Gallagher, 2005a; Grafton, 2009). A recent account of MPS (Metzinger, 2004a) centers on the consideration that minimal selfhood emerges as the result of basic self-modeling mechanisms, thereby being founded on pre-reflective bodily processes. The free energy principle (FEP; Friston, 2010) is a novel unified theory of cortical function built upon the imperative that self-organizing systems entail hierarchical generative models of the causes of their sensory input, which are optimized by minimizing free energy as an approximation of the log-likelihood of the model. The implementation of the FEP via predictive coding mechanisms and in particular the active inference principle emphasizes the role of embodiment for predictive self-modeling, which has been appreciated in recent publications. In this review, we provide an overview of these conceptions and illustrate thereby the potential power of the FEP in explaining the mechanisms underlying minimal selfhood and its key constituents, multisensory integration, interoception, agency, perspective, and the experience of mineness. We conclude that the conceptualization of MPS can be well mapped onto a hierarchical generative model furnished by the FEP and may constitute the basis for higher-level, cognitive forms of self-referral, as well as the understanding of other minds.

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  • AIF agents aim to understand the underlying dynamics of the agent-environment coupling and model themselves as the cause of changes to their own sensory states, developing their own sense of agency through active engagement and intervention onto the world.

    “AIF agents aim to understand the underlying dynamics of the agent–environment coupling and model themselves as the ‘cause’ of changes to their own sensory states, developing their own sense of agency through active engagement and intervention onto the world”

    From Active inference goes to school: the importance of active learning in the age of large language models (2024) · cites this paper as [55]

    Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

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  • In order to regulate the body, interoception models the hidden causes of allostatic fluctuations by attributing them to a unified entity.

    “In order to regulate the body, interoception models the hidden causes of allostatic fluctuations by attributing them to a unified entity”

    From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013

    The Interoception section (page unavailable) says a generative model of the causes of interoceptive input gives rise to self-representations, and it links bodily self-awareness to homeostatic regulation. The paper also describes a unified minimal self, but does not say that interoception attributes the causes of allostatic fluctuations to a unified entity. (LLM, conf=0.82)

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  • Prediction error is best minimized over the long term by attributing internally generated interoceptive sensations to a stable, unified entity, a self.

    “prediction error is best minimized over the long term by attributing internally generated interoceptive sensations to a stable, unified entity, a self”

    From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013

    The Interoception section describes minimizing interoceptive prediction error as a mechanism of self-representation, and The perspectivity of the self-model describes a unified self arising from a temporally extended predictive process. The paper does not say that attributing internally generated interoceptive sensations to a stable entity is the best way to minimize prediction error over the long term; it describes the self-model as dynamic rather than static. Page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.83)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Interoception plays a key role in structuring experiences of 'being and having a body' (i.e. embodied selfhood) and may also shape selfhood at other, hierarchically higher levels.

    “In this putative classification, interoception plays a key role in structuring experiences of ‘being and having a body’ (i.e. embodied selfhood) and may also shape selfhood at other, hierarchically higher levels.”

    From Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain (2016) · cites this paper as [60]

  • Several proposals of minimal self-model implementations under a predictive coding scheme treat the self as a hypothesis within the HGM, which tries to maximize its evidence by minimizing prediction errors.

    “In the last couple of years, several proposals of ‘minimal’ self-model implementations under a predictive coding scheme have been advanced (Seth, 2013; Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013; Limanowski, 2014; Apps and Tsakiris, 2014; Ishida et al., 2015; Allen and Friston, 2016). These proposals have in common that they treat the ‘self’ as a hypothesis within the HGM, which tries to maximize its”

    From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013

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1 of the 145 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. de Vignemont F. Tsakiris M. Haggard P. (2005). “Body mereology,” in Human Body Perception from the Inside Out, eds Knoblich G. Thornton I. M. Grosjean M. Shiffrar M. (New York: Oxford University Press), 147– 170
  2. Pennebaker J. W. Skelton J. A. (1981). Selective monitoring of bodily sensations. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 41, 213– 223 7277203
  3. Varela F. Thompson E. Rosch E. (1994). The Embodied Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

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Authors
Limanowski, J., & Blankenburg, F.
Affiliations
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (DE)
Corresponding author
Limanowski, Jakub
ORCID
Venue
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Publisher
Frontiers Media SA
Published
2013
Volume
7
Pages
547-547
ISSN
1662-5161 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.3389/fnhum.2013.00547
PMC
PMC3770917
OpenAlex
W2148544865
Cited by
263
References
145
Citations by year
2026: 15 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 44 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 4
FWCI
0.99
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • edoc Publication server (Humboldt University of Berlin) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
  • Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Refubium (Universitätsbibliothek der Freien Universität Berlin) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Universitätsbibliothek der FU Berlin Hochschulschriftenstelle u. Dokumentenserver (cc-by)
Funders
Wellcome Trust (088130)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
free energy principle, active inference, embodiment, multisensory integration, interoception, agency, perspective taking, mineness, self-referral, other minds, hierarchical generative models

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