Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 420

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Gender differences in the ultimatum game

Solnick, S.·2001·Economic Inquiry
DOI 10.1093/ei/39.2.189
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

I explore the behavior of men and women in the ultimatum game. In one treatment, players remain mutually anonymous. In the second treatment, players’gender is common knowledge. Average offers made do not differ based on the gender of player 1. Offers are affected by the gender of player 2, with men attracting higher offers, particularly from female players 1. Players 2 of both genders choose a higher minimum acceptable offer when facing a female player 1. These patterns led to substantial differences in earnings. Such striking differences in expectations and decisions could impact salary negotiations and other real‐world transactions.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/ei/39.2.189

Cites

25 of 25 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 25 references

Cited by

See all 420

Metadata

Authors
Solnick, S.
Venue
Economic Inquiry
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2001-04-01
Volume
39
Issue
2
Pages
189-200
ISSN
  • 0043-3640 (ISSN-L)
  • 0095-2583
  • 1465-7295
DOI
10.1093/ei/39.2.189
OpenAlex
W2131259919
Cited by
420
References
25
FWCI
19.18
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Gender differences in the ultimatum game. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/ei/39.2.189
The paper
Solnick, S. (2001). Gender differences in the ultimatum game. Economic Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1093/ei/39.2.189

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.