The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Gender differences in the ultimatum game
Abstract
I explore the behavior of men and women in the ultimatum game. In one treatment, players remain mutually anonymous. In the second treatment, players’gender is common knowledge. Average offers made do not differ based on the gender of player 1. Offers are affected by the gender of player 2, with men attracting higher offers, particularly from female players 1. Players 2 of both genders choose a higher minimum acceptable offer when facing a female player 1. These patterns led to substantial differences in earnings. Such striking differences in expectations and decisions could impact salary negotiations and other real‐world transactions.
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Cited by
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Experimental research on labor market discrimination
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Eckel, C. (2001) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1093/ei/39.2.171 · Cited by 495
Metadata
- Authors
- Solnick, S.
- Venue
- Economic Inquiry
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2001-04-01
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 189-200
- ISSN
- 0043-3640 (ISSN-L)
- 0095-2583
- 1465-7295
- OpenAlex
- W2131259919
- Cited by
- 420
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 19.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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