The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How China lends: a rare look into 100 debt contracts with foreign governments
Open accessAbstract
China is the world’s largest official creditor, but we lack basic facts about the terms and conditions of its lending. Very few contracts between Chinese lenders and their government borrowers have ever been published or studied. This paper is the first systematic analysis of the legal terms of China’s foreign lending. We collect and analyse 100 contracts between Chinese state-owned entities and government borrowers in 24 developing countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Oceania, and compare them with those of other bilateral, multilateral and commercial creditors. Three main insights emerge. First, the Chinese contracts contain unusual confidentiality clauses that bar borrowers from revealing the terms or even the existence of the debt. Second, Chinese lenders seek advantage over other creditors, using collateral arrangements such as lender-controlled revenue accounts and promises to keep the debt out of collective restructuring (‘no Paris Club’ clauses). Third, cancellation, acceleration and stabilization clauses in Chinese contracts potentially allow the lenders to influence debtors’ domestic and foreign policies. Even if these terms were unenforceable in court, the mix of confidentiality, seniority and policy influence could limit the sovereign debtor’s crisis management options and complicate debt renegotiation. Overall, the contracts use creative design to manage credit risks and overcome enforcement hurdles, presenting China as a muscular and commercially savvy lender to the developing world.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
Eaton, J., & Gersovitz, M. (1981) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296886 · Cited by 2,603
Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?
(2017) · Macat Library eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781912281152 · Cited by 2,531
Taylor, J. B., Woodford, M., & Uhlig, H. (1999) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,395
Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies
Economies, E., Arellano, C., & Arellano, C. (2007) · Cited by 1,288
Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
Tirole, J. (1999) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00052 · Cited by 1,193
Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries? An Empirical Investigation
Alfaro, L., Kalemli-Ozcan, S., & Volosovych, V. (2008) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.90.2.347 · Cited by 1,013
Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?
Bulow, J., & Rogoff, K. (1988) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2623 · Cited by 1,004
Hodler, R., & Raschky, P. A. (2014) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qju004 · Cited by 709
A critical look at Chinese ‘debt-trap diplomacy’: the rise of a meme
Brautigam, D. (2020) · Area Development and Policy · doi:10.1080/23792949.2019.1689828 · Cited by 522
Reinhart, C., Rogoff, K., & Savastano, M. (2003) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.1353/eca.2003.0018 · Cited by 473
Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A. M., & Tierney, M. J. (2018) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqx052 · Cited by 410
Self-citationChinese aid and local corruption
Isaksson, A.-S., & Kotsadam, A. (2018) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.002 · Cited by 359
Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset
Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A. M., & Tierney, M. J. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3051044 · Cited by 356
Self-citationHorn, S., Reinhart, C., & Trebesch, C. (2019) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w26050 · Cited by 323
Self-citationAfrican leaders and the geography of China's foreign assistance
Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Hodler, R., Parks, B. C., Raschky, P. A., & Tierney, M. J. (2019) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.04.003 · Cited by 318
Self-citationRogue aid? An empirical analysis of China's aid allocation
Dreher, A., & Fuchs, A. (2015) · Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique · doi:10.1111/caje.12166 · Cited by 306
Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts
Horn, H., Maggi, G., & Staiger, R. W. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.1.394 · Cited by 301
Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset
Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A., & Tierney, M. J. (2021) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20180631 · Cited by 265
Self-citationBanking on Beijing: The Aims and Impacts of China's Overseas Development Program
Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A., & Tierney, M. J. (2022) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108564496 · Cited by 242
Self-citationHorn, S., Reinhart, C. M., & Trebesch, C. (2021) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2021.103539 · Cited by 241
Self-citationStrange, A. M., Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., & Tierney, M. J. (2017) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002715604363 · Cited by 199
Self-citationAguiar, M., & Amador, M. (2014) · Handbook of international economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-54314-1.00011-2 · Cited by 129
The Role of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements*
Maggi, G., & Staiger, R. W. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjq005 · Cited by 101
Debt Relief with Chinese Characteristics
Acker, K., Brautigam, D., & Huang, Y. (2020) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3745021 · Cited by 95
Electoral motives and the subnational allocation of foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa
Anaxagorou, C., Efthyvoulou, G., & Sarantides, V. (2020) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103430 · Cited by 66
The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt
Schlegl, M., Trebesch, C., & Wright, M. L. J. (2019) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w25793 · Cited by 54
Self-citationChinese Aid and Local Ethnic Identification
Isaksson, A. (2020) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818320000260 · Cited by 46
What drives Chinese overseas M&A investment? Evidence from micro data
Fuest, C., Hugger, F., Sultan, S., & Xing, J. (2021) · Review of International Economics · doi:10.1111/roie.12566 · Cited by 28
Aid and Growth at the Regional Level
Dreher, A., & Lohmann, S. (2015) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/grv026 · Cited by 20
Cited by
Clash of Empires: From 'Chimerica' to the 'New Cold War'
Hung, H.-F. (2022) · doi:10.1017/9781108895897 · Cited by 75
China as an International Lender of Last Resort
Horn, S., Parks, B., Reinhart, C., & Trebesch, C. (2023) · doi:10.3386/w31105 · Cited by 73
Self-citationFrom ‘debt diplomacy’ to donorship? China’s changing role in global development
Carmody, P., Zajontz, T., & Reboredo, R. (2022) · Global Political Economy · doi:10.1332/uzhw7185 · Cited by 23
Metadata
- Authors
- Gelpern, A., Horn, S., Morris, S., Parks, B., & Trebesch, C.
- Venue
- Economic Policy
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2022-11-15
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 114
- Pages
- 345-416
- ISSN
- 0266-4658 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0327
- OpenAlex
- W4309187504
- Cited by
- 322
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 48.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.