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Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?

Tirole, Jean·1999·Econometrica
DOI 10.1111/1468-0262.00052
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Abstract

The paper takes stock of the advances and directions for research on the incomplete contracting front. It first illustrates some of the main ideas of the incomplete contract literature through an example. It then offers methodological insights on the standard approach to modeling incomplete contracts; in particular it discusses a tension between two assumptions made in the literature, namely rationality and the existence of transaction costs. Last, it argues that, contrary to what is commonly argued, the complete contract methodology need not be unable to account for standard institutions such as authority and ownership; and it concludes with a discussion of the research agenda.

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Metadata

Authors
Tirole, J.
Venue
Econometrica
Publisher
The Econometric Society
Published
1999-07
Volume
67
Issue
4
Pages
741-781
ISSN
  • 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0262
DOI
10.1111/1468-0262.00052
OpenAlex
W2138595148
Cited by
1,193
References
4
FWCI
103.74
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1 (tdm, 5906 d)

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Tirole, J. (1999). Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00052

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