The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts
Open accessAbstract
We propose a model of trade agreements in which contracting is costly, and as a consequence the optimal agreement may be incomplete. In spite of its simplicity, the model yields rich predictions on the structure of the optimal trade agreement and how this depends on the fundamentals of the contracting environment. We argue that taking contracting costs explicitly into account can help explain a number of key features of real trade agreements. (JEL D86, F13)
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Cites
Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation
Johnson, H. G. (1953) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296006 · Cited by 666
The Economics of the World Trading System
Conway, P., Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. (2004) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/4135340 · Cited by 526
Self-citationDomestic Distortions, Tariffs and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy
Bhagwati, J., & Ramaswami, V. K. (1963) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/258733 · Cited by 494
International externalities and optimal tax structures
Markusen, J. R. (1975) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/0022-1996(75)90025-2 · Cited by 464
Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International Economic Institutions
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530151144096 · Cited by 327
Self-citationA Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements
Maggi, G., & Rodríguez-Clare, A. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.4.1374 · Cited by 316
Self-citationThe Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization
Schwartz, W. F., & Sykes, A. O. (2002) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/340406 · Cited by 222
The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Sykes, A. O. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.415780 · Cited by 198
Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing Contracts
Battigalli, P., & Maggi, G. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260344470 · Cited by 193
Self-citationWill International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading System?
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.3.877 · Cited by 184
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Policy Uncertainty, Trade, and Welfare: Theory and Evidence for China and the United States
Handley, K., & Limão, N. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20141419 · Cited by 988
How China lends: a rare look into 100 debt contracts with foreign governments
Gelpern, A., Horn, S., Morris, S., Parks, B., & Trebesch, C. (2024) · Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/epolic/eiac054 · Cited by 322
A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements
Maggi, G., & Rodríguez-Clare, A. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.4.1374 · Cited by 316
Self-citationWhat Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.4.1238 · Cited by 258
Self-citationBagwell, K., Bown, C. P., & Staiger, R. W. (2016) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20151192 · Cited by 122
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Metadata
- Authors
- Horn, H., Maggi, G., & Staiger, R. W.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2010-03-01
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 394-419
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2096264662
- Cited by
- 301
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 29.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.