Order without Law: Reputation Promotes Cooperation in a Cryptomarket for Illegal Drugs
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The emergence of large-scale cooperation in humans poses a major puzzle for the social and behavioural sciences.Reputation formation-individuals' ability to share information about others' deeds and misdeeds-has been found to promote cooperation.However, these findings are mostly based on small-scale laboratory and field experiments or on data gathered from online markets embedded in functioning legal systems.Using a unique data set of transactions in a cryptomarket for illegal drugs, we analyse the effect of buyers' ratings of finished transactions on sellers' business success.Cryptomarkets are online marketplaces in the so-called Dark Web, which can only be accessed by means of encryption software that conceals users' identities and locations.The encryption technology makes it virtually impossible for law enforcement to intervene in these market exchanges.We find that sellers with a better rating history charge higher prices and sell their merchandise faster than sellers with no or a bad rating history.Our results demonstrate how reputation creates real incentives for cooperative behaviour at a large scale, in the absence of law enforcement and among anonymous actors with doubtful intentions.Our results thus challenge the institutional and social embeddedness of actors as necessary preconditions for the emergence of social order in markets.
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Citations
Cites
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894 · cited 1×
“Humans’ ability to overcome individual self-interest to create a larger benefit for the collective has received considerable attention in the social and behavioural sciences in the past three decades (Axelrod, 1984; Nowak, 2006; Bowles and Gintis, 2011).”
Fixed Effects Regression Models
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Pavlou, P. A., & Gefen, D. (2004) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.1040.0015 · Cited by 2,516 · cited 2×
“…sellers, the legal system in which online markets are embedded deters fraud and promotes trust and large-scale cooperation in its own right (Diekmann and Przepiorka forthcoming; Fligstein, 2001; Güth and Ockenfels, 2003; Pavlou and Gefen, 2004; Beckert, 2009; Bakos and Dellarocas, 2011).”
BackgroundRational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
Shapiro, C. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881782 · Cited by 2,327 · cited 3×
“Once these sellers have built their reputations, they can charge higher prices, which will compensate them for their initial investment in reputation (Shapiro, 1983; Friedman and Resnick, 2001; Przepiorka, 2013).”
Milgrom, P. R., North, D. C., & Weingast*, B. R. (1990) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00020.x · Cited by 1,793
Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’
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Cited by
Open Problems in Cooperative AI
Dafoe, A., Hughes, E., Bachrach, Y., Collins, T., McKee, K. R., Leibo, J. Z., Larson, K., & Graepel, T. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2012.08630 · Cited by 93
Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review
Takács, K., Gross, J., Testori, M., Letina, S., Kenny, A. R., Power, E. A., & Wittek, R. P. M. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0297 · Cited by 61
Reputation effects in socially driven sharing economy transactions
Ter Huurne, M., Ronteltap, A., Guo, C., Corten, R., & Buskens, V. (2018) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su10082674 · Cited by 33
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Metadata
- Authors
- Przepiorka, W., Norbutas, L., & Corten, R.
- Venue
- European Sociological Review
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2017-10-17
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 752-764
- ISSN
- 0266-7215 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2672
- OpenAlex
- W2766522754
- Cited by
- 122
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 17.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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