Cited by 98Healthcare Systems and ReformsHealthcare RegulationOccupational and Professional Licensing Regulation

Do they work? Regulating for-profit providers in Zimbabwe

Open access
Hongoro, C.·2000·Health Policy and Planning

Abstract

The experience of low- and middle-income countries (LMC) with respect to regulation and legislation in the health sector is in marked contrast to that of Canada and Europe. It is suggested that the degree to which regulatory mechanisms can influence private sector activity in LMC is quite low. However, there has been little work done on exploring just how, and to what extent, these regulations fail. Through the use of stakeholder interviews, this study explored the effectiveness of regulations directed at the private-for-profit sector (general practitioners, private clinics and hospitals) in Zimbabwe. The study found that there was limited and asymmetric knowledge of basic regulations among government bodies and private providers. However, there was a clear feeling that regulations are not being implemented and enforced effectively. A variety of opportunistic practices have been observed among private providers, including: practices of self-referral, where patients are sent to other services the provider has a financial interest in; over-servicing; doctor-patient collusion to collect health insurance payments; and the use of unlicensed staff in private facilities. Key factors limiting effectiveness of regulation in the health sector include the over-centralization and lack of independence of the regulatory body, the absence of legal mechanisms to control the price of care, and the lack of knowledge by patients of their rights. The study also identified a number of potential strategies for improving the current regulatory environment. For example, in order to improve monitoring, 'informal' arrangements between the centralized regulatory body and local authorities developed. There is a need to develop ways to formalize the role of these authorities. In addition, professional associations of private providers are also identified as key players through which to improve the impact of regulation among private providers. Increasing consumer access to information and knowledge is another potential way to improve information within the regulatory process as well as implementation.

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Crossref · 10.1093/heapol/15.4.368

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  • Studies in Zimbabwe, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, Korea and Saudi Arabia found strict enforcement of existing laws to be effective in containing non-prescribed antibiotic provision.

    “A number of studies conducted in Zimbabwe, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Mexico and Korea in addition to a study completed in Saudi Arabia found strict enforcement of existing laws to be effective in containing the non-prescribed antibiotics provision [61–65].”

    From No prescription? No problem: drivers of non-prescribed sale of antibiotics among community drug retail outlets in low and middle income countries: a systematic review of qualitative studies (2021) · cites this paper as [61]

    The Drugs and Allied Substances Control Act section describes controls on dispensing drugs, but reports no finding about non-prescribed antibiotics. The Factors affecting effectiveness and Conclusion sections instead examine Zimbabwean stakeholders’ views that existing regulations were not being enforced effectively; they do not test whether strict enforcement would contain non-prescribed antibiotic provision. I searched for antibiotics, non-prescribed dispensing, and strict enforcement. (LLM, conf=0.76)

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Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Asiimwe D, Lule JC. 1993. The public/private mix in financing and provision of health services in Uganda. In: Bennett S, Mills A (eds). Proceedings from the Workshop on the Public/Private Mix for Health Care in Developing Countries. Health Policy Unit Report. London: London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
  2. Bennett S, Ngalande-Banda E. 1994. Public and Private Roles in Health: A Review and Analysis of Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa. Geneva: World Health Organization.
  3. Kumaranayake L. 1997. The role of regulation: influencing private sector activity within health sector reform. Journal of Inter- national Development 9: 641.
  4. Mujinja PGM, Urassa D, Mnyika KS. 1993. The Tanzanian public/private mix in national health care. In: Bennett S, Mills A (eds). Proceedings from the Workshop on the Public/Private Mix for Health Care in Developing Countries. Health Policy Unit Report. London: London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine

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Authors
Hongoro, C.
Affiliations
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (GB)
Corresponding author
Hongoro, C.
Venue
Health Policy and Planning
Published
2000-12-01
Volume
15
Issue
4
Pages
368-377
ISSN
  • 0268-1080 (ISSN-L)
  • 1460-2237
OpenAlex
W1980587778
Cited by
98
References
7
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 6 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 3
FWCI
14.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Health Policy and Planning (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Healthcare Systems and Reforms
  • Health Sciences › Health Professions › Health Information Management › Healthcare Regulation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Occupational and Professional Licensing Regulation
Keywords
health sector regulation, regulatory effectiveness, self-referral, health insurance payment, regulatory enforcement, patient rights, professional associations, low- and middle-income countries, Zimbabwe
MeSH terms
Developing Countries, Facility Regulation and Control, Health Facilities, Proprietary, Humans, Zimbabwe, Private Sector, Health Care Sector

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