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Commentary: Should we always deliberately be non-representative?

Ebrahim, S., Davey Smith, G. · 2013 · International Journal of Epidemiology
Cited by 102

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Rothman and colleagues were invited to submit their piece to our recently established ‘Education Corner’, but on reading it we felt it merited discussion and debate.1 Those invited to comment considered that Rothman et al. had overstated their position but were basically correct.2–4 We are concerned that this notion will become accepted wisdom in epidemiology without its implications having been thought through, and feel that representativeness should neither be avoided nor uncritically embraced, but adopted (or not) according to the particular questions that are being addressed. The purpose of epidemiology is not simply to assess causal hypotheses.5 Rothman et al. elevate causal hypothesis testing to ‘a science’ and denigrate descriptive epidemiology as an applied practice and therefore ‘not science’. It is salutary to reflect that the main reason millions of dollars are poured into modelling the global burden of disease6 (GBD) is because epidemiologists neglected their responsibility to collect data on prevalence and incidence of disease from defined populations. Whatever one’s views are of the GBD initiative, it is certainly the case that evidence-based healthcare planning and policy require population-representative data. In causal studies, the fundamental concern is that lack of representativeness will introduce bias. Richiardi et al. in their commentary suggest that non-representative populations produce only weak bias in exposure-disease associations.2 Their conclusion is based on two of their own studies, one empirical and the other theoretical. Their empirical assessment compares associations of educational attainment and parity with two outcomes: low birthweight and caesarean section. They claim that non-representative internet sampling ‘does not necessarily introduce selection bias’. However, reviewing the data (Pizzi et al.'s Table 47) indicates that the non-representative sampling resulted in odds ratios that were lower for most comparisons, and the confidence intervals (CIs) of the relative difference in odds ratios between non-representative and representative sampling were consistent with effect sizes that would excite interest in many epidemiologists and result in a media frenzy. For example: ‘Any red meat you eat contributes to the risk (of death)’, claimed the lead author of a paper from the Health Professions and Nurses Health studies based on a relative risk estimate of 1.20, well within the limits of what was observed in these empirical estimates of the possible bias.8 Similar excitement was generated by a study that demonstrated a relative risk of 1.06 (95% CI 1.02–1.10) for cancer mortality in relation to a very large difference in intake of processed meat per day.9 The important point is that the distortions may be in any direction (which is unpredictable), and evidence from one empirical example does not necessarily apply to other causal questions. Richiardi et al.’s theoretical example10 uses Monte Carlo simulations to study the effects of selection into a study, claiming that the bias is small, particularly for relative risks between 0.5 and 2.0. However, they only examined scenarios where a single unmeasured determinant of the outcome also influenced the selection process, as they believe that ‘it is unlikely that multiple and independent important disease risk factors would affect the sample selection’.10 This is a surprising belief for these authors to hold, as their own empirical findings (admittedly published after this paper) show very clearly that multiple risk factors are indeed associated with participation (Table 1 in7). Why might the issue of multiple factors being associated with participation be important? Take the example of vitamin C levels and coronary heart disease (CHD) events: a large body of observational data from studies conducted at different times and places has produced a precise and repeatable estimate of an apparent benefit from higher vitamin C levels.11 But exploration of the complex confounding of the association demonstrates how multiple factors, operating across the life course, can lead to confounding strong enough to negate the apparent benefit.12–14 A large randomized controlled trial of vitamin C supplementation, in which such confounding should not arise, showed no strong evidence of any reduction in CHD events.15 A similar scenario, with conflicting results from observational and experiments, has been seen with respect to other antioxidant vitamins.16 The simple fact is that multiple factors do come together to generate sometimes sizeable non-causal associations, even after attempted statistical adjustment for confounding factors. The large American Cancer Society volunteer cohort is exactly the sort of non-representative study group that Rothman and others would consider fit for purpose—it is easy to follow up, participants are motivated to stay in the study and events are likely to be easy to count. In this volunteer cohort, high alcohol co

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Metadata

Authors
Ebrahim, S., & Davey Smith, G.
Venue
International Journal of Epidemiology
Published
2013-08-01
Volume
42
Issue
4
Pages
1022-1026
ISSN
  • 0300-5771 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-3685
OpenAlex
W2117493756
Cited by
102
References
12
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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Ebrahim, S., & Davey Smith, G. (2013). Commentary: Should we always deliberately be non-representative? International Journal of Epidemiology. https://doi.org/10.1093/ije/dyt105

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