Commentary: A structural approach to Berkson’s fallacy and a guide to a history of opinions about it
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Abstract
In 1946, the physician and statistician Joseph Berkson (1899–1982) pointed out that two diseases that are independent in the general population may become ‘spuriously associated’ in hospital-based case-control studies.1 This spurious association was later referred to, often in lively debates,2–14 as Berkson’s fallacy, Berkson’s paradox or Berkson’s bias. Some authors restricted the interpretation of Berkson’s fallacy to disease-disease associations,2,5,7,8 whereas others thought that the fallacy would also apply to exposure-disease associations in hospital-based case-control studies.10–15 In this article we use directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to describe the structure of Berkson’s fallacy, first for disease-disease associations and then for exposure-disease associations. This permits us to understand the contentious debates and strongly differing opinions about Berkson’s fallacy, and has practical implications for study design and interpretation (see Box 1). The fallacy that became eponymous for Berkson caused controversy from its initial formulation onwards. Some held that it biased all case-control studies in hospitals; others maintained that it was only pertinent for associations between prevalent diseases, and did not exist for exposure-disease associations. The DAG analyses in this paper show that Berkson’s fallacy can exist when studying exposure-disease associations, be it only in an ‘indirect’ form and in exceptional circumstances: when in a hospital-based case-control study persons with a prevalent diagnosis are enrolled who were hospitalized for another disease that is associated with this exposure. The DAG of the problem that Berkson originally described has the same structure of all biases due to conditioning on a collider, but cannot be endowed with a causal interpretation since it was formulated and worked out as a problem of the association of prevalent diseases. When using incident cases in hospital-based case-control studies, Berkson’s fallacy becomes highly unlikely for exposure-disease associations, unless there are many people who have developed two different new diseases more or less at the same time and are hospitalized for the other disease, i.e. the disease that is not the subject of the case-control study. When incident cases in a case-control study consist only of people who have been hospitalized for that disease, Berkson’s fallacy is not possible. It is likely that Berkson’s fallacy has had very limited, if any, impact on the findings of epidemiological studies. In 1946 Berkson considered the following problem.1 Suppose a hospital wants to estimate the association between the prevalences of cholecystitis (disease 1 or D1) and diabetes mellitus (disease 2 or D2). To do so, a case-control study is conducted in which hospitalized individuals are included as cases if they have diabetes and as controls if they have ophthalmological refractive errors (disease 3 or D3). The association between cholecystitis and diabetes is then estimated by comparing the prevalence of cholecystitis D1 between cases with diabetes D2 and controls with refractive errors D3. Berkson constructed his example so that, in the source population, the D1-D2 and D1-D3 associations were null and the probabilities of hospitalization for each of the three diseases were independent. Yet, the D1-D2 association was not null in hospitalized individuals. In the Appendix (available as Supplementary data at IJE online) we numerically work out the example Berkson used in his paper, and we discuss the strength and direction of the association in hospitalized individuals. Intuitively, this association arises because persons with two or more diseases have a higher probability of being hospitalized than persons with only one disease—even if these reasons are independent. In the case-control study considered by Berkson, a D1-D2 association cannot generally be endowed with a causal interpretation, even in the absence of confounding and measurement error. Berkson used prevalent cases, which may lead to selection bias,15 and disregarded the timing of D1 and D2 (e.g. diabetes could predate cholecystitis), which may lead to reverse causation bias. Because the study design does not target a causal association, we refrain from referring to the spurious association among the hospitalized as a bias. Instead, in this paper we use the term Berkson’s fallacy to refer to the wrong estimation of a prevalence difference. Most modern case-control studies attempt to use incident, rather than prevalent, cases, but there is no indication that Berkson was aware of this distinction. The use of incident cases reduces both the danger of selection bias and the potential for Berkson’s fallacy, as we explain below. Berkson’s fallacy can be visualized by the DAG presented in Figure 1a. The nodes D1, D2 and D3 represent dichotomous variables (1: yes, 0: no) for each of the diseases described above. The node H represents a dichotomous variable (1: yes, 0 no) f
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“This scenario can be represented by elaborating the arrows from D1 to H and from D2 to H so that they include, as an intermediate step, the disease-specific mechanisms of hospitalization H1 and H2, respectively (Figure 2).(15) The mechanisms H1 and H2 are independent because there are no arrows from D1 to H2 or from D…”
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“They result from conditioning on factors caused by disease and that affect diagnosis of the disease, as can be seen by the DAG in Figure 5, and can be prevented by specific design choices.(22,23) A few years earlier, in 1979, Feinstein had written that this type of bias ‘.”
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The C-Word: Scientific Euphemisms Do Not Improve Causal Inference From Observational Data
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Metadata
- Authors
- Snoep, J. D., Morabia, A., Hernández-Díaz, S., Hernán, M. A., & Vandenbroucke, J. P.
- Venue
- International Journal of Epidemiology
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2014-02-28
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 515-521
- ISSN
- 0300-5771 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3685
- OpenAlex
- W2150533355
- Cited by
- 51
- References
- 11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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