Public and private bureaucracies: a transaction cost economics perspectives
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The public bureaucracy is a puzzle. How is it that an organizational form that is so widely used is also believed to be inefficient - both in relation to a hypothetical ideal and in comparison with private bureaucracies? This article examines public bureaucracy through the lens of transaction cost economics, according to which the public bureaucracy, like other alternative modes of governance, is well suited to some transactions and poorly suited to others. Rather than proceed in a completely general way, I focus on what James Q. Wilson describes as 'sovereign transactions', of which foreign affairs is an example. I ask what it is that distinguishes sovereign transactions, after which I compare the efficacy of public and private bureaucracies for managing such transactions. I conclude that there is an efficiency place for public bureaucracy, but that all modes of governance (markets, hybrids, firms, regulation), of which public bureaucracy is one, need to be kept in their place. I further observe that public bureaucracies are not all of a kind and that differences between them need to be distinguished.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261404 · Cited by 9,352
Capitalism and Freedom: Fortieth Anniversary Edition
Friedman, M. (2002) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226264189.001.0001 · Cited by 8,225
(1938) · Virtual Defense Library (Ministerio de Defensa) · Cited by 7,145
The Use of Knowledge in Society
HAYEK, F. (1996) · Knowledge Management and Organisational Design · doi:10.1016/b978-0-7506-9749-1.50005-3 · Cited by 6,434
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
Peltzman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466865 · Cited by 4,729
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
Becker, G. S. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1886017 · Cited by 4,117
Trust: making and breaking cooperative relations
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-3664 · Cited by 4,014
Corporate culture and economic theory
Kreps, D. M. (1990) · Perspectives on Positive Political Economy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511571657.006 · Cited by 2,117
The New Economics of Organization
Moe, T. M. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110997 · Cited by 1,974 · cited 1×
“1.1 The Politics of Inefficiency Terry Moe was among the first political scientists to encourage the application of the “new economics of organization” to politics (Moe, 1984) and has been a continuing supporter of this project ever since (Moe, 1997).”
BackgroundInfluentialRATIONALITY AS PROCESS AND AS PRODUCT OF THOUGHT
Simon, H. A. (1988) · Decision Making · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511598951.005 · Cited by 1,771
The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons
Hart, O., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555448 · Cited by 1,763
Gambetta, D. (2000) · Cited by 1,666
Weingast, B. R., & Marshall, W. J. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261528 · Cited by 1,527
A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics
North, D. C. (1990) · Journal of Theoretical Politics · doi:10.1177/0951692890002004001 · Cited by 1,372
Information and Efficiency:Another Viewpoint
Demsetz, H. (1972) · Readings in Industrial Economics · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-15486-9_14 · Cited by 864
(1994) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036849 · Cited by 841
Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results
Wittman, D. (1989) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261660 · Cited by 804
An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1988) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/228945 · Cited by 774
Regulation and Administered Contracts
Goldberg, V. P. (1976) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003265 · Cited by 752
Liebowitz, S. J., & Margolis, S. E. (1990) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467198 · Cited by 731
THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT
TIROLE, J. (1994) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042114 · Cited by 685
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.74 · Cited by 555
The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective
Leitzel, J., & Dixit, A. K. (1997) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061072 · Cited by 380
Understanding the economics of QWERTY : The necessity of history
David, P. A. (1986) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 289
Agency Under Stress: The Social Security Administration in American Government
(1990) · Annals of Internal Medicine · doi:10.7326/0003-4819-113-12-1003_1 · Cited by 94
Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate
Spulber, D. F., & Besanko, D. A. (1992) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a037023 · Cited by 79
Cited by
The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead
Williamson, O. E. (2000) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.38.3.595 · Cited by 6,397
Self-citationStrategy research: governance and competence perspectives
Williamson, O. E. (1999) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199912)20:12<1087::aid-smj71>3.0.co;2-z · Cited by 1,576
Self-citationThe Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract
Williamson, O. E. (2002) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533002760278776 · Cited by 1,405
Self-citationIncentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review
Dixit, A. (2002) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/3069614 · Cited by 1,104
From New Public Management to Public Value: Paradigmatic Change and Managerial Implications
O'Flynn, J. (2007) · Australian Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8500.2007.00545.x · Cited by 1,069
Metadata
- Authors
- Williamson, O.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1999-03-01
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 306-342
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2094357075
- Cited by
- 784
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 20.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.